Misunderstandings concerning a Grexit

From Al Jazeera to Yomiuri Shimbun, in both English and Japanese media, Alex Tsipras' actions are wildly misinterpreted and misrepresented. Here are some of the misrepresentations, and the reasons why they are false.

(1) Tsipras decided to hold a national referendum because he wants to maintain his popularity by playing the innocent victim.

This was a common reaction of many writers in both the English and Japanese media. There are many unjustified assumptions that go into this claim. For instance, the anti-austerity policy might actually be wildly unpopular, now that the country has to face a real decision between austerity and a Grexit. The Greek people are rushing to withdraw their euros from their bank account. Therefore, why do writers assume that a national referendum would be against austerity?

The real purpose of the referendum is, I think, to resolve something which SYRIZA (and the IMF and the ECB too) really doesn't know, namely, how the Greek people feel and think about the present situation. It really has come to a point where the government has to hand the decision over to the people.

If SYRIZA proposed austerity measures, then they would fail to maintain their responsibility, since their mandate was to ease the suffering of the people which resulted from austerity and clientelism. If, on the other hand, SYRIZA, the IMF, and the ECB all agreed to disagree, and thus agreed to a Grexit, that would also mean that SYRIZA failed to listen to the people - perhaps the people would have preferred austerity to an immediate Grexit.

In short, this misrepresentation fails to see the situation from the Greek people's perspective. The Greek people have the right to demand the government to make a decision which they would tolerate. In order to find out what this decision is, it is necessary to hold a national referendum.

(2) The Greek state does not want to repay any of the debt.

This is another common misunderstanding, again in both English and Japanese media. However, if one actually reads SYRIZA's 40 manifesto points, it immediately becomes clear that their goal is exactly the opposite: to come up with a long-term debt repayment solution.

When Varoufakis says that the demands made by the IMF and the ECB are "strange," this only means that the demands do not lead to a sustainable repayment. It is actually the IMF and the ECB that do not want Greece to repay their debt. These institutions need to have countries like Greece to stay indebted, so that the former can squeeze out surplus from the latter and the use this surplus to repay their own debts or to make further loans in other parts of the world.

However, in the media, many writers propagate the misunderstanding that Greece does not want to repay any of the debt. Why? The answer is that it makes it easier to write news articles which readers would like to read. (Although, given the recent protests in the UK against austerity, even this appeal might be misplaced.) In the world of political journalism, the method to generate articles quickly is to frame the issue as a fight between the good guys and the bad guys. The bad guy is Greece, and the good guy is everybody else. It makes the readers feel good, because even if Greece really is in crisis, it allows the readers to feel that it is "their fault" - a common way to stop thinking about something that requires analysis.

Even a cursory look at SYRIZA's manifesto quickly shows that SYRIZA is thinking very hard about how to repay Greece's debt. A little bit of research and analysis would have made it clear that it is actually in the interest of the creditors to not have a sustainable, long-term debt repayment strategy. Greece knows what it wants and what it needs to do in order to achieve its goals. It is the IMF and the ECB who do not know what they are trying to achieve, and, in their insecurity, desperately try to maintain the position of power.

(3) SYRIZA is anti-austerity because it wants to hold on to power by being popular.

This argument, again assumed in much of what is written in the media, mistakes the cause for its effect. It is not that SYRIZA decided to go anti-austerity when it realized that that is the way they can come into power. This makes it sound as if SYRIZA has some hidden agenda which it aims to achieve by using the anti-austerity as a scapegoat. The truth is otherwise. SYRIZA is popular because the people want austerities to end. Moreover, SYRIZA wants power because power is needed to end austerities. Anti-austerity is an end, a purpose, not a means.

Again, the fallacious argument in the media is evoked here to frame the issue in a way that is easy to relate to. Many readers are trained to feel that every political party with popular support are actually only wanting power, and that their popularity is actually nothing more than "populism." In some cases, this is true. However, in order to show that populism is indeed what is going on, one has to clearly indicate what the hidden agenda is. So far, I have not come across anything convincing in terms of what SYRIZA's "hidden agenda" might be. The party is basically an anti-austerity party, and anti-austerity and debt repayment are its priorities.

