Concerning The Ages of the World (third manuscript, translated by professor Jason M. Wirth), this entry will consist solely in fragments of interpretations. Here goes.
A. The Past
What is the Past? Schelling: Past as Age (as is implicit in the title) which implies oldness. "Glance into the abysses of the past which are still in one [i.e. the person; not necessarily mind] just as much as the present" (4). It is a present past, or the oldness of age that exists in the present. The past is not something that disappears when the present comes to be.
Aim: describe the present past.
Place: look in a) the present, and b) in the person.
"abysses" - plural, suggests that it is more accurate to say the present pasts.
The goal is to grasp the "whole."
The desire to grasp the "whole" in a fixed, stable proposition (no matte how long or detailed it is) gives rise to the bad infinite. "A = x" alone is incapable of truth. "Movement is what is essential to knowledge. When this element of life is withdrawn, propositions die like fruit removed from the tree of life" (4) - ironic allusion to Hegel, obviously. "From this it seems evident that in true science, each proposition has only a definite and, so to speak, local meaning" (4).
- Later on, Schelling will suggest something like a scale of forms. For example: "Everything that has being of a humbler rank relates itself, when contrasted with being of a higher rank, as that which does not have being" (14).
God = Age?
What can be called the existential principle of method: "insofar as method is a kind of progression, it is clear that here method is inseperable from the being [Wesen] and, outside of this or without this, the matter is also lost" (5).
"Necessity lies at the foundation of freedom and is in God itself what is first and oldest" (5). Important point: necessity is the "oldest," it precedes freedom necessarily.
How is God also free, then, if he has necessity as his basis? "necessity refers only to God's existence as God's own existence. ... [I]n creation, God overcomes the necessity of its nature through freedom and it is freedom that comes above necessity not necessity that comes above freedom" (5). Creation is the key. But then this is not creation ex nihilo: This latter concept is an error based on a "simple grammatical misunderstanding" (14) and can be overcome by distinctions found even in ancient Greek philosophy.
Key passage: "What is necessary in God we call the nature of God. Its relationship to freedom is similar (but not identical) to the relationship that the Scriptures teach is between the natural and the spiritual life of the person" (5). There is an analogy between God and the person. And since the aim was to find the "whole" in the person as the present past(s), by analogy (in the same sense that Plato took the polis to be the analogy of the soul?) the place to look becomes God Himself. An even more interesting claim (although not yet substantiated or justified): "What is understood here by "natural" is not simply the by and large "physical," that is, the coporeal. The soul and the spirit, as well as the body, if not born again, that is, elevated to a different and higher life, belong to the "natural" (5). Nature and mind are not distinguished in the same way as physics is distinguished from psychology.
Being = dislocation (6). It is "ipseity [Seinheit], particularity" (6).
The privation of being (or the mere potential to be) calls for, or necessitates, the Ego (which is not being, but rather "that which has being but does not have being").
God has both forces - the "outpouring" of Being, as well as the "retreat" that is the not-having-being, or the Ego. This is an "eternal antithesis" (6).
What the hell does Schelling mean by "not having being"? - "A = B" is a judgment. But A is A without being B. Therefore, A and B are distinct, and so they are not necessarily bound. They are mediated by a third, an "x." So the expression ought to be "A =x" and B = x" therefore "A = B." The "x" is Being [Seyn]. "A" and "B" take turns "having being" [seyend seyn]. The "x" emerges out of the conflict between A and B, as that which makes the conflict possible, as unity. Not having being means that a Being is not "that which has being."
Did Schelling just treat "being" as a property?
There is a further tension between the "A = B" antithesis and the "x" which is the unity of the two. In so far as "A =x = B" is considered as a unity, as "x," it is again different from that state of tension in which A and B are fighting in order to "have Being." Therefore, there is an antithesis between the tension and unity, between "A = B" and "x."
An Age is defined by its relation to the above mentioned primordial antithesis.
Infinity does not equal to perfection (7).
