PIVOT, Sex-Workers, Etc.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the bawdy house law, the communication law, and the living of the avails provision are unconstitutional. Here is a great video by PIVOT explaining the issues, and here is an article which gives a detailed summary of the court decision.

It is easy to criticize sex-workers or sex-work as being "immoral." And even if one does not fall into this facile attitude, it is easy to criticize the "larger system" which perpetuates the need for some to earn their living through this kind of job. Moreover, it is all-too-easy to say: "look, this is progress, but the real issue is not addressed at all; the real issue is the social system itself, and this kind of activism and court-decision only helps to cover up the real problem."

This kind of cheap criticism misses the important point made by the PIVOT activists and lawyers. Yes, the social system itself is flawed, and yes, sex-work itself ought not to be encouraged - but who disagrees with these moralistic points? In order to actually bring about an improvement, however, means, perhaps paradoxically, to protect sex-workers' rights. As one lawyer puts it, sex-workers have historically been marginalized, treated as "disposable," and the police has failed to protect them as citizens. The reference to history is crucial, for it strongly suggests that the outlaw of sex-work is part of the perpetuation of all the problems associated with it. Against this background, the legal protection of sex-workers means first of all to put the sex-workers themselves in the position to reflect upon their practices, instead of being traumatized by unexpected disasters, and, secondly, to normalize and discourage the work itself, to help society as a whole to grow out of its need to feed upon this business.

Meanwhile, another criticism of the court decision might be the following: since now sex-workers can enjoy legal protection, there is the "danger" that more people will be inclined to enter or stay in sex-trade, and so the fundamental goal, that of eliminating sex-work as such, becomes even more difficult to achieve. Why does this criticism also miss the point? Because it is based on a lack of understanding of the actual motivations behind the act of entering into the sex-trade business.

Most sex-workers enter into this trade out of economic necessity. Whether legally protected or not is really not the deciding factor. In fact, one could even argue that the main reason why sex-trade grows as a market, and why it is becoming more and more contemptible, just is the lack of legal protection for sex-workers. From the point of view of the "customers," it is infinitely easier to "buy" their "products" if they know that no matter what they do "with it," sex-workers will not have the power to appeal to the police or to court. Far from discouraging sex-trade, therefore, laws which outlaw the trade and its workers actually help to perpetuate the entire business.

Moreover, at least in Japan, there are cases where sex-workers start their business precisely because they do not enjoy legal protection. Ryu Murakami, in writing his novel Love & Pop, interviewed many high school students and older sex-workers about their lives. Murakami reports in a conversation (included in the collection The Unbearable Salsa of Being) that it is the fact that the law cannot reach them that makes sex-work an appealing field for these workers. The idea here is this: these students and workers are looking for places where they might live without being "normalized." Part-time work, "proper" entertainment and enjoyment, and ordinary school and work only give the impression that life flows monotonously and impersonally. Against this social system, there is a need to re-assert one's own freedom and autonomy - or so they feel. Murakami reports that it is out of this sentiment that the students and workers go for the "edge," where they can play a critical role against the established norms of contemporary society. This critical stance is, as Murakami notes, not as childish as it seems: and Love & Pop is written precisely in order to explain just how complex this stance is, and why it is necessary for this stance to be expressed in the form of sex-trade.

Murakami's work clearly shows - and in order to see this, it is necessary to read his works first - that criticizing the sex-workers from a safe and cozy moral standpoint only exaggerates the problem. This kind of criticism functions as a means to stop thinking about the more uncomfortable truths of the social structure which necessitates these jobs. On the other hand, providing legal protection for sex-workers paradoxically will discourage newcomers. It will show that society "recognizes" this trade as its inevitable product, and will also make it far less likely for those involved in it to feel like they are "on the edge." This will deprive the newcomer of the very motivation which he or she held upon entering this field in the first place.

Once again, it is important to emphasize that moral contempt against sex-work, and by implication also against the sex-workers, is part of the whole problem. It paints a certain narrow picture of what "they" - the work and the workers - "must be like," and then rejects it as something to be one-sidedly discouraged. The more this kind of work is criticized, and the more such a criticism is "justified," the more inclined the kid or the worker will be to enter or continue with this trade. Any criticism must instead be based on the standards which are held by the sex-workers themselves. What does a sex-worker demand? What is the ideal which he or she is trying to achieve with the work? Taking all this into account, the work done by PIVOT members is truly remarkable. PIVOT has produced a shift in perspective, a new way of approaching the issue of sex-trade, by helping the court to make this great decision.

キリスト教の精神とその運命・第一章

第一章「ユダヤ教の精神とその運命」

各章への副題は、翻訳者である細谷貞雄氏がつけたらしい。『キリスト教の精神とその運命』自体、ヘーゲル自身は出版に値しないと考えていた作品だ。25歳を少しまわったばかりの若いヘーゲルが取り組んだ試作品。

文体は一見平易なようだが、それは言葉遣いが日常の、あるいは普通の論文のそれに近い、というくらいなもので、実は後期ヘーゲルの仕事と比べるとむしろ全体として何が言いたいのかがわかりにくく、読む方は読みづらさとは違う意味での困難を強いられる。

あるいは、そもそもこれは未完成作品であるので、一貫した思想をそこに見出そうとする読み方自体が間違っているのかもしれない。ちょうど若いヘーゲルがこれを書くことによって当時の自分の立ち位置の限界を見定めることができたように、読者である私たちも、この作品を読むことによって、そこに暗示されている考えの限界を検討する機会を得られれば十分なように気もする。

第一章では、「アブラハムの契約」（神がアブラハムに、後者の子孫が星の数や砂の数ほどにも増えるだろう、と約束する）から始まり、モーゼの民の終焉、そして救い主への渇望が発生するまでの聖書の物語をヘーゲルが解釈している。ユダヤ教は「アブラハムの精神」の移り変わり、いわゆる輪廻転生、変移によって発展し、成熟してきたとヘーゲルはいう。これが、本章の大枠だ。そこで、「アブラハムの精神」とは何かを理解することが、大きなポイントとなる。

「アブラハムの精神」には少なくとも二つの側面がある。

１．自然との絶対的な対立。自然を「支配」することによって一見和解するが、こうした「和解」はすでに人間と自然との対立を容認した上で成り立っている。そのため、これは対立を解消した状態ではなく、「調和状態」でもない。

自然との対立と和解は、アブラハム以前に、特にノアとニムロデによって確立されたとヘーゲルはいう。ノアは自然から逃げる形で、ニムロデは自然を共通の敵として人間を団結させることによって、この精神の確立に至った。アブラハムは、これを背景に登場してくる。

２．積極的、具体的な内容をもつ民族との絶対的な対立。アブラハムは遊牧民であり、借り暮らしの個人であり、自分の場所も所有物ももたなかった。土地を持たない民族、つまり、ある具体的なもの、特定のものへの執着をしない民族をアブラハムは率いた。特定のものの否定によってユダヤ民族は登場した。

全てを否定する民族として、ユダヤ人は普遍的な位置を占めた。ヘーゲルはこの普遍性について細かくは言及していないけれど、それは至る所に暗示されている。アブラハムからヨゼフ、モーゼへと移り変わるにつれて、この普遍性は顕著になっていく。

私としては、ヘーゲルがあまりにも一方的にユダヤ人を中傷している箇所はとばして読みたい。特に、エジプトを脱出したユダヤ人を「卑怯」だと揶揄するヘーゲルはいただけない。たしかに、後にキリストが新たな抵抗の仕方を提示すれば、それと比べるとユダヤ人のこの出エジプトの方法は「卑怯」にもみえるのかもしれない。しかし、「卑怯」というような言葉では、ユダヤ人とキリストとの違いを明確にすることはできていない。むしろ、ヘーゲルがここで問題にしたいのは、ユダヤ人が偶然性や運によって抵抗運動を行った点だろう。これを必然性、普遍性による積極的な抵抗へと成熟させることができず、最終的には「救い主」を待ち望むという徹底した受身にまわるユダヤ民族――ここでの問題点はあくまで概念的なものなのだから、感情的な言葉では表現できない。

概念的な問題が扱われているのだということを意識して読めば、一見すると誹謗中傷のオンパレードでしかないヘーゲルの文章にも筋が通ってくる。

まず、ユダヤ人は、外面的なものごと（つまり、特定的で、絶えず移り変わっているものごと）と、内面的なものごと（自分による全てのものの否定、全てを否定してもなお残り続けるものとしての神や魂）とを和解できていない。なので、例えばモーゼは馬鹿馬鹿しいことが原因で失脚する。また、外面的なものとして「言葉」にも相応の役目が与えられていないので、ユダヤ人たちは言葉に内面性を見出せず、よってかえって好き勝手に色々とおしゃべりできた、というヘーゲルの指摘も面白い。

次に、ユダヤ人の律法の原理が単純に否定的なもの（全ての個人は一人では生きてゆけず、他者に依存しているため、この他者依存において全ての個人は平等である）になってしまっている点が問題だ。個人として積極的に独立しようとする者がいると、その人は他者依存の原理に基づいて、再び低いほうの生活水準や文化水準に引きずりおろされる。ニーチェが「ルサンチマン」と呼んだ現象だ。

最後に、ユダヤ人はそもそも民族としての具体的なまとまりを否定するアブラハムの精神から生まれたのにも関わらず、そうした否定を共有することによって民族としてまとまってしまった、という矛盾を抱えている。それは、ユダヤ人という概念そのものが抱える矛盾で、普遍的なものである。この矛盾を解消しようとすればするほど――つまり、ユダヤ王国をうちたてたり、約束の地に根ざしてみたり、再び放浪の民となる、ということを繰りかえすたびに――かえって矛盾は強烈に明示された。ユダヤ人の概念自体がこうして濃密なものとなってゆき、緊張感が高まり、ユダヤ人は狂信的になっていった。ヘーゲルはこの一連の流れをマクベスになぞらえている。

こうした矛盾の源泉は、自然や特定の共同体といった有限なものを一方的に否定するアブラハムの精神である。しかし、こうした矛盾によって一度人間の無限の否定性とでも呼べるものが全面に出る必要があった。

救い主が必要な状況を作り出したことによって、ユダヤ人はキリストが到来するために必要な精神的、あるいは政治的な土壌を用意した。ユダヤ人のこうした貢献について、ヘーゲルは積極的には語っていないが、しかしながらこれもまた文章中の至る所に暗示されてはいる。

最後に一つ注意したいのは、ヘーゲルがユダヤ人、あるいはユダヤ民族というとき、それは特定の個人を表しているのではなく、概念を表しているという点だ。 そのため、一見するとこれはユダヤ人差別の文章としか読めないかもしれないが、しかし実はこれはユダヤ人という概念をある特定の人々が実際に体現したことによって具体化した道程を表現しているのであって、だとすれば、ユダヤ人は自然や共同体と対立して存在する個人の中に必ず含まれている普遍的な概念なのだ。

The Good Old Cliche concerning Theory and Action

A cliche, but a cliche worth repeating many times. There is a prejudice that theory and action are two separate things, and that theory cannot influence action in any concrete or substantial way. Or, the put it in another way, there is a division between "theoretical" and "practical" knowledge, and only the latter supplies what is relevant to action, while the former can only make detached, abstract speculations which have nothing to do with how one actually acts. The strongest argument for this claim ultimately boils down to this truism: at the end of the day, we need to put bread on our table.