The situation is completely different with, for example, the present Japanese government. In Japan, the Abe administration holds up "economic recovery" as a pretext for introducing other measures such as a radical reform of the constitution and a drastic revision of Asian history. By comparison, SYRIZA does not have such measures; it is a genuinely democratic party. Perhaps it is too difficult for writers and readers nowadays to even conceive of the possibility that certain political parties do have concrete strategies for furthering the welfare of the people.

(4) If there is a Grexit, the fault lies exclusively with SYRIZA who failed to come up with a reasonable reform plan.

According to this line of thought, the previous New Democracy government was at least "responsible" even though the austerity measures were not a sustainable debt repayment strategy and even though the Greek people suffered massively due to these measures. SYRIZA, so the thought goes, on the other hand, is not only not able to lift austerity measures, but is also unable to maintain their responsibility to the IMF and to the ECB. SYRIZA is different; and the difference makes the IMF and the ECB suspicious. SYRIZA needs to convince its creditors otherwise by assimilating themselves to the previous, New Democracy government. By failing to do so, SYRIZA is responsible for a Grexit.

This argument relies upon previously mentioned assumptions, such as that SYRIZA does not have a sustainable debt repayment plan, and that they are against austerity only for the sake of maintaining popularity. Since these assumptions are not sound, in must be clear here that the argument also falls.

The real reason why there will be a Grexit is either (1) after the national referendum, the Greek people choose to return to the drachma, or (2) the IMF and the ECB refuse to cooperate with SYRIZA in trying to come up with a sustainable debt repayment plan. If (1), then the Grexit is actually something that the Greek people have chosen, and so SYRIZA would not be accused of working against the interest of the people. If (2), then it is actually the IMF and the ECB's responsibility that Greece had to return to the drachma. Either way, SYRIZA is not directly responsible; they would rather be taking up a choice made by either the people or the creditors. Here, it is crucial to remember that, while the choice of a Grexit might be made by the people or the creditors, the situation which calls for such a choice is made by the creditors' unwillingness to discuss a long-term solution with the new Greek government.

Finally, it is also worth seriously thinking about whether a Grexit really is a "Grecostrophe." It is true that, according to the current credit system, the new drachma would be "weak" compared to the euro. Therefore, the major challenge for the Greek government would be to establish economic partnership with other countries, so that materially speaking the Greek people will not suffer. This really is a serious issue - but why automatically assume that the government will fail to address it, that all other countries will work in the interest of the IMF? On the other hand, having a sovereign currency means that Greece will be in a position to develop what some recent writers call a "sovereign money system." SYRIZA is also a pro-basic income party, which means that it is looking for ways not only to guarantee the people's right to survive (the very first and basic human right), but also to sustain effective demand in an otherwise stagnating economy. Basic income and sovereign money also helps to reduce the amount of bureaucratic arbitrariness, another issue which SYRIZA actively aims to address. A Grexit also gives some breathing space for the new Greek government to implement such policies which were impossible under the regime of the euro and the domination by the creditors.

資本の本質から聖年まで

「資本とは何か」と問われたら、答えられるだろうか。

「通貨と資本の違いは何か」という問いに置き換えてみると、少し考えやすくなるかもしれない。答えは、「成長」である。資本とは、成長する（あるいはすべき）お金のことだ。「資本とは成長である」が最も短い答えだ。

資本ではないお金は、市場のやりとりに使われる単なる「通貨」である。そのため、経済学の入門書に載っている三つの機能を挙げればよい―「交換の手段」「会計の単位」「価値の貯蔵」だ。マルクスに従えば、さらにここで「社会的に必要な労働時間」を加えるべきだ。

なぜ資本は通貨ではないのか。商品を他の商品と交換するとき、人は交換の結果を数字に表すことができない。なぜなら、通貨を介した交換は、商品の交換としては等価だからだ。例えば、私が１０００円で本を売り、その１０００円を使って別の本を買った場合、私は得をしたわけではなく、単に一つの本を別の本と交換しただけとなる。

対して、資本の側からすると、交換は必ず得に結びつかなければいけない。通貨を通貨と交換するからだ。例えば、私が１０００円を持っている。これを本という商品と交換し、さらにこの本を１１００円で売ったとしよう。この場合、１００円の利益が出る。１０００円の本を買い、これをまた１０００円で売ってしまっては、交換した意味がなくなる。利益が出る場合のみ、私は通貨を通貨と交換しようと思うのである。しかし、１０００円を直接１１００円と交換することはできない。そのため、商品による媒介が必要となる。

