Why the Absolute Idea Needs to Discharge Itself to Nature

The unity of the theoretical and practical idea leads into an immediacy. Here, what is given overlaps totally with what has become. Here is where the "absolute idea" comes on the scene. The "absolute idea" is the name for the point where logic transitions into nature.

What is Hegel's definition of nature?

The idea, namely, in positing itself as the absolute unity of the pure concept and its reality and thus collecting itself in the immediacy of being, is in this form a totality -- nature. (12.253)

Nature is here defined as the idea as (1) immediate, yet (2) totality. The idea remains self-identical totality even when it "freely discharges" itself in nature.

On account of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is just as absolutely free: the externality of space and time absolutely existing for itself without subjectivity. (12.253)

The definition here put forth can be clarified with reference to Schelling's concept of nature in his First Outline for a Philosophy of Nature and Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method. For Schelling, the problem to be solved with the philosophy of nature is not how movement or change is caused in nature, but rather why there is a product at all. The unconditioned is as such totality for Schelling, and there is no necessity in this totality to crystallize into a "product," this finite, perishable natural thing. Hegel agrees with Schelling on this point. For both, nature is a product, a representation of a certain failure of the absolute idea to fully become itself. The question becomes how and in what sense the absolute idea distinguishes nature, or space and time, from itself. If the absolute idea is the totality of all logical determinations, how could nature escape this totality? How could a category be posited by the absolute idea yet elude its grasp?

In order to answer this question, I now turn to Collingwood. For Collingwood, in a philosophical concept, the species of a genus overlap in the genus' realization. For example, if the category of the "whole" is the truth of the category of the "part," this does not merely mean that whole and part are two distinct categories, but it also means that the whole is the unity of whole and part, and vice versa. This overlapping is not an arbitrary feature introduced by Collingwood's caprice. It is rather deeply engrained in the very thing called thought, and is deduced rigorously by the opening chapters on being and nothing in the Science of Logic.

In the absolute idea, the logic returns to its beginning, but the return tries to leave behind a totality of all categories. However, in so far as in pure logic all categories overlap with each other, the beginning as such already contains the totality of categories. Therefore, according to the logic's own logic, or according to the very fundamental feature of thought that is deduced from the first beginning of logic, logic cannot simply return to its first beginning. Nature is posited as the totality of categories which do not overlap. Natural categories are posited in space and time, are unified in space and time, and as such do not overlap, are wholly external to each other. It is in this sense that nature is free from pure logic. Yet the categorical determinations in nature are "discharged" from the absolute idea's failure to return to its beginning. It is this failure that links pure logic to nature and necessitates the transition from the former to the latter.

As with all other key claims made in the Science of Logic, the transition to nature is not an ad hoc inference which is supported merely by the historical fact that in 19th century Germany there was such a thing as the idea of nature. Rather, nature is here deduced, and the meaning of the term "nature" is strictly defined and determined as the field of pure externality where the absolute idea "freely discharges" its logical determinations or categories.

Some Hegel scholars have argued that the Science of Logic already implicitly contains all the "logical structures" of nature and spirit. On this interpretation, these scholars have tried to demonstrate how the Science of Logic already has a certain "spatial" or "temporal" structure. I think that this line of interpretation is wrong in light of the above considerations on the definition of nature. The "structure" of nature is that it is a wholly new beginning which only emerges as a result of the absolute idea or pure logic failing to negate the feature of overlap amongst its categories. In one sense, since these categories are nonetheless "discharged," it is partly true to claim that pure logic makes some contribution to the organization of nature. Yet spatial and temporal order is not determined or organized at all in pure logic, precisely because space and time are the first marks of nature's absolute independence from the overlapping character of the categories of pure logic. Moreover, the aforementioned interpretation also misses the much less subtle point that, if pure logic can by itself deduce spatial and temporal structures within itself, then there is no necessity for it to posit nature or spirit - and if there is no necessity, there is no freedom, according to the familiar formula.

There is much more to be said about this solution to the final riddle in the Science of Logic, but for now, this is good enough.

The Reception of Hegel's Science of Logic in Japan

The reception of Hegel's Science of Logic in Japan is problematic, to say the least. Hiroshi Hasegawa's brilliant translations constitute the only beacon of hope.