However, the above is a false dichotomy. Speculation without action will not put bread on the table. This is true. But then the reverse is also true, namely, that action without speculation will not put bread on the table. There is always a minimum of speculation involved in any act of putting bread on the table. The speculation can take the form of trust ("I trust that if I go to the bakery, the baker will not refuse me bread") or of force ("I can make others give to me what is my due, namely, the means to survive") or of something else. Even if the actor is a farmer/baker/blacksmith/lumberjack, and thus is capable of single-handedly producing everything necessary for making bread, there still is speculation, and a huge speculation at that: namely, that he will not have to rely on others in the future. This is a huge speculation because it assumes that everything which he has at present will work as it is for an indefinite duration of time. There will be no bad harvest, no unexpected malfunctioning of machines, no shortage of wood, or, more radically, no nuclear accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, or other disasters which will bring everything to ruins in a sweep. In order to ensure that bread will be on the table tomorrow, therefore, the actor must let speculation influence his actions. In this way, his actions are no longer that of simply acquiring the immediate means of subsistence. Already, the action takes the form of an investment.

On the level of subsistence, there are several key questions at present. Will currency depreciate? Will the price of goods fluctuate in such a way that will render my savings irrelevant? Will a natural or human disaster occur in the near future? Will I have a job that will allow me to live without any physical or psychical injury?

Assuming that all of these issues are given adequate treatment, the big question still remains, namely, am I to be satisfied with the security of mere subsistence? I work, I make money, I eat, drink, sleep - I subsist. The answer is an obvious No. The interesting thing about humans is that mere subsistence requires something more than subsistence. This "more" is first of all culture. Or, to put it more concretely, there needs to be a reason behind subsistence. This is nothing mysterious: it is the way one thinks all the time. For example, upon making the decision between working as a waiter, a banker, a civil servant, or a politician, the question immediately arises: why this rather than that? This question is nonsense from the point of view of mere subsistence, since all jobs equally provide what is needed for subsistence alone. But then, what is this "more" which I here called culture or reason?

With this question we are already deep in speculation and at the entrance gates of philosophy. For the question is immediately also about the reality, function, and power of freedom, for to reason is to be free, although at this point one has no idea what it means to "be free." Caprice is the lowest form of freedom precisely because the capricious actor does not give reasons for his or her acting. There are then reasons which appeal to nature ("I had sex because there is a natural drive in animals to mate") and to psychology ("I felt a desire to have sex") and then to culture or society ("In our overtly sexual society, having sex is almost a status-symbol; thus I had sex in order to belong to a certain class of people in my society") and finally to art and religion ("I fulfill the commandment of God and the meaning of the union of marriage by performing this act as the highest expression of authentic love.") All of these reasons express half-truths; truths, in so far as they can be reasons at all for the action in question; half, because there are higher and more concrete reasons which can accommodate the previous one. The highest reason, however, is paradoxically also the lowest, namely, that there is "something beyond all this that made me do this." This is because, while the action might be accounted for by all of these reasons, it is also part of the action that these reasons are given - in this example, the action won't appear as sex in the first place unless it was represented to me and others in such a way that it appears to be sex, that there can be reasons given to it, etc. But the act of giving reason is itself in need of explanation. And the attempts to explain will always also leave something out - thus proving that there are certain dimensions in this "act of giving reason" which cannot be given reason. But this line of thought is very hasty, unconvincing, and thus in some sense false. For at this point, there seems to be no distinction between this final "I did this ultimately for nothing" and caprice. Both are "groundless," both are reasons which appeal to nothing - literally. And yet, there is a big difference. To grasp this difference is the business of philosophy.

In the path of this critical train of thought, philosophy will illuminate so many particular issues, that this path will prove to be simultaneously the most general and the most particular, or the most abstract and the most concrete. To take an example: Marx. It is an idea of Marx's that money turns to capital when the production of exchange value uses the production of use value as a means to its own realization. From the point of use value alone, therefore, money only appears as a means of exchange, in which the end is to satisfy my own needs. Therefore, capital never appears from the point of view of, say, the consumer or the hard-working laborer. Capital appears for the merchant and for those who use money to make more money, or for those who take the use of a product as a means to satisfying the expansion of the quantity of money. Capital is founded and perpetuated upon this perspectival difference, which is not "merely" a matter of "points of view," but rather a real division that actually structures the way people live in our society. Just this insight is enough to organize a whole range of contemporary phenomena - from the "bait-and-switch" system of unemployment and job-hunting, all the way up to the seemingly never-ending thirst for expansion confessed and even boasted by many CEOs - and bring them into relation. This will further show that unemployment, the so-called "working-poor," and the just mentioned thirst for expansion, are not individual "psychological" problems, as if the unemployed are lazy and the CEOs are greedy. These will rather be seen as necessary symptoms of the overall system of economy and politics, what Marx calls "capitalism," in short, the interplay between those whose primary concern is use-value and others whose primary concern is exchange-value.

Now, assuming that through philosophical education and well-informed action, I secure a relatively good life for my self, and also open up a certain space for good change to happen to others and to the larger political and economic system - say, by writing books and stimulating others to think, and to reassure superior thinkers that there is one more person trying to follow in their wake. There still is the obligation to others in the future, primarily my family. With this a whole new dimension opens up. The question of the meaning of love and the question of the meaning of education. On the assumption that things will turn out to be even worse than what I can possibly imagine at present, and thus thinking in the most pessimistic way possible, I am still also under obligation to secure the subsistence and freedom of my family members. How is such a decision possible? Of course, complete security is impossible. Just as the highest reason for any action includes the lowest ("ultimately, I did this for nothing") here too any decision will have to involve an element of nothingness, an element of absolute uncertainty. But there is still a world of difference between acting upon just such an uncertainty and acting after full consideration of all dimensions and still on the basis of uncertainty. In the former case, the result of the action will almost surely lead to regret - "why didn't I think of this before acting so hastily?" The latter will lead to acceptance - "there was no way that I could have foreseen this."

幻術

「芸術」と打とうとして誤って「幻術」と打ってしまった。その後で、コリングウッドの『芸術の原理』の中の「Magic」の節を訳す適語は、「魔法」ではなく「幻術」なのではないか、と思った。覚書まで。

A Very Short Note on Das Kapital I

Money

Money is the commodity in which use-value and exchange-value converge. As such, it cannot be an object which has a particular use value, such as walnuts or okuras or wine. Modern society has found the most logically consistent form of money: virtual money. It is literally nothing, and, as nothing, universally and necessarily lacks use-value. Or rather, its sole use-value is its function as the means of exchange.

Value of Labour-Power

Labour-power is defined by Marx as the sum total of all the psychical and physical abilities required to perform a given work. The value of labour-power differs according to the two perspectives. From the point of view of exchange value, labour-power is exchanged for the total cost of the production and maintenance of these psychical and physical abilities, i.e. this type of labourer. From the point of view of use value, the same quantity of labour-power has its value in the sum-total of the commodities which it produces.

Surplus-Value

Surplus-value is realized in exchange, more specifically in the triad Money-Commodity-Money (M-C-M). Money, say $100, is spent to buy a commodity. The same commodity is then sold for the price of $110. If the exchange consists merely in the exchange of things or consumable objects, there still would be surplus-value due to accidental causes such as bad harvest, draught, rise or fall in temperature, etc. However, there is no necessary rise in price. The distinction, not made so clearly by Marx, seems crucial.

Capital

It is only when the creation of surplus-value becomes necessary that money becomes capital. In order to effect this step forward, the buyer must find a commodity that can be bought at price P and then sold for price P+D where D is a positive increment. This commodity, it turns out, is labour-power. The market price of labour-power is determined according to the cost of the production and maintenance of it. Now there is no rule that prevents the possessor of this commodity, the buyer or capitalist, from making use of this labour-power in such a way that the commodities produced by means of this labour-power embody more value than said cost. With this difference, money becomes capital, and the ordinary buyer and seller becomes a capitalist.

Two Rules for the Modern Sciences

Following the tradition of modernist philosophers, there seem to be two rules for any modern science to succeed.

(1) The method of that science must be sought in its subject-matter.

(2) Every determination must be deduced from a previous state in which that determination is not yet explicitly realized as such.

These are criteria by which good sciences proceed, and which lesser sciences, or sciences still in a state of confusion, ought to obey. The grossest confusion may be found in what used be called "behavioral psychology" and the traces it left in contemporary psychology and sociology. The idea prevalent here is that human behavior can be subjected to "experiments," and "hypotheses" can be "tested" against these experiments, just like the case in physics. Now, in so far as the human being is considered as a body with many physiological and biological properties, the inquiry is harmless. However, when this method is extended to the study of the human mind, as well as the relation between what the person thinks and what the person does, then things begin to go awry.

There is a famous experiment in sociology, which may be called the Elevator Experiment. Five people populate an elevator, all hired by the experimenter. A hidden camera is placed behind the ceiling. An ordinary citizen enters the elevator. While the elevator is moving, all of the five hired people turn leftward, 90 degrees. The poor man, who feels uncomfortable that he is the only one standing straight facing the direction of the elevator door, also shifts around and eventually turns leftward, 90 degrees. The experiment is repeated for other people who enter the elevator, and the same results obtain: every newcomer turns leftward in response to the behavior of the five hired people.