マルクスの『資本論』第一巻のはじめの方に、以上のことが詳しく書いてある。

成長が止まれば、資本は単なる通貨となってしまう。等価でしか交換できなくなったとき、通貨を「投資」するという発想はもはや生まれない。さらに言うと、商品の交換もまたなくなる。「商品」とは、その起源を隠す「フェティッシュ」だからだ。もちろん、資本がなくなったからといって、ものの起源が透明になるわけではない。しかし、ものの「価値」を交換価値としてみる傾向はなくなる。

資本が成長を続けるための条件は、大きく言えば二つある。一つ目は、労働の搾取である。１０００円の本は、そのままでは１０００円の値打ちしかない。これを１１００円で売るためには、最初の本に何らかの「加工」をほどこさなければいけない。つまり、労働が必要となる。

さて、もし私が個人的に加工をほどこして１１００円で本を売った場合、１００円の利益は直接私のところに来る。対して、労働を資本家に売っていた場合は、事情が異なる。私は、例えばあらかじめ「時給１０００円」という価格で契約を結んでいることになる。そのため、例えば一時間に２０冊の本を加工して売り、２０００円の利益をあげたとしても、実際に手にできるのは１０００円だけである。（逆に、本を一冊も加工しなかった場合でも、１０００円をもらうことはできる―そのため、労働者をいかに勤勉に働かせるかは、資本家にとって一番の関心事となる。）　差額の１０００円は、資本家が手にする。これが「搾取」である。

資本の成長の二つ目の条件は、商品が売れることである。商品が売れるためには、あらかじめ消費者の手に通貨がまわっていなければいけない。しかし、商品が売れる前に、商品の総額分の通過を人々が持っているということは、論理的には不可能である。そのため、まだ商品が売れていなくても、通貨を人々が手にできるような仕組みをつくる必要がある。

この仕組みとは、「債務」である。グレイバーの作品『債務―５０００年の歴史』に詳しく書いてあるが、市場とはことごとく債務から始まる。まず、侵略者たちが前資本主義経済の社会を略奪し、人々から土地と生産様式（そして場合によっては相互扶助の文化）を取り上げる。次に、通貨を大量に発行し、これを人々に「貸し出す」。最後に、この通貨を通してでしかものを買えないようにする。こうして、人々は「債務」の返済のために、労働者として労働力を市場に売るように強制されるのである。

以上がマルクスやグレイバーなどの書き手の作品を参考にした簡単な資本論だ。

一見すると、抽象的な論理と史実の組み合わせにしかみえないかもしれないが、実際のところ、私たちの日常生活や世界政治にまで、このような資本の動きはくまなく浸透している。例えば、コンゴの採掘場に強制的に閉じ込められる子どもたちや、香港から出国できずに身売りをする大量の労働者たちをみてみれば良い。あるいは、アメリカの農場で働く不法移住者たちや、日本の農業や漁業、建築業、製造業、小売業を支える移民を考えてみればよいだろう。これに排外主義のイデオロギーを加えれば、「搾取されても仕方がない」人々を社会に組み込むことに成功する。土地と生産様式、文化を奪われて債務を無理矢理負わされた人々と全く同じである。

労働階級にとって、現代資本主義はかつてないほどすさまじい暴力の源となっている。とはいえ、少なくとも８０年代くらいまでは、「プチ・プルジョアジー」のような、いわゆる「土地・家・車」を所持しつつ家族を営む階級が存在した。それがゼロ年代になるとますます難しくなってくる。これの一番の原因は、純然たるホワイトカラー労働者の数の減少だろう。つまり、９時―５時の週五日勤務で年収３００万円＋昇給が保証される仕事の激減である。

なぜホワイトカラーが縮小されているのか。答えは、製造業から金融業へと資本が流れているからである。製造業・小売業など、労働者から搾取をして利益を得る会社は、まずは金融資本（つまり借金）を負わないと設立できない。この借金に対しては、毎年利益をあげ、金利を返済しなければいけない。成長へのプレッシャーがここからくる。そのため、ホワイトカラー労働者や、社長さえも、低賃金で過重労働を強いられる。すべては資本の提供者への金利支払いのためである。

一言でいうと、利子や罰金、賃料を徴収して生活する層が肥大し、利子や罰金、賃料を負担している側が総じて息切れをしているのだ。

現代資本主義のこの問題は、何も現代に特有のものではない。「現代に特有ではない」という考えはとても大切だ。解決可能な問題としてこれをみることができるようになるからだ。

