英語を勉強させることについて

外から、花と動物と線香の匂いがしている。風が部屋に入ってくると、思いのほか透きとおった匂いなので驚く。床を水拭きし、洗濯をし、食器を洗った。そして、コンビニへ印刷をしに行った。扇風機のパーツを洗った。きれいな日で、そろそろ秋という感じがする。夜も、涼しくなってきた。寒い夜もあったくらいだ。

今学期が始まってすでに半年近くが経とうとしている。各クラスの中では、当然、生徒によって実力に差が出てくる。上にいる生徒たちは、授業で行う新しいことを次々と覚えていくので、退屈そうにしていることがある。下の生徒たちは、なんとかついていこうとはしているが、やる気が落ちている人も何人かいる。集団で授業をするときのジレンマはこれだ。上にあわせるか下にあわせるかの二択しかない。下にあわせつつ上にも面白いことをやる、といった小細工は、少しはできても、根本的な解決にはならない。それに、授業でそういう小細工をやると、かえって生徒たちの間では「上」と「下」の差がはっきり意識されるので、授業自体がやりづらくなる面もある。

今のところは、下の方に合わせて授業を行っている。上の方の生徒たちは案の定やや退屈そうにしている。しかし、余裕があるから感じるフラストレーションよりも、全く授業についていけなくて感じるフラストレーションの方が重いはず。それなので、この方針は、正しい妥協の仕方だと思う。

それにしても、生徒たちはよくついてきてくれているといつも感心する。小学生が英語を習いに毎週勉強に行くということは、大変なことだ。自分が小学生の頃、同じことをしろと言われたら、間違いなく反発しただろうし、どこか塾へ通うように言われたら、恐らく何らかの方法でサボっただろう。自分の場合、両親が半ば無理矢理に英語をやらせた。家庭教師だったので、サボるのも難しかった。勉強をしているときはつらかったし、これが一体何の役に立つのかが全然わからなかった。それでも、今は、そのときに英語をしっかり勉強したおかげで、色々なことができるようになっているし、今の社会において比較的生き延びやすい立場を得ることができたと思う。

英語の勉強の大切さを小学生に説明して納得してもらうことは不可能だ。往々にして、小学生が何かを判断するときは、それが「快い」か「辛い」かが判断基準となる。今は辛いけど将来役に立つ、とか、今は快いけど将来後悔することになる、とか、そういった長期的な判断が、小学生にはできない。小学生が快さを感じる機会が量産されている現代においては、あえて辛さを我慢して意味のわからない勉強に専念するのはさらに難しいだろう。

その意味では、毎週しっかり英語を勉強している小学生もえらいが、そういうことを子供にしっかりさせている親御さんもえらい。子供に英語を勉強させるのは非常に面倒くさい。お金もかかるし、毎週宿題をチェックしたり、ちゃんと塾に行っているかを確認したり、子供の文句を聞いたり、子供を説得したり罰したりしなければならない。何もやらせなければ、こうした苦労からは自由でいられるので、親にとっては楽だ。それでも、子供の将来やこれからの世の中についてしっかり考えているからこそ、親御さんも子供に英語を勉強させることを選んだのだろう。

「勉強させる」といっても辛いことばかりではない。わかる楽しさはあると思うし、数年の勉強が実って本を読めるようになったり、英語で文章が書けるようになったりすると、ある種の「力」を実感することができる。

Historicizing Hegel

Let those who are still dissatisfied with this beginning take upon themselves the challenge of beginning in some other way and yet avoiding such defects. Science of Logic. 2010. p.53.

Historicizing the legacy of Hegel is perhaps the most formidable task which contemporary philosophy faces. Heidegger's approach does not work, in so far as Dasein in Being and Time is in fact a concept, a thought, and thus is in some sense a representation. Dasein is the being to which (or to whom) the question of the meaning of being arises. In so far as the questioning is taking place at the beginning of phenomenology, Dasein is an as it were a priori necessary being. However, this does not mean that one ought to begin philosophy from the analysis of Dasein. There are other beings for which (or for whom) the question of the meaning of being does not arise. Why should one begin philosophy with Dasein rather than from one of these latter beings? The answer is that, while Dasein is necessary for philosophy as such to have its existence, these latter beings may or may not be there for philosophy. Another reason is that these latter beings, in order to be there, must have already been mediated in some way by the question of the meaning of being, for after all these are beings. However, even here, the question still remains as to whether or not it really is necessary to have a questioning being, i.e. Dasein, as the a priori foundation for the being of all other kinds of being. What if there were beings who are able to be without the mediation of a conscious, questioning being such as Dasein? This, then, is the limit of Heidegger's thought: for Heidegger, the legitimate question in philosophy is always a question concerning a question, or a reflection upon an seemingly immediate question. In other words, the question of the meaning of being is always reflected back into the question of the meaning of being of Dasein. This leads Heidegger to describe the presuppositions which make a particular Dasein possible, but Heidegger's questioning cannot reach beyond the "world" which is always the world of Dasein.

The same defect can be found with any other mode of questioning which in some sense presupposes a mediation when beginning a process of questioning or dialectics. Hegel's challenge is to have philosophy make a beginning without presupposing such mediation. While Heidegger's legacy does constitute an interesting and constructive chapter in the philosophy of mind, it nonetheless is not powerful enough to overturn the Hegelian system or to meet the challenge which Hegel poses in the Science of Logic.

There is no quick and easy way out of the problem of the beginning. If one begins with the thought of pure being, then one necessarily ends up thinking pure nothing, and the Hegelian machine comes into motion, manufacturing all the other categories with a necessity and rigor which is difficult to dispute. And even when one is able to insert other categories in between, the introduce further mediations into the system -- a task which is no doubt appropriate given the significant advancement in all fields of the different sciences since Hegel's death -- the fact still remains that the system is fundamentally a Hegelian one. This is because the beginning is made with pure being, and because the thought of pure being immediately collapses into pure nothing. Negation here necessarily becomes the predominant motif, and unless one is able to find a still prior, different motif which can also envelop negation, one remains caught within the Hegelian framework.

One question worth raising is this: how did Hegel himself manage to historicize his predecessors? The answer is: Hegel found a way to begin philosophy with a thought which is more fundamental than anything else, and he succeeded in patiently working through the consequences of making such a beginning. In particular, Hegel's way of beginning philosophy allows him to uncover and criticize the hidden presuppositions in the systems of Spinoza and Fichte. The lesson to be learned from Hegel, a lesson which will allow a thinker to historicize and overcome Hegel, is this: one ought to begin philosophy in a manner different from that of Hegel's, and thus uncover the hidden presuppositions which informs Hegel's way of beginning philosophy.

小三治の落語

良い声ですね。間の取り方もうまいです。

Two Kinds of Solitude

The first kind of solitude is a simple one. One is simply alone and has no other to whom one could relate in a deep way. By deep way I mean renouncing one's own ego and will and choosing to look at the world and act from the other's point of view. Lacking such a partner or a companion is the first kind.

The second kind is that there is such a partner but one could no longer relate to the other's thoughts and will in the manner described above. The situation becomes all the more painful when one suspects that the other in fact has no thought or will of this kind which one could follow. For example, if the other makes a request to do something, then one could prove the bond between the two by doing that something no matter what. However, if the other does not request anything, one is left with nothing to work on, and is instead forced to withdraw into oneself. In this way, the bond starts to decay. Being alone while feeling this decay is the second kind.