Now what the experiment aims to establish is the fact that some of our behaviors are socially determined. However, beyond this point the more precise consequences are less clear. Consider, for example, the fact that the experiment was set within an elevator, where indeed people have nothing better to do than to stay put in a relatively stupified state. In this environment, the most trivial change in the behavior of others would have stimulated the newcomer much more than, say, in a different situation such as a meeting room or in the mountains, where many things are on each person's mind, including ideas on what one ought to do next. While in each of these situations it is undoubtedly true that certain behaviors - often very trivial ones - are due to habits nurtured in society, often times the real issues that matter to the person in the non-trivial situation are not wholly determined by the behavior of others. 

For instance, in the case of the meeting room, questions such as "how one ought to conduct oneself in a discussion?" "what ideas one ought to express?" "in what sort of context is it appropriate to express such ideas?" and so on immediately affect the thinkers involved. When the underlying purpose of the thinker is to "blend in" to the gathering and to follow what is normal, then the answers to these questions will most likely be determined through social norms and habits, as well as how others speak and behave on that particular occasion. But if the thinker has a degree of independence, and wishes to base his ideas and conduct on more than mere convention, then the way in which he chooses to present himself to others will be determined by something other than the observable behaviors of others in the same room. In this latter case, no amount of experimenting can give us insight into why this person has decided to express these ideas in just these manners. The sufficient answer must come from a method suited to the process of thinking which was that thinker's.

Now the sociologist who believes that all behaviors of any sort can be explained by appeal to social norms, might say that what appears to be the original thoughts belonging to the thinker's spontaneous reflections are really conditioned through and through by what others have deemed "normal" and "acceptable" under similar circumstances. The thinker, then, is merely re-combining the elements of these previously acquired norms.

The above line of thought rests upon two fallacies, which are both violations of rules (1) and (2) respectively. The first fallacy comes from the fact that the sociologist takes a phenomenon that is not social to be a social phenomenon. The reflection of the thinker is not a reflection guided by the purpose of conformity and social harmony. It rather rests upon very different principles, and moreover the thinker is more or less aware that this is the case. By distorting the subject-matter so that it will conform to his sociological method, the sociologist in essence fails to take into account this self-reflective aspect of what the thinker is doing. The second fallacy is that the sociologist presupposes what in fact only arouse afterwards. What I mean is that the norms to which the thinker allegedly conforms do not exist prior to the thoughts and conduct on the part of the thinker. If the thinker is successful in his conduct, he will most likely establish a new norm, to which future thinkers will aspire. While it may be just to explain the behaviors of these subsequent followers by appealing to the norm established by the first thinker, the same cannot be the method by which to explain how the thinker himself came to think and act in this particular way.

This kind of distortion and illegitimate presupposing is more commonplace in the dubious sciences than is desirable. This is one more good reason for studying logic from a properly philosophical point of view, that is, in abstraction from its application to particular branches of thought.

Love as a Category of Representation

Love is a key to comprehending what freedom is. As with all philosophical concepts, love also has its own scale of forms - to follow R. G. Collingwood's method. At its lowest, love is a mere momentary emotion, almost indistinguishable from like. However, whereas like is conditioned by a relative presupposition - i.e. a particular, contingent, and selfish interest - love rests upon a universal and absolute presupposition. This latter states that in loving someone, the lover affirms everything about the beloved, unconditionally and without exception, down to the most trivial and minutest detail.

The expression "I love you" is absurd and ticklish, not because love is a sublime emotion which the average existing human being cannot realistically handle, but because in declaring love in this form, I turn love into something which I more or less intentionally do, like a decision. However, love is not merely a decision. Deciding to love someone does not mean that in so deciding I come to love that person for the first time. Rather, such a decision is only a reaffirmation, a confirmation I give after reflecting upon the fact that I already am in love with the other person. Love, therefore, is a category of representation and action rather than a particular object or act.

Of course, it is contingent that I love at all, and it is even more so that I love this particular person. This is the reason why I called love a "presupposition." Love can eventually go away. In recognizing this contingency, a human being can further make the decision to love love, that is, to absolutely presuppose the absolute presupposition, or, what comes to the same thing, affirm everything about affirming the entire existence of the beloved. This decision based on reflection is a free act. It is also a terrible decision. In making such a decision, love begins to burn and char the body and mind of the lover. The lover must learn to accept absolutely everything about the beloved. No moral, natural, political, aesthetic, or religious argument can excuse the lover from neglecting the implications of this standpoint. The lover must affirm the unnatural, the immoral, the politically impotent, the aesthetically unpleasant, or the profane.

It is also through this absolute passivity, this absolute renunciation and acceptance, that the lover liberates himself from the immediacy of representation. Prior to loving someone, the lover more or less thinks that some things in the world just is how it is, regardless of how he chooses to represent it. After the process of love, at the point which the lover assumes the full weight of his decision to love someone, the world essentially is how the lover chooses it to be. True, the lover did not, and could not, decide to let the world be in a particular way ex nihilo. But then it is also the case that, in a certain sense, the world is indeed the way it is ex nihilo. The lover knows that if he chooses to reject and criticize the faults of the beloved, and the faults of the world, then this decision will directly determine the way in which the thing appears to him. It is this consciousness of his own power of representation that is also the seed of a peculiar kind of freedom. I say seed because this freedom cannot blossom within the narrow confines of the flowerpot that is love. It must travel by wind to foreign lands, compete with other trees and bushes, take root, germinate, and grow. The resulting stand of trees is a state. But everything starts from the traumatic experience of becoming self-conscious while being in love.

知的生活の土台としての哲学

芸術や職人芸から政治まで、人間の精神生活を一通り網羅した哲学書を書くとしたら――哲学書とはそもそもこうあるべきものである上に、実際もそういうものだったのだけど――どのような構成になって、どのような題名になるだろうか。

『知的生活』(Intellectual Life)という題名はどうだろうか。本当は、『知的生活の土台としての哲学』の方が正確なのだけれど、そもそも「知的生活」という考えがあまり国民の日常に浸透していないように思える。まだあまりよくわからない「知的生活」という言葉があるだけで、十分変な本となるはずなので、そこにさらに「土台」だの「哲学」だの見慣れない言葉を加えられては、読むほうとしては遠慮がちになってしまうかもしれない。それは避けたい。

本の構成としては、幾つかの部や章に体系的にわけていく。言葉遣いは易しくするし、実際の議論には豊富な例も織り交ぜて読みやすく考えを表現する。他方で、論理はしっかりおさえる。哲学的な議論も躊躇なく行う。耳当たりの良い言葉で済ませず、ある考えを表現するために必要な言葉をしっかり使う。「それっぽい」ことを書くのではなくて、ある程度重みや実感の伴うことを書く。

『知的生活』

第一部　論理

第一章　基礎的な概念について

第二章　ものごとを縛る概念について

第三章　ものごとを自由にする概念について

第二部　自然

第一章　数学と物理学

第二章　化学などの質的な自然科学

第三章　有機体と生物学

第三部　人間

第一章　芸術と職人芸

第二章　宗教

第三章　政治と経済

いずれにしても、こういう内容の本を読んで批判してくれるような人は少数派なんだろうと思えてならない。

In and Out of the University

In his Diary of a Bad Year, Coetzee makes mention of a philosophy seminar in Australia which was organized entirely by non-academic civilians. However, this seminar was in no way, for that reason, second-rate. Rather, in Coetzee's eyes at least, this seminar had its unique merits, the chief ones of which is those which stem from the fact that this was founded on sincere, free motivations.

Nowadays, the seminar in a university setting is taken for granted, to such an extent that many students wouldn't, I imagine, feel at all that they are voluntarily being part of a movement. The institution of the university has become such a normal, well-established environment, that a seminar rather appears to the average student as something which already exists somewhere out there, waiting to be "filled in" before class one. No wonder then that many such seminars end up being not as lively as it could have been.

Perhaps this shift in the meaning of seminars is reflected in other parts of the university. University is turning into a tool for boosting one's career, to repeat a cliche. In any case, it is a cliche worth repeating, since it makes it clear that, for the pure learner, it is not necessary to get a Ph.D. And yet. Many people still believe that a Ph.D. is an absolute requirement if one is to become a successful academic.

The main justification for this belief is that only a person with a Ph.D. can get the chance to teach, do research, and get published in journals. However, in the contemporary world, this is no longer the case. By using the world wide web, it is possible to organize a local seminar on just about anything. People can in this way teach each other. They can also conduct research on their own thanks to Open Source Journals and Creative Commons Licenses. And, they can publish their works in electronic book form without any cost, and can also write on other avenues.

Traditionally, professors were respected and revered just because... they were professors. The old joke goes that everyone knows that a professor has done something important but no one can tell exactly what it is. The 19th and 20th century Russian novel repeatedly satirizes the "academician" who is respected for no substantial reason.

Now, if free access to journals were granted to the ordinary person, this would have a huge impact on how professors conduct and present their research. I do not mean that they should cater to the needs of the average layperson - such a turn of events would be unfortunate, since it would compromise the quality and rigor of their ideas. Rather, professors would have to be conscious that someone out there is actually going to read his or her work. In other words, they would no longer be able to treat their duty of research merely as part of their "career." If the long list of publications happened to be comprised of articles and books which, upon inspection, appear to be of almost no value (in one sense or another,) then it is clear that that fact would severely damage the professor's reputation. This scenario would have been very unlikely in an environment where ordinary people were barred access to academic publications, and thus were unable to see for themselves just what the professors were up to. Hence the mysterious aura of the "respectable" professor and the corresponding joke.

But if more and more scholarly material become available to the ordinary citizen, then two things would happen. First, the academic ability of individuals will be assessed not according to what kind of credentials they have on their CVs, but rather on the quality and reception of their works, both in research and in teaching. Second, getting a Ph.D. merely for the sake of career-building will become an obsolete option. The whole Ph.D. system, especially where the subject-matter demands a broad comprehension of a variety of topics rather than a rigid and narrow focus on one point, will have to be reconsidered. If a Ph.D. were to continue to be a sign that one is a professional in one's field, then a dissertation would have to satisfy certain qualitative requirements including that of being intelligible, meaningful, and not excessively narrow or short-sighted.

Academic institutions are valuable sanctuaries for theory and thought. They should not turn into mere tools for career-building. Philosophy, in particular, shouldn't be taught for the sake of "transferable skills." It ought to be an end in itself. If academia ceases to insist on this point, then Coetzee's civilian seminar will become necessary, for where else would philosophy be able to enjoy unconditional attention and respect as it is in itself?