The secondary literature contains many basic misreadings. For instance, Takehito Tatetchi's The System of Hegel's Science of Logic claims that the "being" which begins the Logic already contains all possible determinations and categories in principle. Tatechi also claims that the real starting point of the Logic is not being but essence, and the reason is because essence grounds being, and so the ground must come before the grounded. Here, Tatechi's work confuses the order of categories with the order of their deduction. In the order of the categories, essence is more basic than being, because essence is the truth of being. That is to say, the categories of being cannot "be" without positing itself against itself -- which sounds like nonsense on its own, but the job of secondary literature, especially the expository ones like Takeuchi's work, is to elucidate this thought. The order of knowledge in the logic begins with being, and for very good reasons.

Other books make false assertions as if they were facts accepted among scholars. For example, Hegel's Science of Logic: A Conversation written by Zenichi Ebisawa opens with the remark that "The Science of Logic is a work of metaphysics, that is to say, ontology." Wrong! Metaphysics is not ontology. Yet Ebisawa quickly equates the Logic with the "science of being." The book is presented as a conversation between a teacher and a student, and the student is constantly perplexed as to how one could make inferences about being. The student's intuition is on the right track, because there is no such thing as a science of being.

Another false assertion made by the teacher character in Ebisawa's book is that "Hegel prides himself to be the one who first discovered the method of dialectics." Wrong again! Hegel clearly states in the Introduction that in modern philosophy it was Kant who raised dialectics to its proper significance in philosophy. It is crucial to see that what Hegel is doing is not something alien to the rest of the philosophical tradition but rather is its most classical example. The idea of "Hegelian dialectics" is misleading, as if one should become a die-hard Hegelian in order to write anything in the way of dialectical logic.

The mess is discernible in the translations of Hegel's works, too. For example, "Sein" is translated as either 有 or 存在. Accordingly, the Doctrine of Being (Seinslehre) is translated as either 有の論, 有論, 存在論, or 存在の論. The problem is not so much the variation as the clumsy expressions that dominate the entire work. In general, trying to force all philosophical thoughts into noun-phrases is a bad idea, but that is unfortunately the norm in Hegel translation. I would argue that ある is the best translation for Sein, ない for Nichts, and なる for Werden, just because these hiragana expressions are much more familiar in everyday Japanese compared to 有, 無, and 成. One of the most important outcomes of studying philosophy should be that one uses one's everyday expressions in a different, self-conscious, true way. Hasegawa does an amazing job at allowing precisely this to happen. Other translations, not as much.

The reception (or non-reception) of The Science of Logic amongst Japanese philosophers fairs no better. All the stereotypes of Hegel appear in the writings of many well-known Japanese thinkers. The most popular stereotype is that for Hegel, history develops according to divine providence. The Absolute Idea pulls the strings of history and the cunning of reason uses the individuals to achieve some one divine plan. This is a gross misreading of the Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Another popular stereotype is that Hegel's Science of Logic somehow contains the germ for all forms of existence in the natural and spiritual worlds. Therefore, by simply studying the logic, one is supposed to learn everything that is needed in order to "deduce" nature and spirit from the Absolute Idea.

There are also scholars who present their ideas as somehow "overcoming" Hegel, and yet do not realize that what they are overcoming is a caricature of what is in fact written in Hegel's texts, and that what they present as original is a fragment of what is already found in Hegel or even in Kant. Such misunderstandings and false overcomings can be found in Nishida, Tanabe, and others. The claim that "absolute nothingness" is the basis of all existence, for example, is nothing new.

There are many reasons for being upset with this (non)reception of Hegel in Japan. For one thing, it discourages students from taking the great idealist's writings seriously. For another, it makes it difficult for prospective scholars to do research in certain areas. It is telling that Hiroshi Hasegawa, possibly the only good contributor to the study of Hegel's writings in Japan, works outside academia, that is, is not hired by a university.

Much of the problem seems to lie in the desire to look like one is saying something original. Therefore, it is tempting to try and coin new terms or distort the history of philosophy. The temptation is especially strong if one realizes that one can get away with it in Japan. I do not know whether this is a uniquely Japanese problem or is part of a wider tendency in the world. In any case, someone like Hasegawa, who translates not because he wants to rise above others in some academic competition, but rather because he simply finds it worthwhile both for himself as well as for others, still exists. Others should follow his lead.

性差別は根強い

『カタコトのうわごと』所収の作品の一つの中でだったと思うが、多和田葉子が日本の文芸批評界について、女性の文芸批評家がいないという「グロテスク」な状況だ、と述べていた。音楽の世界でも、最近Vulnicuraを発表したビョークがPitchforkとのインタビューにおいてこう述べている。

I want to support young girls who are in their 20s now and tell them: You’re not just imagining things. It’s tough. Everything that a guy says once, you have to say five times. Girls now are also faced with different problems. I’ve been guilty of one thing: After being the only girl in bands for 10 years, I learned—the hard way—that if I was going to get my ideas through, I was going to have to pretend that they—men—had the ideas.