Principle of Intensification: "it is conceded that of that which has been opposed [A = B], if they indeed become one, only one of them would be active and the other would be passive. But, enabled by the equivalence of both, it follows that if one is passive, then the other must so also, and, likewise, if one is active, then, absolutely, the other must also be active. But this is impossible in one and the same unity. Here each can only be either active or passive. Hence, it only follows from that necessity that the one unity decomposes into two unities, the simple antithesis (that we may designate as A and B) intensifies itself into that which has been doubled" (9). Clearly needs to be unpacked and elaborated in detail.
The abstractness of Schelling's idiom suggests that he is trying to purify what he calls the "whole" of its temporally acquired particularities. No example can contribute to the discussion, save perhaps some quotations from the Scriptures or the general inklings towards abstract ideas expressed in various esoteric texts.
Why this abstractness? One way to interpret this is that Schelling's ontology is the same as Hegel's and Collingwood's, that there are three things which are fused into one unity. The first is "abstract entities." The second is "nature." The third is "mind." These are not exact definitions or names, but what each term suggests ought to give a general idea of their respective differences. It is interesting that God, as the "whole," is posited as neither nature alone nor mind alone. God is that which permeates nature and mind, and has to, by necessity, "create" these two realities out of itself. In this sense, while God, or abstract entities, enjoy being the basis of all reality, it is at the same time the most impoverished form of reality which desires to be supplemented by nature and mind.
It is quite challenging to sketch and then elaborate on a system of such "abstract entities" while also keeping a check on one's own methods and procedures in order to prevent from falling into a pre-critical, aesthetic mind-set.
Especially because this work is only a manuscript, Schelling does a bad job articulating himself. It is remarkable that, upon a close and careful reading, he is nonetheless consistent throughout the text.
The distinction between "Being" and "having being" is crucial. It opens up an interesting possibility of treating concepts and categories not only as mental or subjective properties but rather as the very architecture of the world. Also, the idea that an Age just is a certain relationship to the "antithesis" (the A = x = B) seems promising.
A. The Past
What is the Past? Schelling: Past as Age (as is implicit in the title) which implies oldness. "Glance into the abysses of the past which are still in one [i.e. the person; not necessarily mind] just as much as the present" (4). It is a present past, or the oldness of age that exists in the present. The past is not something that disappears when the present comes to be.
Aim: describe the present past.
Place: look in a) the present, and b) in the person.
"abysses" - plural, suggests that it is more accurate to say the present pasts.
The goal is to grasp the "whole."
The desire to grasp the "whole" in a fixed, stable proposition (no matte how long or detailed it is) gives rise to the bad infinite. "A = x" alone is incapable of truth. "Movement is what is essential to knowledge. When this element of life is withdrawn, propositions die like fruit removed from the tree of life" (4) - ironic allusion to Hegel, obviously. "From this it seems evident that in true science, each proposition has only a definite and, so to speak, local meaning" (4).
- Later on, Schelling will suggest something like a scale of forms. For example: "Everything that has being of a humbler rank relates itself, when contrasted with being of a higher rank, as that which does not have being" (14).
God = Age?
What can be called the existential principle of method: "insofar as method is a kind of progression, it is clear that here method is inseperable from the being [Wesen] and, outside of this or without this, the matter is also lost" (5).
"Necessity lies at the foundation of freedom and is in God itself what is first and oldest" (5). Important point: necessity is the "oldest," it precedes freedom necessarily.
How is God also free, then, if he has necessity as his basis? "necessity refers only to God's existence as God's own existence. ... [I]n creation, God overcomes the necessity of its nature through freedom and it is freedom that comes above necessity not necessity that comes above freedom" (5). Creation is the key. But then this is not creation ex nihilo: This latter concept is an error based on a "simple grammatical misunderstanding" (14) and can be overcome by distinctions found even in ancient Greek philosophy.