Additionally, if academia is to become a retreat for higher level students, it ought to make the necessary changes that will give breathing space to those students. At present, there are too many time-consuming duties, which have very little to do with learning academic content, seem to weigh heavily on the student's shoulders. Attending conferences in order to "make connections," doing TA work in order to "pay the bills," and taking courses and writing papers which will "get the approval of the professors," are all extraneous activities. It might be the case that a non-student outside the university has a better chance of learning his or her own topic of interest. I am currently assuming the latter position by working a job that will pay my bills and then devoting the rest of my time to academic activities without worrying about external matters.

Again, this does not mean that people ought to start doing research outside the university. Rather, this means that the current higher education system needs to be improved quite fundamentally, so that students are actually given the space to focus freely on their primary vocation, namely, to learn. At present, such a free focus seems easier to achieve outside the university. This is a problematic situation.

日常雑記

久しぶりに日常的なことについて書きたいと思った。長い間海の中に潜り続けた後、日光の下に顔を出したような気持ちになる。

いきなり否定的なことを書く。日本には住めない。日本で暮らしたい。世界を旅するなんてしたくない。外国に行くなんてしたくない。でも、日本には住めない。理由は、とても単純で、原発がこの先再稼動していくから。東北へ実際に二度行った。どちらも、息が詰まるような気持ちを抑えつつの滞在だった。今も、そのときのことを思い出すと、どっと疲れが押し寄せてくる。そんな惨事が、また本州のどこかで起こるのか…　可能性があるだけで、本州に住みたくないと思ってしまう。津波がなくても、直下型の地震で空気や水や土地がすぐに放射能で汚染されてしまうだろう。その可能性を、あたかもないもののように忘れることが、できない。その可能性があるのに、責任をもって家族をこの国で養えるのか？　養えない。本当に家族を生存させたいのならば、外国に、それも中国や韓国などではなく、もっと遠くに逃げ、そこで暮らすしかない。日本の政治は当分変わらない。原発を廃炉にしたり、廃棄物や余った燃料を自然災害のリスクがない地方へ輸送する等といった措置も、当分実行されないだろう。選挙での一票、脱原発のデモ、署名。節電。そうした白々しいことを続ける以外に、できることがないのだとすれば、家族を守ることなど現実的に不可能だ。

行くとしたら、やっぱりEU圏内か、あるいはカナダのどちらかになるだろう。大学院生としてそこへ行き、博士課程まで終え、何らかの形で教職に就くだろう。日本でも、もう家庭教師を始めて一年になる。コツは掴んできたし、我ながら、教えるのは下手ではないと思う。結果も出ている。だから、海外に行っても、特に数学と理科の指導ができるので大丈夫だろう。

日本を離れるのはおしいし、今住んでいる町を離れるのも残念だ。たまたま住み始めた町に、思いのほか面白い人たちがたくさんいることを知り、驚いている。パン屋さん。イタリアの人。ダビデ。ドイツの人。ひよこと山羊の人。床屋のおじさん。近くに川があって、月がきれいで、夜は虫の鳴き声や大雨や大嵐を聴いて眠るのが心地良い。

英語には、Voluntary Exileという言葉がある。自主的亡命。本当は、戦争や貧困や差別が原因でそういうことをする。原発のリスクが原因で国から逃れるのは、はたして亡命といえるのか。

哲学を続けていて本当にありがたいと思う。美しいものをつくるということは、美しさとは何かを知ること。善いことをするということは、善さとは何かを知ること。何かを知ることは、何かを知るとは何かを知ること。全て、知ることにかえってくる。自分がどこにいて何をしていても、ものごとを知る自分はそこにいる。何にも依存しないで、どこへ行っても、自分が自分のままで、普遍的なことに触れていられる。

今の日本には住めないけれど、日本語という言葉はとても好きだ。日本語で思想をしたい。

自由について ２

前回はヘーゲルの『法権利の哲学』を土台に、人間の自由がどう芽吹くのかを考えました。今回は、自由そのものについて、『論理学』から見えてくることを述べます。

『論理学』では、自由の前に必然性が来ます。必然性とは、何かがまさにそうであるしかない、ということです。例えば、肉体が朽ちることは必然的である、とかいう風に言います。逆に、日本がソチ五輪で一番多く金メダルをとるのは必然的である、とはいえません。とらない可能性もまだ否定できていないからです。

必然性とは、 なにに関しても、ことが起こった後でみえてくるものです。日本が五輪で金メダルをとってからでなければ、「なぜ金メダルがとれたのか」という問いは生まれませんし、そうした問いが生まれなければ、金メダルをとれた原因について考え始めることもできません。つまり、実際に起こったことしか必然的ではないのですし、逆に実際に起こったことならば、全て必然性の中で捉えることができます。

全てを必然的なものとしてみなしたときに、自由が生まれます。これが、ヘーゲルの考えの非常に面白いところです。ものごとの一部が必然的で、別の一部が自由なのではありません。自分の外にあることによって決定されてしまうものは、不自由です。自由なものは、自分の内部に自身の成り行きを決定する力や原因を持ち合わせています。例えば、金メダルをとった私と、金メダルをとる原因となったものごととが切り離されて考えられているうちは、私は自由に金メダルをとったとはいえません。この出来事に向けた一連の因果関係が全て一つにまとめられ、私の考えとしてまとまったとき、私は始めて、自由にこの出来事を起こした、ということができるのです。

この、自分の外で起こっていたようにみえた出来事が、自分の考えへと転化していく動きは、ヘーゲルいわく、存在、あるいは客観的なものが、概念、あるいは主観的なものへと昇華されていく（Aufhebung）ことです。ここにくると、ある出来事は、「私がそうみるからこそ」その出来事である、という風に捉えられ、その出来事を生かすも殺すも主観である私次第となります。そのため、必然性と自由とは二つの別々のものの見方なのではなく、ものの見方として二つを区別できる時点で私はすでに自由なのです。

とにかく、この思考の流れの中で一番大切なのは、自由になる前には、全てのものごとを必然性の名の下に一回まとめる必要がある、という点です。ものごとの因果関係がまだよくわかっていない内は、ある出来事の解釈をどう料理しようがそれは身勝手な偏見にすぎません。これでは、結局自分の外にある、自分ではまだ捉えきれていない原因によって、その出来事が決定されているからです。「これが起こるにはこういう因果関係しかありえない」といえるまで全てを考え抜いて、初めて、その因果関係に自分から関わっていく土台が生まれます。

必然性が自由の条件だとすれば、考えることの大切さが改めてみえてきます。昨今は、「考えている暇があったら行動しろ」とか、「意見をいうならばまずは行動に移せ」といった具合に、行動こそ意味と内容のある尊敬すべきことで、考えや意見、哲学や批評は口だけの薄っぺらい無力なものだと思われがちです。しかし、自分がそもそもどんな状況にいて、今とっている行動はなぜこうでなければならなかったのか、それを把握できないまま、がむしゃらに思いつきを実践に移しても、虚しいだけです。この虚しさと、人は向き合えていないように思えます。 考えることによってでしか、つまりものごとの必然性を把握することによってでしか、この虚しさを乗り越えて、本当に次に進むような行動をとることはできません。「なんとなく良いように思える」ことをやって、かりそめの安心感に浸っていても、全くそれははりぼての城のようなもので、自分の行動を今の世界の大局と結び付けていくためにはやはり学問が必要不可欠なのです。

ヘーゲルは、手つきも鮮やかに、哲学者が哲学によって哲学を正当化していくさまをみせてくれます。かれの打ち出すこうした自由の概念は、また改めて詳しく論じるに値するものです。

External and Reflective Alienations

The naive concept of alienation runs as follows. A person works. The labor is reflected in the value represented by something other than the worker. The worker forgoes this valuable something. In doing so, the worker also lets his or her own time and ability go. Here, alienation has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, there is the structural meaning, where the worker is at a loss as to how his or her labor is connected to the whole. In other words, the worker cannot associate his or her own labor with the whole. On the other hand, the concept is psychological, for the labor appears to the worker as something which is constantly sucked into a vacuum-like Beyond. It is this feeling of hollowness that is particularly problematic about alienation.

If alienation is to be taken in this purely negative sense, then it is something to be criticized and overcome. There cannot be two types of alienation. However, reading The Philosophy of Right, especially the first chapter where the term "alienation" or "conveyance" (depending on the translation) is introduced, gives the reader the idea that perhaps there is a way of "alienating" one's own labor in such a way that is neither structurally nor psychologically taxing. If the experience of having one's labor be sucked into the void of the unknown whole can be called "external alienation," then the experience of letting one's labor go in such a way that allows one to keep a relation to this labor may be called "reflective alienation" - reflective, since the forgoing or externalizing of one's labor is at the same time taken as the extension of one's self. This latter kind of alienation might appear contradictory and thus impossible or unreal, but I do think that there are grounds for supposing that it is indeed something that really occurs. In fact, there even are cases where a worker desires to let go of his or her labor, to disperse it in the world, and to enjoy the unknown and unforeseeable consequences of such an act of alienation. If such a concept is possible, then perhaps it might serve as a key to an ethical form of work which is not dependent upon larger systemic changes.