借金が膨らみすぎ、罰金や賃料も払えなくなったとき、人々はどうするのか。グレイバーをはじめ人類学者たちが指摘するのは、こうした事態が歴史上では「聖年」(Jubilee)によって乗り越えられてきた、という点だ。

聖年とはキリスト教の考えで、例えば５０年ごとにすべての罪を赦すという制度である。簡単にいえば、ある決まった年毎に借金・罰金・未納賃料などをすべて帳消しにし、ゼロからやりなおそうという制度だ。近代的に言うならば、「革命」とも呼べるだろうか。

他の宗教や文化をみてみると、債務を帳消しにする制度というのは滅多に見当たらない。むしろ、逆に債務をでっち上げる場合が異様に多い。例えば、子どもは親に「命を負っている」とか、労働者は雇用主に「生活を負っている」という具合だ。また、キリスト教の中にも、アクィナスのように、信者は神にすべてを負っているという神学を展開する人もいる。「負い目」ほど人を支配するときに好都合な感情はないからである。

しかし、キリスト自身は「人の罪をのぞきたもう神の子羊」である。つまり、アクィナスの唱えたような神学はキリストの示した規範に反するし、その他債務や「負い目」を強調するあらゆる宗教や文化も、キリストと対立する。他方で、グレイバーのような無神論者のほうが、むしろよっぽどキリストの考えを理解しているといえる。

「聖年とは何か」という考えは、資本主義のもつ債務の必然性を乗り越える新しい手段を考えるにあたって、出発点となる問いだと思う。

Fichte and the Aesthetic in Hegel's Differenzschrift

According to Hegel of the Differenzschrift, after Kant, the problem to be solved by modern philosophy is the identity of pure and empirical consciousness. The starting point of Fichte's philosophy is the identity of the I, namely I = I. The theoretical consciousness, which Hegel calls "reflection," makes the I objective to the subjective I. Practical consciousness is, however, the precondition for making this move, for it is only by the free positing of the Anstoss that the I can experience itself as an object, even though it at the same time knows that this objective I is identical to itself. This identity is the identity of pure and empirical consciousness. However, in this ethico-theoretical mode, consciousness does not return into its starting point, namely, identity. This is because the totality of natural drives is alienated, distinguished, from the pure consciousness into which it ought to return.

To make this abstract point tangible, an example might help. I have a child and a cat. The cat attacks the child from time to time and injures the child. I perceive this as something alien to my consciousness, and in order to "make it right" (i.e. in order to identify myself with the phenomenon) I lock the cat into the cage. But then the child now goes to the cat and pokes the cat with a knife from time to time. Again, in order to "make it right," I now punish the child. However, another issue arises: did I not traumatize the cat as well as the child through such actions? Now I perceive myself as a natural drive alien to myself, and I again try to "make it right." In each case, the failure to identify myself with a particular drive also allows me to see a way in which I can identify myself with another drive - i.e. the way to achieve the identity between pure and empirical consciousness. On the other hand, the moment such an identity is achieved, it instantly sunders itself again into a new antithesis - although, the form of the antithesis remains the same as before, and only the content is new, i.e. it is merely empirically new. In this sense, the identity is not complete, it only fully comes into view as an"ought."

Fichte however fully recognizes this problem. Hegel quotes Fichte making the following remark:

"Art," Fichte says, "makes the transcendental point of view into the ordinary one. [...] From the former the world is made, from the latter it is given: from the aesthetic point of view the world is given as it is made." (152)

The key phrase here is: "from the aesthetic point of view, the world is given as it is made." The given and the made, the empirical and transcendental, are here in identity. How this is achieved is precisely what Fichte's philosophy is all about. That is to say, Fichte's philosophy accounts for how the I develops or evolves in such as way as to feel the need for the aesthetic identification of itself with its external, given world, and of the way in which it prepares the conditions for doing so.

