Sketchy Sidethoughts on Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Parts II & III

Part II of Outline of the Philosophy of Right is all about abstract subjectivity. At the starting point, the subject emerges as the gap between the promise and performance of a contract. The subject occupies both sides in a negative way, and so is the gap which separates the two. By degrees, the subject frees itself from the initial thing which was its object of contract. The subject passes through various dichotomies -- intention/action, means/ends, etc. -- and then reaches its unity in the notion of happiness. It then passes through the dichotomy "good/conscience." In the end, the subject is thoroughly stripped of all positive and particular content, and thereby occupies the place of pure particularity and arbitrariness.

Part III, "Sittlichkeit," begins from this point where the subject is this thoroughly abstract self-related negativity. The subject is in itself the will to be all, or to be the subject. On the other hand, for itself, the subject is still one, particular subject, against which stands the highest good.

The first attempt of the subject to become all is family. The family grows in twos and threes. Two: two individuals make absolute commitments to each other, renounces their particularity, and thus becomes a universal self-consciousness. Three: the child produces another family, and the tension between families, as well as the family and the subject, becomes explicit in the consciousness of the child. The second attempt is civil society. The third attempt is the state.

An important first step, by which consciousness steps into the sphere of ethics proper, is marriage. In marriage, two minds absolutely commit to each other. This commitment is "absolute" in the sense that its meaning and form is not influenced by what has preceded it. Marriage is thus a fresh beginning, a negative act by which the very negation which negates the past is also negated.

One important point to note is that marriage can only happen between two individuals. Why? One individual is the I, the mind which is related to itself. The other individual is the other mind, who is equally an I yet is related to me in a negative way, that is, there is always the possibility that the other will will the opposite of what I will. However, if a third individuals comes along, then there is the possibility that the two others oppose each other. This possibility allows me to make an arbitrary choice between the two opposite wills. This choice will always rest on a particular, contingent, and external reason, which has nothing to do with an absolute commitment to the barren will of the other. This choice and contingency is strictly virtual. Therefore, for example, it does not matter if all three individuals live in the same house. There is a possibility that the three would live in separate places, in which case there is no way for one's will to be directed simultaneously to both of his partners (e.g. I cannot sincerely want to live in Washington DC while also wanting to go to Ottawa at the same time, assuming that it is in those two places that my presumed two partners live.) Only if there is just one partner could I ever desire to live with her absolutely and thus blame the inability to do so on external, contingent reasons. Otherwise, the fault lies in the form of the relationship, not just on such contingencies.

One question arises here: how does this absolute negativity of marriage relate to the equally absolute subjective notion of love? On the one hand, the two are in tension. In marriage, love is a derived effect of external and objective ceremonies. Therefore, it is not that I marry someone out of love, but rather that I love someone because I am married to her. Love, however, also asserts its absolute negativity, although subjectively. Love commits my own will to the abstract will of the other. No matter what the external appearance of our relationship might be, it is this subjective commitment that counts in love. Therefore, from the point of view of love, whether or not I am married to the other is a contingent and insignificant matter.

How to resolve this tension? On the other hand, love and marriage share an essential feature, namely, that both privilege the act of commitment over any particular quality or event. This formal correspondence between the two is precisely also the reason why the gap between the two cannot be simply closed. If there were to be such an absolute merging of two wills, then it has to be either subjective or objectively initiated, but not both at the same time. Or at least this is how the situation appears after these two positions are spelled out in their formal detail.

Hegel does not talk about the ethical role of love in the sections on marriage and family. However, since love is essentially the moment of subjective ethicality, as it were, it surely has a role to play in altering the content of the ethical form of marriage.

平凡なものに対する嫌悪はそれ自体平凡だ

哲学は近代に入ってから、否定性を本気で考えるようになった。否定性とは、今目の前に現存しないもの、人々が「ない」と思っているものごと、その「ない」感じのことだ。ないはずだけど、それは「ある」ものごとにたしかに影響を与えている。というより、なにが「ある」のかを決めるのは、「ない」ものごとだから。

この考え方は、芸術や宗教や思想にも応用できるし、応用しないといけない。よく、芸術は平凡なものを拒むという。一面では、これは正しい。極端なことをできない人は芸術家ではない。極端ではない作品は芸術作品ではない。極端でありながら意味がわかり、抵抗し難い魅力を持っており、ある種の強烈な磁力を持っている作品こそ、芸術作品だ。しかし、そこで否定されている「平凡なものごと」は、単に忘れ去られていてはいけない。平凡なものごとをどう否定するかが芸術作品の命だ。否定の仕方は色々あると思う。上から塗りつぶすもよし、真っ向から対立するもよし、そのまま表象するもよし、拒絶する素振りをみせるもよし、作品中で少しずつ破壊するもよし、または気がついたら消えていた、という風に作品を構成するもよし．．．　平凡なものをどう否定するかによって、作品のレベルが決まる。

平凡なものごとを単に拒絶することはそれ自体平凡だ。しかし、そういう芸術作品、そういう宗教、そういう思想が、ちまたには溢れている。溢れすぎている。誰もこんなものには満足していない。ただ、こうした作品や宗教や思想を創るほうからしてみれば、これ以上楽なものはない。教養もエネルギーも必要がないから。もちろん、良いものがたくさん出回っている世の中においては、こうした凡作、つまらない宗教、虚しい思想はすぐに廃れる。しかし、こうしたつまらないものごとしかない世の中においては、相対的に輝くこともできる。増えれば増えるほど、人々にそれは受け入れられていく。

これはとても残念だ。ただ、ことの元凶は、かつての素晴らしい芸術作品や宗教や思想にあるのかもしれない。そうしたものがあまりにも素晴らしすぎて、新しいものを創る人々はやる気がなくなってしまったのかも。あるいは、ただ何か異なることをするだけでも大変なこととなってしまったので、何か異なることができた時点で満足してしまい、消費するほうも、ただ今までと異なることができたというだけで満足してしまったのかもしれない。そのもの自体の質を真摯に評価すれば、それがつまらないものだとわかったかもしれないが、それだと、ここまできて結局過去を越えることができていない、という辛い現実と向き合わなければいけないから、人々はそれから眼を背けるのかもしれない。

だったら、まだ過去の芸術作品や宗教や思想を学んで、それを反復するほうが、よっぽど新しいだろう。というか、それより他に道はないようにすら思える。だから、個人的には、ジョイスを読み、キリスト教の聖書を読み、ヘーゲルの哲学をまだまだ考え抜きたいと考えている。もしかしたら、この三つを越えるものもあるのかもしれないけど。