自由について １

ヘーゲルの『法権利の哲学』は自由についての思考を始めるための土台です。哲学の方法を守っていますし、とても簡潔に書かれています。「土台」というのは、それ自体としては揺るぎないものですが、まだそれ自体として完結してはいないものでもあります。そういう意味で、この作品は精読されるべきです。精読した後で、自分の言いたいことをさらに付け足して行けば良いのです。

自由について述べる前に、まずは哲学の方法とは何かを簡単に書きたいと思います。哲学は概念を扱う学問です。概念は色々な形をとります。これらの形は、互いに別々のものではありません。むしろ、互いに重なり合っています。概念の全体も、概念の形の内の一つです。この形こそ、概念の持ちうる最上級の形なのです。対して、「これを外してしまっては、この概念自体が成り立たない」といった要素があるとします。そしたら、この概念の最下級の形は、この要素のみを含んでいます。哲学は、この最下級の形から出発します。例えば、自由という概念について考える場合、「これがなければ自由は成り立たない」という要素一つから出発します。そして、その要素の中に含まれる矛盾をバネにして、次の形へと考えを進めます。こうして、最上級の形にまで、つまり概念の全体にまで至ろうとします。哲学的な批判や発見は、すでに先人たちが描いた概念のもつ各段階を再び考え直し、途中でなにか飛躍はないか、省略されていたりないがしろにされたりしている段階はないか、あるいは、最上級の形と思われている形よりもさらに先の形はないか、などといったことを考えることで成り立っています。

ヘーゲルは、自由の概念の最小限の形、一つしか要素のない状態を次のように描いています。自由とは、意志の自由です。意志とは、個人に宿るものです。個人とは、思考、あるいは観念としてしか存在しないものです。つまり、必然性しかない自然の世界から逸脱した個人、思考の力によって全てのものごとから距離を置いた「私」こそ、自由の最下級の形です。この「個人」が存在するところから、自由は出発します。しかしながら、この「個人」は全く抽象的な存在です。内容が全くありません。自然界のものごとの一切はこの個人とは別のものですし、この「個人」の肉体や、考えや、感情や才能さえも、自由の形としての「個人」の一部ではないのです。自然も肉体も考えも感情も才能も、全てここでは必然的なもの、つまりすでにそのあり方が「どうしようもなく決まりきっているもの」なのですから。対して、この自由な個人には、あらゆる可能性を夢想する自由があります。

さて、この個人が始めにもつ自由は、否定的な自由です。というのも、この個人は思考によって自然の中のものごとの一切を否定し、そこから自身を切り離すことによって生まれたのですから。当然、自分の外にあるものごとは自分の自由を侵害するものとして目に映ります。こうしたものごとを斥け、破棄し、否定することで、この個人は自由を表現するのです。

ただし、こうした自由の表現は、逆に言えば外の世界にある様々なものごと失くしては成立しません。つまり、否定する対象がなくなってしまうと、この個人もまた潰えてしまうのです。もちろん、この最も貧しい自由の状態にひたり続けることは全く簡単なことです。現実の世界には、否定する材料はいくらでもありますから。自然物を否定できなければ社会制度や人間関係に対して否定的になれば良いですし、それすらもなくなって独りになった後も、自分の中に沸き起こる感情や考えを否定し続けることができます。サミュエル・ベケットの『名づけえぬもの』の主人公こそ、この自由を貫徹している好例といえるでしょう。

ここにきて、この否定的な個人は、自分の自由がその実結局自然物に支配された不自由さである、ということに気がつきます。しかし、同時にまたこの個人は自由です。自由で居続けるための打開策として、個人は自分の自由意志の対象に何か具体的なものを設定しようとします。しかし、あらゆる自然物は、結局偶然的にその場に現れては消えるものなので、自由にそれを実現することは個人にはできません。例えば、私たちは自分の感情を自分の思うように掻きたてたり鎮めたりすることができませんし、さまざまな欲望や物理的な制限などに対しても概して無力なものです。

しかしながら、一つだけ、この個人にとって自由に実現できるものがあります。それは、すでにこの個人が自由に実現しているものでもあるのです。何かといえば、それは他でもない、自由な意志そのものです。この個人は、自由な意志を自らの意志によって選び取ります。「私は自由になろう」と自分で決定するのです。自由な意志は具体的なものですが、それは自然物ではなく、思考によって自然の一切から距離をおいた結果生じたものです。つまり、自由に実現されたものなのです。あるいは、自由の生じるきっかけとなった出来事は必然的に起きたかもしれませんが、その結果生じた自由な意志は、自ら自分自身を実現しようとするこの段階に来たときに、このきっかけとは無縁の自立した存在となる、ともいえます。

こうして、自由な意志を自ら実現しようとするとき、自由は一段上の形へと発展しているのです。この新しい形を、ヘーゲルは「私的所有」(private property)と呼びます。

Project Ideas

1. From Nature to Mind

This work will aim to tackle the problems related to the relation between nature and mind. This chiefly includes the so-called "problem of consciousness," although other issues such as the classical mind-body problem, as well as the problems related to the "correspondence theory of truth" and the "limits of our knowledge (of nature)" will also be discussed.

The work will be divided into three parts. First, there will be a discussion of Nature. Nature will be considered as mathematical and organic natures. The second deals with Mind, where concepts dominate the scene. The final part deals with the Transition, in which the logical movements from organic to conceptual beings will be investigated. In particular, the question of how "memory" or "learning by experience" becomes possible, how blind repetition is sublated, will have to be thought out in detail.

The ontological presupposition is that the world is fundamentally logical. In a word, panlogicism. Logic, however, is much more than formal logic. It contains all the essential abstract tensions which, although they do not manifest themselves directly in nature, are nonetheless part of nature, and of mind also. The principle which will guide the entire development is that mind is the reality or full realization of these logical entities, although logical entities condition the existence of mind. Nature mediates the two sides, and the ways in which this mediation happens will be the chief topic of part three, Transition.

Beyond this outline, there is nothing much to be said about the work. And this outline has hardly said anything at all. The reality of the work should lie in the work itself.

Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality should be one important reference point, upon which this work will build itself.

2. The Principles of Freedom

We here take the word "freedom" in its most naive sense, and try to build a systematic scale of forms. Freedom is, most naively, a) absence of all predetermination, and b) emergence of something new or other. The latter can be something other either in terms of a specific new quality or a specific quantitative determination such as position in space and time. From this we move forward dialectically by contrasting the positive and negative sides of this starting point in order to move to a higher form.

This work presupposes the work done in From Nature to Mind. Although logic continues to serve a foundational ontological role in the existence of freedom, freedom is not a concept which can be understood prior to the emergence of mind.

Moreover, as with the first work, this work also aims to show that its conclusions are categorically true. It must describe the forms of freedom as they exist regardless of whether or not a mind is hypothesizing about them as things external to itself. One of the reasons why From Nature to Mind needs to be presupposed is precisely located here, that freedom is in a very important sense identical to the mind, and so cannot be detached from the real existence and process of the mind.

Beyond these remarks, what is worth saying about this second project is, once again, only to be found in its actual execution.

A Note Against Unreflective Commitment

One prevalent cliché in contemporary social criticism is the line of argument against the younger generation which runs as follows in Japan. The older generation, after the war, has worked and worked tirelessly in order to better their lives and to pass on a better world to their children. They were energetic and committed. However, the younger generation takes material comfort for granted. This prevents the youth from feeling hungry for progress. They are always calculating how to get the most out of the least amount of work. By not experiencing the hardships of poverty, the youth has become lazy. This is the reason why they will not commit to something "real" and that they will not act in the ways that the older generation sees to be good. I might add here that Tatsuru Uchida's The Regressive Attitude (a tentative translation of the original title, 『下流志向』) popularized this train of thought quite effectively.

One of the key premises of the above criticism seems to be this: commitment is good, detachment is bad. Or, to put it another way: career and family is good, personal activities and non-family relationships are bad. In short, it is "regressive" to opt for the latter.

This premise is very symptomatic, and it overlooks one crucial point which turns the entire argument around. The decisions to not fit into a "normal" career, and to not pursue a "normal" family, are seen by the exponents of this critical view as signs of a pure lack of interest. This is true, but only from a certain perspective, which assumes the above stated premise. What if, however, career, family, and commitment perpetuate inevitably the real problems which the modern progressive life-style has given birth to?

Now I take it that each and every social organization - whether it be family, solo, office, etc. - limits the number of possible situations in which each individual may find him or her self to be. These situations further limit the kind of choices and decisions which these people can make. For example, by choosing to work at an office, as a marketer, for a major electronics company, one is obliged, for example, to dress up in a certain way, produce certain products, and sell them, regardless of other factors external to the business system. The main aims of his actions are already given to him by this company or this system. He has no freedom to say no unless he can show that his own alternatives better serve the objectives defined in such a way. The same constraints hold for other modern institutions such as the family or the school.

In a state of poverty, the first objective is naturally to improve one's material conditions. There is no point in asking further the reason for trying to relieve this material poverty. Rather, such a relief appears as an end in itself, a goal to be pursued for its own sake. It was doubtless not an easy goal to achieve, and the younger generation ought to feel deeply thankful that they do not have to repeat this process for themselves. If we decide to neglect completely what the older generation has given to us, then of course we are open to all sorts of moral criticisms.

The younger generation is thus largely freed from a state of dire poverty. This means that for the younger generation, material security is not an end in itself. It must be questioned. The urge to further ask "to what purpose is this material security for?" already implies that a new goal has been set.

What is this "new goal?" The new goal is peace.

Peace is a very tricky concept. One thought implied in the concept of peace is that every human being ought to be educated to be self-responsible and autonomous, and that unnecessary conflict and harm be minimized. Here it is further implied that peace demands a very complex and sophisticated culture, within which each individual is able to think and understand the state of the world at a very high intellectual level. On the other hand, peace does not require that we stubbornly attach ourselves to existing institutions and norms. Rather, if peace is not actualized, then one of the essential demands of peace is that such institutions and norms be reflected upon and questioned. They must be understood primarily as habits, suspect to change, open to improvement.

The younger generation has a much better grasp of this concept of peace than the older generation. This is the reason why the former refrains from so blindly flinging itself into the system laid out by existing institutions. The former knows that something is not working, and so is more cautious. Seen in this light, it is clear that this attitude is not regressive at all. Rather, it is regressive to demand the youth to force themselves into the framework which, although those who contributed to it most actively may not see any fundamental problems with it, appears to the newcomers as highly problematic, filled with anomalies and dilemmas which it does its best to disavow.

On a related note, one idea might be to write a treatise on the principles of freedom, which must ultimately culminate in the concept of peace.

In any case, I definitely stand by those who are reluctant to accept commonly prevalent ways of designing one's way of life. It is not the time to disavow, but to think more seriously.

Personal Note (2)

This is a purely personal note.

After listening to a Brahms Symphony, I understood what was missing from my current way of living - good music. It has been almost a year since I last listened properly to a performance of classical music. Listening to Giulini conducting a Brahms was like swimming in a cool spring on a nice bright summer afternoon.

This phenomenon suggested to me that music is not just an accessory to life. It constitute the movements which my mind makes at a level deeper than explicit self-consciousness.

I have been exposed to much junk "music" and noise. And for a quite considerable length of time. I will now buy a new set of stereo speakers and start listening seriously again to classical music.

Reflections on the Prospect of War - U.S. and Syria

This article from the Military Times shows that 75% of United States military troops, including many higher officials and commanders, oppose the air strike of Syria.

This shows that the majority of the citizens of the United States, the members of the U.S. military, and the leaders of the world all oppose a potential warfare between the U.S. and Syria.