今２０代の女性たちに対して、私は次のように言って励ましたいです―「あなたたちの感じていることは妄想では決してありません」と。男性ならば一回言えば通ることを、女性は五回繰り返さなければいけないのです。それに、今の女性たちは別の困難にも直面しています。私にも罪はあります。というのも、色々なバンドで１０年も紅一点でいた後、私はあることを―必要以上の苦労を通して―学びました。もし自分の考えを通したい場合は、あたかもかれらが―つまり男性たちが―その考えを持っているかのようなふりをしなければいけなかったのです。

性差別は国や業種を問わずまだまだ根深い問題だ。

誰かの人格を思い浮かべるときに、性別という要素は意識的にはそこに含まれていないだろう。しかし、全く性別を意識していないのは逆に問題である。

それはちょうど、「私は人種に関係なく誰とでも友達になります」と言う人に限ってものすごいレイシストであるような意味で。

女や男というステレオタイプは存在する。そして、それらは無意識のうちにかなりのところまで私たちの欲望を形成している。

生物学的な性別に対する差別と、人格の一部としての性別に対する差別とが存在する。どちらも多様な効果を生みだす。性差別の問題が最も切実にかつ最も複雑に出現するのは家族関係においてだろう。しかし、あらゆる人間関係において、性差別はまだまだ存在する。

性差別はもう存在しない、という意識を持っている人が一番差別者である可能性が高い、と書いた。こういう意識の持ち主は、性差別批判を口にする人と会うと、「なぜこの人はありもしない問題についてこんなに真剣に話すのだろうか」とか、「この人はいもしない敵と闘っていて滑稽だ」などと思うのだろう。そして、「この人さえ静かにしていれば、何も問題ないはずなのに、なぜこの人は自分から問題を起こそうとしているのか」とさえ思うかもしれない。

性差別は存在し、それは普遍的な面を持っている。つまり、それは個々人の心の持ちようの問題にはおさまらない。それは公共の場で行われる発言や決定などに潜在している。

Hannah Arendt and Anna Karenina

Amazing final scene from the film Hannah Arendt:

Heidegger is portrayed as the "fox" that Arendt thought he was in one of her journal entries. "Moral judgements" would perhaps be the single term that is utterly absent from Heidegger's works. This absence is all the more striking after listening to the Arendt character speak in the above clip. "Heidegger the Fox" is an eye-opener. And the film is extremely moving. It is amazing how the film portrays the intensity of Arendt's inner struggle in a visual way. Her English is beautiful, and her way of speaking German too.

Anna Karenina is a film which makes you want to talk about it so badly right after you've seen it.

Anna and Arendt form an interesting contrast. I sympathize immensely with Arendt. She is not jealous, yet she is not forgiving either. Forgiveness was the major mistake both Karenin and Vronsky made with respect to Anna. Anna did not destroy herself. Rather, she was destroyed because men forgave her. She was perhaps too perfect, and that perhaps explains why men were unable to demand anything of her. If somebody demanded her of something, if a Levin came along and told her to work with him in the fields, then Anna would have been transformed. Tolstoy's genius is to make a character like Karenin in order to bring out the extreme folly of forgiveness. I liked the ending of the film better than the novel; perhaps Tolstoy is a little too indulgent in his caricaturing of Karenin's character. His saintliness is disgusting, yes, but after his fall from society, perhaps he could have been given the chance of rebirth as well?

If Heinrich were actually cheating on Arendt, it still would not have mattered for her. This silent resolve is much superior to what de Beauvoir and Sartre had to perform in order to push the boundaries of the concept of love.

The side of Arendt as a Kantian also comes out very sharply in the film. The evil of Eichmann is not radical, because it is not based on the purity of Eichmann's will. The evil is rather based on particular interests, the "private use of reason," and so anybody would have replaced Eichmann and have done the same.

Nothing much in the way of drama or effects takes place in Hannah Arendt. Compared to this, Anna Karenina is restless. The train to Moscow is a toy train, then zoom! and Anna is sitting inside. The pace of the film is very fast and everything is so artificial, but then it is good because it brings out the artificiality of Tolstoy's characters. The film suggests strongly that the whole novel is anti-realist, at least on the surface. Which makes the novel even more interesting. It is no use trying to criticize Anna or Karenin or Vronsky or Oblonsky. In every human soul there is an Anna, a Vronsky, a Karenin, and so on. But the story does not suggest that therefore some kind of balance between them is possible. In the real world, or the world of Anna Karenina, a particular part of the soul does dominate and prevent the others from coming to the surface. Levin must win.