What is the aesthetic point of view, and how does it complete the identity between the practical subject and its obstacle? Here it is helpful to return to the previous example of the I-child-cat triangle. From the ethical point of view, the I is in perpetual struggle because, as soon as it performs a particular duty, another duty lays claim on it. The limit of the ethical is the opposition between these multiple, conflicting duties, and the pure consciousness which tries to unify them and to treat them as identical with freedom. This remains an "ought" because of the nature of the conflict of the duties - each duty requires acknowledgement due to its universality, but consciousness cannot attend to them all at once. From the aesthetic point of view, the issue is not which duty to perform, but how to illustrate empirically the different duties and their interrelation. Therefore, in the example, I will perhaps write in my mind a short play with three characters: I, the cat, and the child. In an Ibsenian way, I might sketch out the tragedy of the conflict of duties, and include myself as the comical one who consciously performs a duty which he knows is bound to end in failure. In this way, although the conflict persists at the practical level, I nonetheless fully identify myself with the empirical phenomena.

Does this mean that, by writing a beautiful or amusing play about it, I can justify whatever action I perform? Not necessarily. True, in certain cases, this can be done. However, this only reveals that, what I first understood as ethically wrong was only so understood because of the artistic representation of the situation which I used to rely upon. So, for example, while the kamikaze seems to from a Christian point of view a perverted suicide mission, it is seen as the highest act of bravery when perceived from the ideological point of view of the spirits which will rest in peace in the Yasukuni shrine.

However, the reverse may just as well occur, and in fact this testifies to the strength which the aesthetic has over the ethical. Now imagine a soldier, fully immersed in the Yasukuni ideology, about to embark upon the kamikaze suicide mission. The night before the flight, however, he happens to watch a movie which represents the entire situation as laid out according to the Yasukuni ideology. Now the realization that he is playing a role in this ideology might well transform his entire ethical outlook radically: what he perceived as an act which he was about to perform for the sake of defending the honor of his own family was actually an act which served the Japanese nation, and for these ideological reasons.

Another example of such an "aesthetic conversion of the ethical" can be seen in Terrence Malick's Tree of Life. Mr. O'Brien played by Brad Pitt obviously thinks himself to be the good father, helping his family to live a "good life" while teaching his sons to "become like men." From the ethical standpoint of Mr. O'Brien, therefore, the problem with the way the family develops is that his purpose is not realized due to contingent reasons. Perhaps the children are not hanging out with the right sort of friends. Perhaps Mr. O'Brien ought to introduce them to other classical composers. The aesthetic point of view, however, questions the role of the father itself. If Mr. O'Brien were to watch the Tree of Life, he would have had to confront the totality of his own role, i.e. he would have had to identify his pure consciousness with the empirical totality of what is expressed in the film. The issue here is no longer on how to realize that purpose. Rather, the issue is, does Mr. O'Brien want to play a part in such a struggle at all? Instead of keeping his purpose and changing merely his means for realizing it, here Mr. O'Brien would be forced to renounce the purpose altogether with all possible means for its realization.

This also explains why, while it is terrifying to have to commit evil deeds in the name of morality, it is even more terrifying when, after committing the deeds, one realizes that one's actions were part of a fully formed script written by someone else. Here, the terror is twofold: first, the terror of acting out an evil deed, and second, the terror of realizing that the whole ordeal was part of a pre-existing plan. The fact that the plan was devised by a single human individual, and that the only raison d'etre of the plan was the subjective caprice of that individual, adds insult to injury. However, if the plan is perceived as the work of God, the entire experience becomes different, including the moral status of the deeds and the aesthetic judgement of the involved agents.

Lars Von Trier's Manderlay is another good illustration of this point. At the beginning of the film, Grace believes that she will have to set free the black workers enslaved to "Mam's Laws." Grace believes that she is following this scenario of gradual liberation, where she is teaching the hitherto oppressed people the ins and outs of a democratic self-organization. However, at the end of the film, it is revealed that Mam's Laws were actually the fruit of a "democractic" decision of the black workers themselves. Grace is asked to become the new Mam. In response to this terrible news, Grace, thoroughly disarmed and not knowing what to do next, i.e. losing her ethical compass completely, now whips Timothy just as if she were the new Mam. The oppression of the workers is here not stemming from the self-interest of the ruler, but rather from the workers' refusal to conform to the very scenario which the "benevolent" ruler lays down for them. This type of resistance on the aesthetic level is much more intense and concrete, which explains why Grace, with all her conviction, suddenly is forced to act in a way unthinkable prior to the shocking revelation.