Would Obama make the decision to strike despite so much opposition? If he does, the political message of such a decision would be that the U.S. will not listen to either its citizens, its military members, or other key country leaders. Therefore, at least from a formal political perspective, there really isn't any justification for the U.S. to strike Syria.

How about more rational reasons with regards to the decision itself, keeping in mind, of course, that in politics form matters just as much as the pure content of a decision? In this case, the Military Times article provides an interesting comparison between those reasons given for and against the airstrikes.

As for cons, military members point out the fact that the United States is economically not in a position to invest in another war that would take years. It also tries to appeal to psychological reasons, such as the fact that those who are actually fighting the war are getting weary of engaging in endless battles. Finally, troops point out the fact that to engage in another war under the present formal political conditions would worsen U.S. isolationism, which is not a very attractive course of action when there is another option, that of the U.S. letting the "rest of the world figure out what to do" and thus playing a supportive or a more dynamic role in world politics rather than always being Big Daddy. In addition, troops point out strategic problems related to supporting the Syrian rebels, which might be an irrational thing to do given how those Syrians can potentially turn into another group of insurgents.

On the pros side, the main reason is a "humanitarian" or moral one. The argument runs that to strike or not to strike will directly reflect on the United State's moral standpoint against the kind of violence that took place in Syria.

If we now weigh the two sides, it starts to seem that there cannot really be a rational justification for the strikes from a political point of view. In politics, while how a country appears to other countries and to its own citizens is an important political element, other more concrete issues such as economics and military strategy ought to be given priority. A country does not follow any pre-established moral rule, but rather is in a position to define for its citizens what counts as moral. Thus, there is no moral a priori justification that can ground a political decision, regardless of how complex the decision might be.

Incidentally, it is apparently quite rare that the United States military members oppose a war even before it is being fought. This historical novelty also ought to signal a warning for U.S. leaders.

However, despite these considerations, I do think that there is a strong chance that the U.S. leaders will decide to force through their decision to strike Syria. Why?

There is no reason that they can appeal to in this decision, but there is a cause (the distinction is crucial here.) The cause would mostly be psychological, pertaining to the frame of mind of the leaders in charge.

Naomi Klein's The Shock Doctrine shows how and why many country leaders, including U.S. presidents, lose their rational control over political situations and momentarily turn into irrational decision-makers. The sense of "urgency," coupled with a sophistical (= convincing yet baseless on a more critical analysis) rhetoric that makes them think that the war is "needed," together with high levels of stress (from which the only way to escape is to "make a decision" - as far as this is not made, they will have to withstand continual pressure; this seems to show that it really requires more strength, character, and leadership to not do something rather than to do it) equals recipe for irrationality. Moreover, the case of Syria is reminiscent of the Iraq War on several levels. The symptoms are all there, and one suspects that the particular interests of the weapons industry, as well as the need to maintain "social cohesion" in times where Occupy Wall Street and other dissension continue to express criticism against the government, are involved in these recent happenings.

Therefore, while it might be true that the Syrian government actually used chemical weapons against its citizens, this is not a good enough reason for Uncle Sam to lift his buttocks and fight. Nonetheless, he might be induced to doing just that. I wonder whether president Obama and his advisory board members are aware of Klein's work, and how past leaders have made wrong decisions in situations like this.

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Postscript: After reading several more articles which provide different perspectives, I'm also convinced that another possibility exists with regards to how to interpret Obama's decisions thus far made. The antiwar.com articles such as this and this suggest that Obama's very aggressive gestures might actually have positive effects with regards to the peace politics between the United States and the Middle Eastern countries. If this really is the case, then we'll continue to see Obama walking on a thin line that divides war and peace, but never crossing it completely until the peace process comes to maturity. At least it feels good to think that the prospect of striking Syria is not merely there as a trap into which leaders may fall but also as an effective diplomacy card.

The Schelling Memo (7)

Concerning The Ages of the World (third manuscript, translated by professor Jason M. Wirth), this entry will consist solely in fragments of interpretations. Here goes.

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A. The Past

What is the Past? Schelling: Past as Age (as is implicit in the title) which implies oldness. "Glance into the abysses of the past which are still in one [i.e. the person; not necessarily mind] just as much as the present" (4). It is a present past, or the oldness of age that exists in the present. The past is not something that disappears when the present comes to be.

Aim: describe the present past.
Place: look in a) the present, and b) in the person.

"abysses" - plural, suggests that it is more accurate to say the present pasts.

The goal is to grasp the "whole."

The desire to grasp the "whole" in a fixed, stable proposition (no matte how long or detailed it is) gives rise to the bad infinite. "A = x" alone is incapable of truth. "Movement is what is essential to knowledge. When this element of life is withdrawn, propositions die like fruit removed from the tree of life" (4) - ironic allusion to Hegel, obviously. "From this it seems evident that in true science, each proposition has only a definite and, so to speak, local meaning" (4).

- Later on, Schelling will suggest something like a scale of forms. For example: "Everything that has being of a humbler rank relates itself, when contrasted with being of a higher rank, as that which does not have being" (14).

God = Age?

What can be called the existential principle of method: "insofar as method is a kind of progression, it is clear that here method is inseperable from the being [Wesen] and, outside of this or without this, the matter is also lost" (5).

"Necessity lies at the foundation of freedom and is in God itself what is first and oldest" (5). Important point: necessity is the "oldest," it precedes freedom necessarily.

How is God also free, then, if he has necessity as his basis? "necessity refers only to God's existence as God's own existence. ... [I]n creation, God overcomes the necessity of its nature through freedom and it is freedom that comes above necessity not necessity that comes above freedom" (5). Creation is the key. But then this is not creation ex nihilo: This latter concept is an error based on a "simple grammatical misunderstanding" (14) and can be overcome by distinctions found even in ancient Greek philosophy.

Key passage: "What is necessary in God we call the nature of God. Its relationship to freedom is similar (but not identical) to the relationship that the Scriptures teach is between the natural and the spiritual life of the person" (5). There is an analogy between God and the person. And since the aim was to find the "whole" in the person as the present past(s), by analogy (in the same sense that Plato took the polis to be the analogy of the soul?) the place to look becomes God Himself. An even more interesting claim (although not yet substantiated or justified): "What is understood here by "natural" is not simply the by and large "physical," that is, the coporeal. The soul and the spirit, as well as the body, if not born again, that is, elevated to a different and higher life, belong to the "natural" (5). Nature and mind are not distinguished in the same way as physics is distinguished from psychology.

Being = dislocation (6). It is "ipseity [Seinheit], particularity" (6).

The privation of being (or the mere potential to be) calls for, or necessitates, the Ego (which is not being, but rather "that which has being but does not have being").

God has both forces - the "outpouring" of Being, as well as the "retreat" that is the not-having-being, or the Ego. This is an "eternal antithesis" (6).

What the hell does Schelling mean by "not having being"? - "A = B" is a judgment. But A is A without being B. Therefore, A and B are distinct, and so they are not necessarily bound. They are mediated by a third, an "x." So the expression ought to be "A =x" and B = x" therefore "A = B." The "x" is Being [Seyn]. "A" and "B" take turns "having being" [seyend seyn]. The "x" emerges out of the conflict between A and B, as that which makes the conflict possible, as unity. Not having being means that a Being is not "that which has being."

Did Schelling just treat "being" as a property?

There is a further tension between the "A = B" antithesis and the "x" which is the unity of the two. In so far as "A =x = B" is considered as a unity, as "x," it is again different from that state of tension in which A and B are fighting in order to "have Being." Therefore, there is an antithesis between the tension and unity, between "A = B" and "x."

An Age is defined by its relation to the above mentioned primordial antithesis.

Infinity does not equal to perfection (7).

Principle of Intensification: "it is conceded that of that which has been opposed [A = B], if they indeed become one, only one of them would be active and the other would be passive. But, enabled by the equivalence of both, it follows that if one is passive, then the other must so also, and, likewise, if one is active, then, absolutely, the other must also be active. But this is impossible in one and the same unity. Here each can only be either active or passive. Hence, it only follows from that necessity that the one unity decomposes into two unities, the simple antithesis (that we may designate as A and B) intensifies itself into that which has been doubled" (9). Clearly needs to be unpacked and elaborated in detail.

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The abstractness of Schelling's idiom suggests that he is trying to purify what he calls the "whole" of its temporally acquired particularities. No example can contribute to the discussion, save perhaps some quotations from the Scriptures or the general inklings towards abstract ideas expressed in various esoteric texts.

Why this abstractness? One way to interpret this is that Schelling's ontology is the same as Hegel's and Collingwood's, that there are three things which are fused into one unity. The first is "abstract entities." The second is "nature." The third is "mind." These are not exact definitions or names, but what each term suggests ought to give a general idea of their respective differences. It is interesting that God, as the "whole," is posited as neither nature alone nor mind alone. God is that which permeates nature and mind, and has to, by necessity, "create" these two realities out of itself. In this sense, while God, or abstract entities, enjoy being the basis of all reality, it is at the same time the most impoverished form of reality which desires to be supplemented by nature and mind.

It is quite challenging to sketch and then elaborate on a system of such "abstract entities" while also keeping a check on one's own methods and procedures in order to prevent from falling into a pre-critical, aesthetic mind-set.

Especially because this work is only a manuscript, Schelling does a bad job articulating himself. It is remarkable that, upon a close and careful reading, he is nonetheless consistent throughout the text.

The distinction between "Being" and "having being" is crucial. It opens up an interesting possibility of treating concepts and categories not only as mental or subjective properties but rather as the very architecture of the world. Also, the idea that an Age just is a certain relationship to the "antithesis" (the A = x = B) seems promising.

Personal Note

It has been felt as if my thoughts have hit a cul-de-sac only until today when I read the two essays and one correspondence appended to Collingwood's An Essay on Philosophical Method. New insights awaken the mind.

First, on why classical writers of philosophy refrain from citing. I have never heard an intelligent explanation given by university professors, but Collingwood gave one. His principle is this: he will mention the author's name only if he is praising the author's thoughts. Moreover, since thoughts are often criticized out of context, it is very difficult to claim that what one paraphrased within the context of one's work really is the exclusive property of the author to which one ascribes such thoughts. The author would most likely not want to be associated with a mere fragment and distortion of what he takes to be an organic part of his entire system. In short, according to Collingwood, it is only "good manners" to keep references implicit when criticizing a thought, and to let the readers figure the sources out if they are really keen on finding out more.