Another interesting contrast is that whereas Anna Karenina is a family story, Hanna Arendt is an anti-family film. If Arendt had a baby with Heidegger and another with Heinrich, things would have been totally different. Because she is a woman but not a mother, Arendt is able to sustain herself. In a way the film only evades the question of the family, but on the other hand, for those who are not Ekaterinas and Levins, perhaps this is the wiser path, rather than becoming an Oblonsky or a Karenin.

翻訳者の役目―アリストテレス『魂について』中畑氏の訳文から

中畑正志氏が翻訳したアリストテレス『魂について』を読んだ。哲学の翻訳について日々考え関わるうちに深まる思いがある。それは、哲学を和訳するということは、一からその作品を書き直すことにも等しいという思い。中畑氏はあとがきで次のように述べている。

翻訳にあたっては、平明さというより以前に、アリストテレスの文章がともかく一応筋がとおり意味をなすような訳文を作ることを第一に心がけた。したがって当然、訳者自身の判断で言葉をかなり補い、また説明のための註も量が多くなっている。

また、次のようにも。

アリストテレスの主要な概念については訳語がかなりの程度固定しているために、まったく別の訳語の創出には逡巡したというのが正直なところである。結果的には、従来のアリストテレスの邦訳の拘束を免れることができず、いくつかの基本的語彙については訳語を補うなどの見苦しい工夫をしなければならなかった。アリストテレスの基本的概念の訳語については全般的な再考と改訂の必要があるが、それは別の機会を期すしかない。

従来の訳語の見直しを部分的に行うために行う工夫は「見苦しい」―たしかにその通り、と深く納得した。また、訳文作りの作業を、「ともかく一応筋がとおり意味をなすような訳文を作ること」を最優先して進める姿勢も深く共感する。（「共感」という言葉が安易に使われている昨今ではあまりこの言葉は好きではないのだが、ここではこうとしか言いようがないので仕方ない。）

哲学は西洋発祥の学問なので、それを日本語のような言語で行うためにはどうしても言語自体を大きく捻じ曲げていく必要が出てくる。その結果、日本語が「見苦しい」ものになってしまうことはある程度は避けられない。 ある程度は。訳者によって、何をどの程度まで「見苦しい」と感じるかが異なる。私見だが、日常語や日常感覚―それは「俗語」とははっきり区別されるもので、一種の美学すらも備えているような言語・感覚であり、それは詩人や小説家の積極的な興味の対象に常になっているようなもののことである―に可能な限り接近しようとしている訳者ほど、哲学の和文もまた優れたものになっていると思う。中畑氏の訳文は、読みやすいのみならず、表現されている思想が、実際に日本にも存在しているのだという気持ちにさせてくれる。あたかも、日本には昔アリストテレスのような人がいて、今はもう証拠となるものは何も残されていないが、かつては弟子たちも持っていてアリストテレスのような哲学を説いたこともあるのだ、などという空想すらさせてくれるような訳文だ。なかったはずのもの、現になかったものを、それがあったかのように錯覚させ、むしろそれがなければおかしいとすら思わせる訳文―中畑氏の訳文はそんな訳文だ。

同じことは、長谷川宏氏や中山元氏、田中美知太郎氏、木田元氏の訳文についてもいえる。

アリストテレスは18歳のときに初めて読もうとした。プラトンの作品群をひととおり読み終えた後だった。プラトン全集の田中美知太郎氏の訳文で、全く異国性や別時代性を感じさせない、じかに迫り来る文章だったことを覚えている。その後、岩波文庫から出ている対話篇を読んだときも、私は田中氏の訳文の余韻のおかげで、ややまわりくどい訳文となってしまっている作品も一気に読み進めることができたように思う。そして、私は哲学対話の活力に満ちていて、アリストテレスとはプラトンの後で一体どんなことをいうことができたんだろう、と興味に満ちていた。しかし、『形而上学』の日本語テキストと向き合ってみると、とにかく意味がわからず、1ページも読めずに挫折した。アリストテレスの場合、田中氏の訳文のような書き手に出会っていなかったので、出発点となる作品と出会えず、結局英語訳のものを後日読んだのだが、日本語では作品に触れられずにいた。

ふと先日、駅での忘れ物を売っているバザーをみていたら、『魂について』が350円で売られていた。こんな短い作品なのになぜこんなに分厚い本になっているんだろうと不思議に思い、興味本位で買ってみたのだが、中を読んでみて、新たなすばらしい訳者さんに出会うことができた。これのおかげで、他のアリストテレス作品の和訳にも入り込んでいけそうな気持ちになった。