If Fichte clearly saw this power of the aesthetic ("the world is given as it is made,") then why does Hegel claim that the "necessary viewpoint of [Fichte's] Ethics, far from being aesthetic, is precisely the one that reveals distorted, fear-ridden, oppressed forms, or ugliness" (154)? This criticism does not mean that Fichte somehow overlooked the identity of pure and empirical consciousness in the aesthetic point of view. As was already mentioned, Fichte himself mentions the identity between being and making. The problem is that aesthetic judgement is either reduced to a non-activity, i.e. laziness and pure looking, or else is subordinated as one moment within an already given ethical system, i.e. as a particular, natural drive which is once more opposed to pure consciousness. In short, Fichte turns the aesthetic into the ethical.

However, the aesthetic is not reducible to the ethical, for the opposition between freedom and nature, making and being, which constitutes the latter, are illustrated and defined by the former. No ethical system is free unless it is represented in a spiritual form, whether it be art or religion or philosophy. Nonetheless, there are multiple artistic representations of the world. How do these representations arise? And how do we adjudicate between them? How are aesthetic judgements made? These are the questions which Schelling will take up in his System of Transcendental Idealism. The "indifference point" is the point of culmination at which a new aesthetic point of view, a new artistic representation of the ethical or natural world, is realized in its totality.

Fichte og Fagurfræðí í Differenzschrift Hegels.

Samkvæmt Hegel á Differenzschrift, eftir Kant, vandamalið sem nútíma heimspeki þarf að leysa er sjálfsmynd af hreinu og reynslunni meðvitunda. Upphafið af heimspeki Fichtes er sjálfmyndinn "égið," þ.e. ég = ég. Fræðileg meðvitund, sem Hegel kallar "spegilmynd," breytir hlutlæga égið til huglæga égið. Hagnýtt meðvitund er, hins vegar, forsenda fyrir þessa ályktun, vegna það er aðeins í gegnum "Anstoßsetzung" að ég get upplifað mig sem hlut. Á sama tíma, ég veit að hluturinn er sá sami og mín. Þetta sjálfsmynd er sjálfsmyndinn af hreinu og reynslunni meðvitunda. Hins vegar, í þessu siðferðileg-fræðileg viðhorf, meðvitund ekki aftur í upphafið, þ.e. sjálfsmyndinn. Þetta er vegna þess að öll náttúrleg Triebe eru fjarlægst, aðskilin, frá hreinu meðvitund sem það ætti að skila eða fara aftur.

Til þessi að gera þetta punkt áþreifanlegur, dæmi gæti hjálpað. Ég er með barn og kött. Frá tími til tími, kötturinn ræðst á barnið og meiðir það. Ég skynja þetta sem eitthvað framandi við vitund mín sjálfs, og til þess að "gera það rétt," (þ.e. til þess að þekkja mig með fyrirbæri) læsa ég köttinn í búr. En þá, nú barnið gengur köttinn og ræðst það með hníf frá tími til tími. Enn og aftur, til þess að "gera það rétt," nú ég refsa barnið. Hins vegar, annað vandamál kemur upp: gerði ég ekki andlega meiða köttinn auk barnið gegnum aðgerðir mínar? Nú ég skynja aðgerðir mínar sem náttúrulega Triebe framandi fyrir mig, og aftur ég reyna að "gera það rétt." Í hverju tilviki, bilun til að þekkja mig við tilteknu Trieb gerir mér líka að sjá leið til að þekkja mig mið annan Trieb, þ.e. leiðin til að ná sjálfsmynd af hreinu og reynslunni meðvitunda. Á hinn bóginn, andartakið svo sjálfsmynd er náð, meðvitundin skiptir strax sjálft aftur inn í nýja gagnstæða. Form hið gagnstæða er enn sama, og aðeins efni er nýtt, þ.e. reynslurökum nýtt. Í þessum skilningi, sjálfsmyndinn er ekki heill. Það kemur aðeins inn í að skoða sem "ætti."

Fichte, hins vegar, viðurkennir fullkomlega þessum vanda. Hegel vitna Fichte, sem gerir etirfarandi athugasemd:

"List," segir Fichte, "gerir yfirskilvitlegt sjónarhorn inn í venjulegt einn. (...) Frá fyrrum ein, heimurinn er gert, frá seinni einn, það er gefið. Frá fagurfræðilegu sjónarmiði, heimurinn er gefið eins og það er gert.