In university, citation was supposed to be a way of showing courtesy to the readers. Perhaps universities ought to also teach liberal arts majors how to be courteous to the writers whom they criticize. I think the best way to do this is to have students write essays on previous essays written by their peers.

Next, on politics. The elections for the Lower House held back in July had an astoundingly low turn-out rate of 52.61%. This means that only one in approximately two citizens had a say. I can understand the mentality. When politics has been impotent for so long, especially in its inability to lead the recovery process after Fukushima and the Great Tohoku Earthquake, it might seem understandable for citizens to feel that it is a waste of time to study politics, to read the manifestos and books published by key party members, and to actually make the effort to rationally decide on which party and politician to cast their vote. "It doesn't matter, it doesn't make a difference," they would say, "it is a waste of time, so I will do something else."

But to not vote is to accept whatever course the country will take. So to not vote means to argue that it doesn't matter which way the country goes. This the non-voters certainly wouldn't accept. Yet their emotional detachment from their rights entails this very logical and political consequence. And the latest elections only exemplified this logic. The Liberal Democratic Party gets the so-called "organization votes" - votes from employees of companies such as Toyota, Yomiuri, and Yamaha. If poor or marginalized citizens - a not insignificant sector of contemporary Japanese society - did not vote, these "organization votes" count, and the LDP wins. Which was exactly what happened in July. If only the turn-out rate rose to 65%, the results would have been different, given how past elections have turned out. This means that it is no time to be disillusioned. Disillusionment is the greatest illusion. Politics is becoming a key activity in Japanese history at present. Grass-root volunteer work is admirable and not totally non-consequent, but it is very limited as a means to achieve real goals such as containing the contaminated water or dissembling the existing nuclear power plants.

Third, religion. An atheist is someone who has proven to himself that it is possible to be religious without believing in God, the immortal soul, or the afterlife. I do think that there is a strong possibility that Jesus Christ was in fact an atheist, and that his disciples, who were still very much confused by what has taken place, were reluctant to portray the Son of God as such a figure, so the Bible does present a contradictory and interesting Jesus. But then, just as it is difficult to reconstruct the life of Socrates from what emerges out of the writings of his followers and enemies, so it is hard to determine how exactly Jesus lived and what in fact he preached or meant to preach. In any case, I do see clearly that the idea that everything is created by God, that everything is a gift, etc. paves the way to the liberation of thought. Thought is God becoming self-conscious as a thinking mind. The Holy Spirit is the community of those who follow the example of Jesus, and the example of Jesus is that God is not "given" by the "grace" of some force external to our "souls" or minds, but rather that God just is our own minds. Of course, this is a very tricky notion to grasp, since this does not mean at all that God can be "reduced" to what a non-religious atheist calls a mind, a mere container of psychological phenomena. To fully understand Jesus requires philosophy.

Fourth, everybody uses the word "philosophy." We have webpages of cafes and restaurants that have a "philosophy" tab where they explain their "philosophies." No one would have presented their business's way of operating as its "science." The reason is that somehow people respect and take a distance from science, yet they feel that philosophy is something which anyone is able to grasp and understand intuitively and without specialized training. It is true that science requires special skills, and that the "science of coffee-making" will have to involve technical labor that will produce just the right proportion of elements for the ideal cup of coffee. But then the "philosophy of coffee-making" seems to allow a free play of beautiful words and sales pitches. If there is a specialist involved in this, it would be a market analyst or a psychologist, but certainly not a philosopher.

Here, a "philosophy" is confused with a "policy." A policy is something which deals with a rigidly defined content and a limited range of interests. It defines a style and doesn't question itself any further. Philosophy, on the other hand, begins by questioning, that is to say, by criticizing. A truly philosophical mind would not have been satisfied by the mere beauty and psychological effectiveness of a word. It would not have allowed a concept to serve the rather narrowly conceived goal of "meeting the customers' needs." A philosopher desires to grasp the truth of things, and the truth of things only becomes clear when the whole range of different disciplines are consulted under the guidance of one unifying idea or method, which is sometimes called dialectics. If the "philosophy of coffee-making" were to be possible at all, at least it would have to take into account all the steps involved in the production of coffee, including its history and its dark side. There is nothing purely beautiful about enjoying a cup of coffee. There are many, many problems associated with it. And to philosophize about coffee is to be honest about the existence of these problems. It is also an attempt to make an effort to withhold judgement, to not take leaps, and to try and patiently describe the situation as it is. It is a form of reflection which does not panic when there seems to be no ready-made improvements at hand.

Working on a work of philosophy in Japan may seem like an act of total social detachment, but I do firmly believe that this is one of the few routes left for any hope for improving the way things are in this country.

政治と、日本語

社交の場や仕事の場、あるいは自宅でさえも口にできないような考え、しかし忘れ去るには少しもったいない考えを書き留める場として、このブログは続けてきた。カナダにいたときも、帰国したときもそうだった。

最近、小沢一郎氏の著作を読み漁っている。これまでにも、安倍晋三、小泉純一郎、福田康夫など、首相となった人の書いた著作を拝読する機会はあったが、夢中になって読めるほどの内容が書かれているものはみつからなかった。小沢氏の場合は、違った。『日本改造計画』には、非常に現実的で筋の通った本流の「改革案」が提示されていて、しかもそれらの多くが２０１３年現在既に実現されている。 また、『小沢主義』では民主主義の原理が日常の泥臭い視点から説かれているが、こちらも読めば目から鱗の内容だ。例えば、小沢氏は、国会議員となるものはまずもって選挙活動に力を入れるべし、それも、一軒一軒家庭をまわって挨拶をするという地道なやり方で勝負すべし、と力説する。これだけ読んでしまってはただの根性論にも聴こえるだろうが、そうではない。机上の空論で政治をしないように自分の感性を鍛える意味もあるだろうが、それだけではなく、実際に国民が政治家に声を届ける機会を作ることで、単に票を入れるだけではない、一歩踏み込んだ民主主義を可能とするだろう。メディアの世論調査や、いわゆる「識者」の述べることが自分の政治的な要求を代弁していると感じられる国民は少数派ではないだろうか。そのため、実際に自分の意見を生で届けることのできる議員の存在は、特に現代のような政治的問題が山積みの時代にあっては貴重で価値のあるものだと思う。ここまで考えると、小沢氏の一言が、決してただの根性論ではないことが明確になる。

他方で、『小沢主義』の中で小沢氏は「国民の民度以上の政治家は生まれない」という趣旨のことも述べている。こちらも、もっともなことだ。どんなに国会議員候補が家庭に足を運び続けても、肝心の国民が政治について無知であり無頓着であるならば、そこで議員に何も言えない、あるいは無知をひけらかすような愚かなことしか言えないなどという羽目になるだろう。挙句の果てには、「また選挙か、どうせ票がほしいだけだろう、うっとうしい」などという風に議員を中傷する人まで出てきかねない。本当は、政治家がわざわざ訪問してきたのに、そのチャンスを逃す国民の方が愚かなのだけれど。

さらに、今は『剛腕維新』を読んでいる途中だが、小泉内閣に対する冷静で強烈な批判が読んでいて痛快だ。特に、イラク問題に対する外交戦略が、小泉元首相と小沢氏との間で全く異なり、小沢氏の方が遥かに日本を自立させようと苦心している様がみてとれる。もちろん、小沢氏からみた現状分析が述べられているので、バイアスも多分にあるだろうが、少なくとも小沢氏の述べることは筋が通っている。小沢氏は、護憲派でいながら世界平和へ積極的に日本が参加していく道を提示していると思う。かれの案は、「自衛隊は護衛に徹する一方、国連待機部隊を新たに編成する」というもの。そして、場合に拠っては自衛隊の兵力を国連部隊へと異動することも視野にいれる。日本国として他国と戦争をすることと、国連の平和維持活動（PKO）に武装集団として参加することとの違いも明確に述べられている。前者は自他国民の中に本当の「被害者」が生まれる（つまり、日本という国の名の下に死ぬのは嫌だと感じている人々）が居るのに対して、後者では国際的な合意が普遍的な人権等の原理の元に必要なため、人間である限り皆賛成するような理想的な形で戦闘行為が行われることとなる。もちろん、これは現時点では理想論だ。というのも、国連は結局アメリカに牛耳られている、といった声も無視できないものだから。それでも、少なくとも戦闘行為の一切を他国に任せつつ、例えがコンゴや中国の政治的な混乱に便乗して利益だけを得ている日本の現状を良い方向に向かわせるためには、小沢氏のいうように国連待機部隊を組織することは良いと思う。そして、かつて自由党と民主党が合併したときに、国連待機部隊の編成について小沢氏と横路氏の間に合意があったということも象徴的だ。これが２００３年のことだが、２１世紀に入り、以前と比べて人々の政治的意識が希薄なのではないかという感じのする時代にあって、こうした動きを見せる小沢氏の粘り強さには舌を巻く。すごいなあ、と素直に思う。

さて、話は飛んで、さらに長谷川宏訳の『哲学史講義』の序論を読み始めた。長谷川氏自身のまえがきが印象深かったので、引用する。「翻訳は平明達意をもって旨とした。なにより、訳文がドイツ語原文とは独立に、日本語として無理なく読めるように心がけた。」　さらに長谷川氏は続ける。「こんなあたりまえの心がけをあえて口にしなければならないのは、日本の哲学系統の翻訳書の多くが、いまだ、原文にひきずられることの多い、きわめて生硬かつ不自然なものだからである。日本語の文章として何度読みかえしても納得のゆく理解が得られない。しかたなくドイツ語の単語におきかえてみる。あるいは、ドイツ語の文脈を想定してみる。挙句、原書をひっぱりだしてきて対照する　―そんなわずらわしい手つづきを要求する翻訳が少なくない。そのことは、哲学をとっついにくいものにする原因の一つにもなっていると思う。」

よくぞ言った、と相槌をうちたくなる。特に、僕は個人的に翻訳活動をしているので、一層頷ける考えとしてこれを読んだ。もちろん、原文を聖なるテクストのようにあがめ、シミ一つ無くそれを外国語に置き換えたいと欲する純粋志向もわからなくはない。しかし、それは突き詰めて行けば自己満足的な翻訳でしかないと思う。往々にして、原文に多少なりとも慣れ親しんだ人しか読めない作品となってしまうからだ。対して、原文の「字義」を多少変更しても、それによって外国語の作品に自立した活力が宿るならば、作品にとってそれはむしろ幸福なことだと思う。読者も格段に増えるし、なにより原文にはなかった新しい可能性が引き出され、さらに作品自体が奥行きのあるものとなる可能性すらある。