西田幾多郎や田邊元の作品群、三木清や中沢新一、広松渉の書いた本などを読んでみると、やたら見慣れない言葉が連発されており、内容も一体どうやってカントやヘーゲルを「超えた」り「完成」したりしているのかが全く不明確なままだ、という印象しか受けない。『フィロソフィア・ヤポニカ』などには、西田が田邊を「子どもがいないから情愛がわからない」という風に批判した、などということが取り上げられ、そうではない、田邊は愛の哲学者だった、という議論が載っている。馬鹿馬鹿しいとしか思えないが、こういうレベルの論争ばかりが矢継ぎ早に出てくる。決め付けを決め付けと思わずにすらすらと造語を並べ立てていく書き手たち。例えば、「絶対無」とヘーゲルの「無」はどう異なるのか、といった基本的な点すら、説得力のある説明が与えられない。

和辻哲郎、鶴見俊輔などの書いたものの方がまだ「読める」が、そうはいっても、かれらはあくまで歴史家・民族学者であって、哲学者ではない。それはかれらの仕事への批判ではなく、ただ、かれらの仕事は日本語の哲学への貢献ではないということだ。『鎖国』や『日本精神史研究』は史実を一貫した物語へとまとめてくれていて読んでいて大変面白いし、文体も淡々としていて明るい。

長谷川三千子氏の『日本語の哲学へ』には、日本語で哲学をする上で「こと」と「もの」が持ちうる意味などを考察していて、断片的ながら面白い。ただ、やはりヘーゲルにうまく入り込めていない。日本語にこだわりすぎている。そもそも、日本語は完成した実質や体系などではなく、むしろ日本語はそれを使う人の言いたいことを柔軟に表現するために変容していく。私の偏見かもしれないが、英語よりも日本語の方がそうした変容がしやすいように感じる。それがために、せっかく定着しそうだった哲学訳語が日常語の変化に取り残されてしまい一新を要するようになってしまうことも事実だ。

例えば、「ある」と「いる」のちがいとか、「もの」と「こと」のちがいなどというところからは、哲学の議論は始まらない。また、「ある」「有」「存在」などの品詞の歴史や和訳の苦労の歴史も、哲学の議論の出発点にはなりえない。デリダを読んでいる人には怒られそうな話だが、結局、哲学は今を出発点とするしかないのだと思う。ヘーゲルの「純有」「純無」という言葉に縛られているとすれば、それは言葉の影響力というよりは、それが表現しているカテゴリーの力と言った方が良い。西洋哲学が日本に紹介されてすでに一世紀以上が経つが、まだ西洋のカテゴリーの消化や哲学議論の出発は到底日本語には定着していないように思える。翻訳者は、そうした消化や出発の手助けをするものなのだと思い込んでいたが、案外その担い手にならざるをえないのかもしれない。

The Question of the Beginning and of Being in Pure Philosophy

The beginning of pure philosophy, i.e. of pure logic, is the subject-matter of the first question of philosophy. On this question, David Gray Carlson writes the following in his "The Antepenultimacy in Hegel's Science of Logic":

Pure being and nothing is never before us as a thought because it is unthinkable. It is a failed thought. It is retroactively theorized only. And in support of this interpretation, it may be noted that Hegel states that pure being and pure nothing "have no separate subsistence of their own but are only in becoming."

Hegel states that the beginning can be either mediated or unmediated -- but either way of beginning is refuted in advance. In other words, the beginning must fail. If it did not, then there would be no possibility of progress beyond the beginning. "Hence the advance is not a kind of superfluity; this it would be if that with which the beginning is made were in truth already the absolute." In short, it is the very nature of a beginning that it must fail; otherwise it would be result-not beginning.

[P]ure being and pure nothing are not even moments. Rather, they are retrospective reflections on what must have been.

[B]eing and nothing are unthinkable. As we cannot think them, there is little use in observing that they do not imply becoming.

How does becoming emerge from pure being? It does not emerge at all. Becoming is absolute knowing itself, as it stands back from its own failed proposition, learning from its failure that when it tries to think an immediate thought, it ceases to be in that thought and is alienated from its product.

On the same issue, Hegel writes in the third Remark in the Being chapter of the Science of Logic:

[N]owhere on heaven or on earth is there anything which does not contain both being and nothing in itself. ... All further logical determinations ... (existence, quality, and in general all the concepts of philosophy) are therefore examples of this unity.