Key passage: "What is necessary in God we call the nature of God. Its relationship to freedom is similar (but not identical) to the relationship that the Scriptures teach is between the natural and the spiritual life of the person" (5). There is an analogy between God and the person. And since the aim was to find the "whole" in the person as the present past(s), by analogy (in the same sense that Plato took the polis to be the analogy of the soul?) the place to look becomes God Himself. An even more interesting claim (although not yet substantiated or justified): "What is understood here by "natural" is not simply the by and large "physical," that is, the coporeal. The soul and the spirit, as well as the body, if not born again, that is, elevated to a different and higher life, belong to the "natural" (5). Nature and mind are not distinguished in the same way as physics is distinguished from psychology.
Being = dislocation (6). It is "ipseity [Seinheit], particularity" (6).
The privation of being (or the mere potential to be) calls for, or necessitates, the Ego (which is not being, but rather "that which has being but does not have being").
God has both forces - the "outpouring" of Being, as well as the "retreat" that is the not-having-being, or the Ego. This is an "eternal antithesis" (6).
What the hell does Schelling mean by "not having being"? - "A = B" is a judgment. But A is A without being B. Therefore, A and B are distinct, and so they are not necessarily bound. They are mediated by a third, an "x." So the expression ought to be "A =x" and B = x" therefore "A = B." The "x" is Being [Seyn]. "A" and "B" take turns "having being" [seyend seyn]. The "x" emerges out of the conflict between A and B, as that which makes the conflict possible, as unity. Not having being means that a Being is not "that which has being."
Did Schelling just treat "being" as a property?
There is a further tension between the "A = B" antithesis and the "x" which is the unity of the two. In so far as "A =x = B" is considered as a unity, as "x," it is again different from that state of tension in which A and B are fighting in order to "have Being." Therefore, there is an antithesis between the tension and unity, between "A = B" and "x."
An Age is defined by its relation to the above mentioned primordial antithesis.
Infinity does not equal to perfection (7).
Principle of Intensification: "it is conceded that of that which has been opposed [A = B], if they indeed become one, only one of them would be active and the other would be passive. But, enabled by the equivalence of both, it follows that if one is passive, then the other must so also, and, likewise, if one is active, then, absolutely, the other must also be active. But this is impossible in one and the same unity. Here each can only be either active or passive. Hence, it only follows from that necessity that the one unity decomposes into two unities, the simple antithesis (that we may designate as A and B) intensifies itself into that which has been doubled" (9). Clearly needs to be unpacked and elaborated in detail.
The abstractness of Schelling's idiom suggests that he is trying to purify what he calls the "whole" of its temporally acquired particularities. No example can contribute to the discussion, save perhaps some quotations from the Scriptures or the general inklings towards abstract ideas expressed in various esoteric texts.
Why this abstractness? One way to interpret this is that Schelling's ontology is the same as Hegel's and Collingwood's, that there are three things which are fused into one unity. The first is "abstract entities." The second is "nature." The third is "mind." These are not exact definitions or names, but what each term suggests ought to give a general idea of their respective differences. It is interesting that God, as the "whole," is posited as neither nature alone nor mind alone. God is that which permeates nature and mind, and has to, by necessity, "create" these two realities out of itself. In this sense, while God, or abstract entities, enjoy being the basis of all reality, it is at the same time the most impoverished form of reality which desires to be supplemented by nature and mind.
It is quite challenging to sketch and then elaborate on a system of such "abstract entities" while also keeping a check on one's own methods and procedures in order to prevent from falling into a pre-critical, aesthetic mind-set.
Especially because this work is only a manuscript, Schelling does a bad job articulating himself. It is remarkable that, upon a close and careful reading, he is nonetheless consistent throughout the text.
The distinction between "Being" and "having being" is crucial. It opens up an interesting possibility of treating concepts and categories not only as mental or subjective properties but rather as the very architecture of the world. Also, the idea that an Age just is a certain relationship to the "antithesis" (the A = x = B) seems promising.