とはいうものの、これだけは譲れないという重要な言葉が哲学に存在することも事実である。例えば、「精神」という語。「心」などという語の方が日本では良く使われるが、英語のheartとmindとの間には決定的な違いがある。前者では感情が支配的なのに対して、後者では理性が大切な役目を果たすからだ。他にも、「理性」や「反省」など、必ずしも日本語では日常的に使われていない言葉でも、そのまま残す必要がある。その代わり、他の言葉は平易な訳をあてるよう心がける。そうすることによって、「これは」という言葉たちが実際に読者の日常生活にまで浸透する可能性もあがる。少なくとも、作品を意味不明な専門用語で埋め尽くすよりはよっぽど建設的なはずだ。そして、文句のある専門家は、自身が「字義通り」の訳を改めて完成させれば良い。「読みやすい」訳と「字義通り」の訳との二種があれば、より多様な読者層に作品が届くし、前者を通して作品の研究に取り組みたいと感じるようになった読者があたることのできる二冊目があるのも良いことだ。

Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History

Perhaps more than anywhere else, The Lectures on the Philosophy of History clearly brings out the philosophical significance of Hegel's way of thinking - his idiom and his style of composition. In a "lecture," it is very tempting indeed to try and "condense" one's points into a convenient, memorable formula. Hegel resists this temptation, and the result is that every formulaic sentence reads as a genuine part of the whole flow of his thoughts. In other words, Hegel resists the limits of formulaic prose by inserting formulas into contexts which dissolve the former's very formulaic character.

Bearing in mind this stylistic move, one could extract a few ideas in this work which hint at not only a stylistic revolution in philosophy, but also a total broadening or displacing of the proper content of philosophy.

Hegel works through the dichotomy between logic and history. This split morphs into several other splits such as idea/time, concept/time, thought/action, etc. The "Introduction" to the Lectures essentially outlines this morphology. For example, not every action belongs to history, Hegel claims, and then, because of this, actions are only actions in so far as they are historical. This double movement - first, limiting the number of actions that can be considered historical, then re-constituting the concept of action in terms of the historical - is repeated for other concepts such as nature, time, freedom, state, etc.

Of these concepts, the idea of the "state" occupies a special position. The state is, according to Hegel, the point at which freedom first comes into existence. There are no doubt more than one way to interpret this thought, and I will here only present one. Freedom is, for Hegel, to unify the manifold of implicitly existing things under a system of necessity. In this way, the necessity of the past becomes explicit, which then allows the mind to rationally claim that it has conquered its environs as well as its own unruliness. In this way, the mind then hands over its own work, the system of necessity, to the "future," the next thing that is to come. It can be anything - a capricious act, a natural phenomenon, or even an unnameable x. Now the state is the external figure of this system of necessity. Science, ethics, art, religion, and philosophy are all subordinate to the state, in the sense that while not all people can become adept at all of these domains, each member of the state nonetheless knows - perhaps through trust, or perhaps through outlines - that they are part of a larger mind which exists as the melding-together of these subjects. To take a mundane example, although one has absolutely no knowledge of aerodynamics, one nonetheless recognizes the existence and work of the engineer who does have such knowledge by comfortably boarding a jumbo jet. It is the idea of the state which makes such an absolute trust and a sub-conscious extension of the mind possible. For Hegel, only by cognizing the state in its totality can the mind really grasp the system of necessity, which will then in turn liberate the mind towards a radical re-configuration of this system.

It is very rarely the case that such a cognition happens. In fact, I would even go so far as to say that for Hegel, the state can never be fully cognized by an individual member. However, there are nonetheless individuals who embody the system of necessity which is the state, and this individual is precisely what Hegel would have called the incarnation of Zeitgeist. It only makes sense that the person who is the Zeitgeist remains unconscious of the full implications of his or her own existence, for what makes him or her a Zeitgeist is not his or her thoughts or intelligence but rather actions. Just like the trust expressed in boarding a jumbo jet is the historical component of the state which gives a place to the engineer, so is the act of war or an act of resistance played out by a key leader a sign of his or her freedom which only becomes apparent as such once the deed is done and its freedom is dead.

Although the "Introduction" is a brilliant and clear explanation of Hegel's thoughts, the rest of the book is filled with empirically flawed claims. In particular, Hegel's discussion of the "geographical conditions" of history and of the "East" is highly problematic to the point where it becomes unreadable. However, this does not mean that one must ignore Hegel and return to empirical history, which is merely the gathering of data and a timid construction of an almost unrecognizable story. One must be bold and assert that history is indeed the path towards freedom, and that the state is the condition of all history, and that anything which does not belong to a state or does not have a state is not part of history. This framework is still quite feasible. The real job of the Hegelian historian is to sort out the empirical mess created by the rest of the Lectures. Or, more fundamentally, since history is the science of Time, as Hegel himself notes, the other task of a Hegelian is to move to a higher level of abstraction and re-interpret Hegel's Lectures through the language of temporality in order to name the movements of Time(s) which still remain implicit in history.

How to Read Cloud Atlas (1)

From Cloud Atlas by David Mitchell, "An Orison of Sonmi-451" is perhaps the most disturbing story for self-conscious citizens or denizens of the contemporary world. Mitchell substitutes terms such as "movie" and "shoe" into "disney" and "nike" unapologetically. He also substitutes corporation names for social sectors - "exxon" for "oil plants," for instance. The result is a story thoroughly told from within the linguistic environment of what Mitchell calls "corpocracy."

The story speaks for itself, so I will not go into its synopsis nor its general "moral" lessons. I do think worth noting here that this ought to be the first story to be read in the entire book. The story is split into two parts, which ought to be read successively. Proceed then to "The Ghastly Ordeal of Timothy Cavendish." This, again, is split into two, which again ought to be read successively. In this manner the six stories first must be read, before re-reading the entire book according to its own order. Trying to read it from front to back on the first attempt is very, very challenging, perhaps even impossible.

"An Orison" is such a beautiful and powerful story, with no word wasted, that it painfully brings out - well beyond the limits of the morally palpable - the reality (there is no other word for it) of contemporary culture. Again, it would be futile to try and articulate this "reality" outside the flow of the story itself. It is only after fully appreciating the aesthetic force of "An Orison" that readers are able to read the next story without lapsing into the habit of searching for the simple story behind the "pretentious" words. The words are not pretentious at all. They are necessary, in order to re-present what is otherwise buried or made invisible in ordinary speech. Exactly what this implicit "reality" of our contemporary culture is can only be made visible through the experience of Mitchell's new language.

Once readers are tuned into the flow of Mitchell's idiom, its lucidity and eloquence becomes fairly apparent, and the new world which it paints crystallizes into a concept - which awaits renewed articulation - thanks to Mitchell's aesthetic rigor.

A Short Summer Meditation

There are times, and there is Time, as many times as there are languages, perhaps. For in the form of "time of ___" time continues. But then continuation is just one way of being for time, and so continuation itself will then be inscribed into the series of time which will then be unified under a different time. Whether we count time in twos, threes, fours, or fractions, or in imaginary numbers, in imaginary times, it is possible to speculate. And in speculating, one probably needs to live the experience of the time to which he turns in his speculation, yet his reader (including himself) will only see a trace, receiving an intellectual intuition but not an experience of time.

There is perhaps one Time, but then this Time will eventually be at home in freedom, and this freedom will be the freedom of the One, the only ground of all time, since it is the freedom of Time. And this One is the "Godhead" of which Schelling speaks. The space for speculation opened up in Schelling's insight is very valuable. But this big "Time" is not a time, and it is really timelessness. Perhaps even Schelling confuses between this and eternity but then this is partly because he never came to come to the end in his work. Time forms a rhythm, the fabric of the world, a politics of consciousnesses, of multiple forms of consciousness. It is the real side of the world, music, which can be traced out ideally in space and then be unified in a form. A plastic form, of sculpture, for example. And what exactly does Schelling mean by "indifference"?

It is not that thought will first produce time. I already know time, time is there. In fact, everybody knows time. The only difference is between knowing well and knowing very crudely. Time is implicated in everything, for it is rhythm, the fabric of all relations. And if one were to think well of time, one ought to stay silent and still about space. Space is the absolute "out-there" which is silence itself, the lack of all rhythm, and for that very reason also the absolute wellspring of all rhythm.

Are there any laws, any regularities, as to how this or that particular kind of time is disclosed? For it seems that some times "go on" seemingly indefinitely, while others only give themselves in glimpses. The guiding metaphor is here the layer, the world of Time as a layered world. A cicada cries, birds fly, the cloud flows, the traffic moves, my eyes trace the rhythmic pattern of the roofs, the roads, the basketball court, I hear the breathing of others, of opponents, of friends, I read and feel as if for every penetrating insight a part of spirit - not necessarily "mine" unless one radically re-interprets the meaning of this term - is awakened, made explicit, "for-itself," but not necessarily a self- relation. Thinking time is the flight from all systems, from the authorities of present systems, of correctness and propriety. It is to live in a space of clear and fresh air. It is a new life. Schelling also saw that the rhythm of times, dictated perhaps by the absolute Time which is either timeless or eternal, I cannot intuit it at present, is the totality of life. Every finitude, as a limitation, is a limitation of time, limited by Time, and returns back into Time. This is nature itself.

And why is a human being given this extraordinary capacity to meditate on something like time? Or rather, given that the human being is a meditating being, why is it that such a meditation is violently interrupted, perhaps forever for many people, by the irresistible so-called "needs" to "preserve" oneself? Why this call to perpetual action, which eventually makes the air stuffy for the intellect? But in equally violent fashion an intellectual intuition can intervene, forever haunting the body towards a different path, that of thought, of thought of time. An absolutely "useless" flight of fancy. For Time allows only a limited "amount" of time for the thoughts of time to becomes explicit for a thinking being. Such is part of the laws of Time. It is as if Time did not want itself to be caught by something that is "beneath" it, that is, by a particular time.

Every trace in space brings the imagination back to a time for a time. There is here a pull towards simplification and "leveling" in the Kierkegaardian sense, where time is no longer dialectical, no longer growing out of itself. However, with sufficient luxury, one comes to a far richer intuition of the way in which space brings different times together. Times, which are not necessarily epochs, eras, or periods. These are ready-made terms. There are many more. Suspend these, a summer afternoon calls.