These passages resonate with a related idea of Collingwood's in An Essay on Metaphysics:

An ordinary science is the science of some definite subject-matter, having special problems of its own that arise out of the special peculiarities of the subject-matter, and special methods of its own that arise out of the special problems; whereas the 'science of pure being' has a subject-matter which is not a something but a nothing, a subject-matter which has no special peculiarities and therefore gives rise to no special problems and no special methods. This is only a roundabout way of saying that there can be no such science. There is not even a quasi-science of pure being: not even a thing which in certain ways resembles an ordinary science and in certain ways differs from it, such as a collection of statements that are not certain but only probable, connected together in ways that are not convincing but suggestive. There is no even a pseudo-science of pure being: not even a collection of what seem to be statements but are in fact only the record of guesses, intellectual gropings or emotional reactions that take place within us when we confront an object we do not understand.

This is a more than twice-told tale. ... It is all implied in what Hegel said when he expanded that phrase of Kant's into the more explicit statement that pure being is the same as nothing. I quote these precedents ... because I wish to remind [the reader] that what has been said [here] is nothing new, but has been a commonplace for over two hundred years.

I propose to call the science of pure being, when I want a one-word name for it, ontology. ... Ontology will be my name for a mistake which people have made, Aristotle first and foremost, about metaphysics.

Collingwood also writes in his lecture manuscript "The Nature of Metaphysical Study":

Just as the idea of pure being cannot be grasped in its bare abstraction, without allowing it to sprout determinations out of itself like nothing and becoming, so the idea of metaphysics in general cannot be grasped in abstraction by a purely formal definition, unless we will allow this abstract idea to sprout determinations of its own in the shape of particular metaphysical problems and doctrines. These are not mere instances of metaphysical inquiry ... [but] are universal and permanent problems and theorems of all metaphysical thought, and you will find that all metaphysicians have at all times and in all places concerned themselves with these ideas, the ideas of being, of nothing, and of becoming, as problems arising necessarily out of the very nature of metaphysical thought.

... I have tried to expound the idea of metaphysical inquiry as an inquiry always concerned with the same fundamental problems: being, nothing, becoming, and of course others necessarily arising out of these and their interrelation.

Even Heidegger, the great exponent of "ontology," admits the same point with regard to the problem of thinking pure being. He writes in Division II of Being and Time:

The existential interpretation of the historicity of Dasein constantly gets caught up unexpectedly in shadows. The obscurities are all the more difficult to dispel when the possible dimensions of appropriate questioning are not disentangled and when everything is haunted by the enigma of being [emphasis is in the original text] and, as has now become clear, of movement. Nevertheless, we may venture an outline of the ontological genesis of historiography as a science in terms of the historicity of Dasein. It should serve as a preparation for the clarification for the task of a historical destruction [Destruktion] of the history of philosophy to be carried out in what follows.

Heidegger admits the "obscurities" which arise out of the "enigma of being," and he does not go any further here in clearing such obscurities. With the apologetic word "Nevertheless," Heidegger, in his characteristic style, pushes on with his "destruction" -- and here it is important to connect this to Derrida's deconstruction as well, and to read the method of deconstruction as one of inheriting this Heideggerian attitude towards the "enigma of being." However, being may perhaps appear enigmatic to us because it is also enigmatic in itself; there is nothing to think about in pure being. To call this nothingness an "enigma" seems to be an act of investment, of positing determinations into this nothingness in order to later make them "explicit." If being is confronted with in its pure simplicity, and if nothing is what one encounters as a result, then this result should be taken literally and at face value. This is the way to dispel the enigma of being. Otherwise, metaphysics becomes hermeneutical in the bad sense of the term, and philosophy becomes aesthetic philosophy, a philosophy based on feeling and on free play, fueled with the rhetoric of investment and explication; a mere "love of knowledge," not actual knowledge.

In An Essay on Metaphysics, Collingwood calls for a "metaphysics without ontology," and this seems to be exactly what Kant and Hegel are trying to do in their Critique of Pure Reason and Science of Logic. The name for this metaphysics may also be transcendental philosophy, critique, logic, pure logic, and so on.

The reason why metaphysics is so deeply concerned with its starting-point or beginning, and the reason why it always comes back to the idea of pure being and, in its failure to think this idea on its own, "sprouts" the determinations of its own thinking -- the reason for this is, namely, that philosophy is interested in what is, or in what is categorically true. This is why (1) philosophy cannot begin from ready-made presuppositions, and (2) philosophy first turns to the question of the meaning of being. Ready-made presuppositions still contain a categorical element, and the meaning of being cannot be stated plainly or once and for all. Metaphysics disentangles the categorical element from such pre-suppositions and shows in what way one can and does state the meaning of being.

「直接性」をどう訳すか

『精神の鏡』の和訳は、『哲学の方法について』の和訳よりも一層自然に読めるものにしたい。『哲学の方法について』でも、わかりやすいように、自然なようにと心がけて和訳をしたのだが、結局まずは何よりも正確さが大切になる。そういう事情もあり、また自分自身の未経験・未熟もあり、『哲学の方法について』は改善の余地が多分にある作品となってしまった。それでも、これにあと1，2年かけるよりも、『精神の鏡』へと進んだ方が、数少ない読者にとっても、私自身にとっても生産的であろうと判断した。読みやすさとは何だろうと、いついかなるときも悩んでいる。寝ているときも、脳内の一部は起きていて、自動的に悩みが継続されているような錯覚にさえ陥る。

たまたま今目の前にある『精神の鏡』の190ページからの一節を取り上げる。

This immediacy is not identical with the immediacy of religious vision; it is not faith; for the religious immediacy is the genuine immediacy of imagination; the immediacy of science is the false immediacy of thought, which is trying not to be immediate, so that its immediacy is the mark of its failure. Science feels that it ought to be able to justify its assumptions; religion never feels that it ought to be able to prove the existence of God. That is the feeling of theology, which is not religion but science.

そして以下が和訳。immediacyを「直接性」と訳すのは問題があるのだが、まだ代案がないので、暫定的に「直接性」にした。

さて、ここでの直接性は、宗教における幻視と同一ではなく、よって信仰ではありません。というのも、宗教的直接性は想像による正真正銘の直接性ですが、科学における直接性は思想による偽の直接性だからです。後者において、科学は直接的になってしまうことを避けようとしているので、直接性は科学にとって失敗の証しなのです。また、科学は自らの前提を正当化できるようになるべきだと感じています。対して、宗教は、神の存在を証明できるようになる必要を全く感じないものです。そう感じるとすれば、それは神学のもつ感情ですが、神学は宗教ではなく科学です。

文章の流れを保つためには、原文の語順に忠実でなければならない一節になっている。しかし、日本語のもつ引力というか、性癖というか、習性のようなものからすると、どこか逆立ちしているような文章だ。

まず、「科学」や「宗教」などが主語となって、「感じる」という動詞が述語に来ている。ここが日本語ではいかにも不自然な感じだ。「From Mother Tongue to Linguistic Mother」というエッセイの中で、多和田葉子さんは、ドイツ人が鉛筆に向かって怒る様子を初めて目の当たりにしたとき「これはドイツ的アニミズムにちがいない」と思った、と書いている。ものに主体性を認めるという特徴がギリシア・ラテン言語にはあるのだろう。鉛筆から一歩進んで、「科学」などといった抽象的なものにも、主体性は自然と宿るのだろう。しかし、日本語ではなかなか難しい。なぜだろう。今なら、日本語で「この鉛筆は馬鹿だ」とか、「この本棚はえらい」とか書いても、さして不自然な感じを与えない。身近で愛着のあるものならば、そしてリアリティーのあるものならば、主体性を与えても良いのかもしれない。とすると、「科学」「宗教」などは、身近でもなく、リアリティーもないので、主体性を与えにくいのだろう。

「科学は、自らの前提を正当化できるようになるべきだと感じています」という一文など、このままではどうしようもない。そして、こういう「どうしようもない」文は本当にたくさんある。とりあえず直訳に近い形で訳すが、第一稿が仕上がったら日本語だけを読みつつバシバシ直す予定だ。

もう一つの悩みは、「直接性」という言葉。以前も書いたが、directとかdirectnessという含みが強い。immediacyあるいはimmediateは、「媒介がない」という意味なので、「無媒介」「無媒介な」としてしまいたいのだが、「無媒介性」までいくとすこしやりすぎな気もする。すでにimmediacyという語は「直接性」と訳すという伝統があり、例えばこの語を多用するヘーゲルの著作でもこの伝統は守られているので、今さら新語を当てるのも非生産的なのかもしれない。しかし、気になるものは気になる。この作品だけをみたとき、「直接性」という言葉はどうもしっくりこない。代案は、例によって直ちには（「直接には」）浮かばないのだが。「直接には」と「直ちには」の差異を考えることが、まずは出発点になるかもしれない。

さて、上に引用した節からは離れるのだが、もう一つ、「in itself」のような再帰の形をとる表現も、和訳する際にとても悩む。今のところは、「そこにおいて」「潜在的に」などなど、場合によって言い分けることにしている。「即自」という訳し方は、専門用語として一貫した訳語を当てたいときには仕方がないのかもしれないが、それにしても実感の薄い微妙な言葉だと思う。「即」という文字が「immediately」や「instantly」を強く連想させる一方、肝心な「in」があまりうまく表現されていない気がする。同様に、「implicit」と「explicit」の組を訳すときも、「暗示」と「明示」ではやはり日常表現との不和が強すぎていけない。「暗示」は「暗示をかける」という意味もあり、「明示」はやや硬い。「暗示」の代わりとして、「潜在」「潜在性」を今は多用し、場合によっては「暗に含まれる」という言い方をする。そもそも、「implicit」には「示されている」という意味はほとんどないので、「示」という漢字を保持する必要はない。また、「明示」という語は、「明らかにする」「引き出す」「明るみに出す」「明確にする」などといった表現に置き換えている。専門用語としての統一性は失われるが、言いたいことは伝わりやすくなる。

Björk Documentary + Reflections

Björk says that the human voice is "natural and free." She says: "looking back on Vespertine ... I was aiming for how you can express yourself when you ... exploded 5,000 times and and there is nothing left, and you're just lying there, the ruins of you, but you still want to make something, but you have no muscle, you have no blood, and you still want to create beauty. So you end up ... creating music with no physical-ness, no body."

John Cage tried to break down the barriers between music and sound. Björk actually broke down this barrier. In Cage, for instance in Water Walk, what is not supposed to be music still sounds like non-music. In Björk, what is not supposed to sound like music sounds like music and becomes music. It is no longer a representation of sound, but is directly and immediately sound-music.

Ryuichi Sakamoto recorded the sound of melting ice in the Arctic for his song Glacier. Takeshi Kitano used the sounds of farming and carpentry in his Zatoichi to create a complex beat. In Kitano's case, the sounds eventually form a beat, and the two do not fuse; that is, there is something unnaturally unnatural about the way the farming and carpentry work sounds. By comparison, in Sakamoto's case, the melting sound directly is music, it is naturally unnatural.

Björk also makes non-musical sounds directly into music in Sakamoto's sense. Glacier comes after Vespertine, and perhaps Sakamoto was in part inspired by the song Joga to use the sounds found at the geological level directly as music.

Björk also says that Vespertine expresses the experience of reading a book. Perhaps All is Full of Love expresses the aftertaste or aftereffect of the experience of a musical piece or a book. (Björk calls All is Full of Love the "first track of Vespertine" although it is actually the last track of Homogenic.) The music video of All is Full of Love portrays two robots making love as they are being built. The relation between the two robots can be the relation between the musician and the listener, or between the writer and the reader. Or maybe the machine-hands building the two robots are the text or the tune, and the two robots, as musician/listener or writer/reader, are connected and mediated by the hands/work.

In Björk's music videos and tunes, nature is disconnected entirely from the image of a harmonious whole or of a passive mother. Nature is rather an extension of art and machinery. It exists only insofar as it is represented by music.

In another documentary, Björk says that making one of her works more selfish or individual than others might have made it more universal as well.

She also says that in the music video of Isobel, the moths are supposed to stop or suspend the rational, calculating side of her listeners' mind and to activate and revive its emotional side. This resonates with what Kenzaburo Oe said in his Nobel Prize Speech. Oe said that the task of science is to transform the unknown into the known, while the task of literature and art is to transform the known into the unknown. This is exactly what Björk has been doing, right up to her latest Biophilia project. Ancient Greek thinkers, as well as modern Romantics led by Schelling, thought that music makes the structure of nature intuitively graspable. Against this position, Björk's Biophilia as well as her use of "natural" sounds suggest that music is not explanatory but rather expressive; it expresses nature, shapes the nature of nature. Björk remains at the edge of art, and does not make the mistake of taking music as a philosophy. This mistake is what Collingwood cautions against when he writes:

Aesthetic philosophy is the abstract assertion of immediacy, the denial of thought. 'Don't think, feel,' is its maxim. ... A person who has to remind himself to act on impulse has ceased to act on impulse; and one who advises others to follow their impulses is really advising them to follow his advice. Thus aesthetic philosophy is the formal denial of its own existence (Speculum Mentis, 262-3)

Expressing nature through music without trying in any way to substitute art for knowledge, Björk preserves music, not nature. The airplanes had to morph into moths, so that nature may become artificial as music and expand in a pure and free way. Instead of representing something in nature, Björk's music extends nature, and it is the task of thinking to reflect upon this expansion and represent it. Moths eat everything, both natural and artificial; they are attracted to light; some moth species do not need to eat anything at all; and their babies produce the finest silk.