Mikilvægt orðasamband hér er: "frá fagurfræðilegu sjónarmiði, heimurinn er gefið eins og er gert." Gefið hlutur og gerði hlutur, reynslunnið og yfirskilvitlegarið, eru hér eins. Hvernig þetta er gert er hvað heimspeki Fichtes er allur óður í. Með öðrum orðum, heimspeki Fichtes skýrir hvernig "égið" bróar á þann hátt, þar sem það finnst þörf fyrir fagurfræðileg einingu við ytri, gefið heiminum, og einnig hvernig "égið" undirbýr skilyrði fyrir að gera þetta.

Hvað er fagurfræðileg sjónarmiði? Hvernig það ljúka sjálfsmyndið af hagnýtum huglægni og hindrunin (Anstoß) þess. Hér, það er gagnlegt að fara aftur til dæmis ég-barn-köttur þríhyrningsins. Frá siðferðileg sjónarmiði, égið er i ævarandi baráttu, vegna þess, svo fljótt sem það sinnir eitt skylda, annar skylda kallar það. Takmörkin af siðferðilegið er stjórnarandstöðu milli nokkurra skyldur í átökum, og hreinu meðvitundið sem reynir að sameina þær og meðhöndla þá eins og frjáls, einn með frelsi. Þetta er eins og "ætti." Því af algildi þess, en meðvitundið geta ekki annast þá allt í einn. Frá fagurfræðileg sjónarmiði, spurningin er ekki "hvaða skylda ætti ég að sinna?" Frekar, verkefni er að reynslan sýna mismunandi skyldur og samspili þeirra. Þess vegna, í þessu dæmi, ég myndi kannski skrifa stutta leiklist í hugar mínum með þremur stöfum: égið, köttur, og barnið. Í stíl Ibsen, ég gæti skissa harmleikur af átökum skyldum, og gæti falið mig sem gamanleikir manneskju sem vísvitandi sinnir skyldu, sem hann eða hún veit verður endilega mistakast. Á þennan hátt, á meðan átökin verður eftir í verklega stigi, égið getur engu að siður alveg fundið sig í reynslunni fyrirbæri.

Þýðir þetta að ég get réttlætt hvað sem aðgerð með því að skrifa fallega kvæði eða skemmtileg leiklist um það? Ekki nauðsynlega. Það er satt, í sumum tilvikum, er hægt að framkvæma. Hins vegar, þetta aðeins leiðir í ljós að hvað ég skilið að vera siðferðilega rangt var aðeins sem svo vegna þess þess að listrænum lýsing á aðstæðum sem ég hafði í huga. Þess vegna, til dæmis, frá kristna sjónarmiði, hinn kamikaze virðist vera rangsnúna sjálfsmorðileg verkefni, en frá sjónarmiði í yasukuni-hugmyndafræði, það er hæsta athöfn af hugrekki.

Hins vegar, getur gagnstæða gerst jafnt, og raun sannar þetta styrk af fagurfræðið yfir siðferðið. Nú ímynda sér hermaður, alveg í yasukuni-hugmyndafræði, sem mun hefja kamikazeleg sjálfmorðileg verkefni. Á nóttunni aður flugið, hins vegar, sér hann af tilviljun bíómynd eða kvikmynd sem táknar allt ástandið sem er lýst með yasukuni-hugmyndafræði. Innsæið að hann er að spila hlutverk í þessari hugmyndafræði gæti umbreyta öllu siðferðileg sjónarmiði algerlega og róttækan: verknaðurinn, sem hann hélt að hann var að gera fyrir fjölskyldu hans, var í raun verknaður sem þjónar japanskan þjóðin  fyrir þessum hugmyndafræðilegum ástæðum.

Soverign Money System

Frosti Sigurjónsson wrote an amazing report which teaches us how the Icelandic banking system worked before, during, and after the 2008 crisis, why the crisis happened, and how to fix the system. Frosti's solution is the "Sovereign Money System." The report is worth reading even for skeptics of such a system, since chapter 9 is dedicated to answering some of the big skeptical questions which might be raised.

The Sovereign Money System (SMS for short) is very simple in its outline. In this new system, the Central Bank of Iceland is the only institution that has the power to create new money. The amount of money to be created will be decided by the Money Creation Committee, and the allocation of the new money will be discussed in parliament.

The aim of the SMS is to guarantee the money deposited by customers into their transaction accounts. Those who would like to invest are welcomed to do so through the investment accounts. However, in that case the bank owns the customer's money, i.e. the customer has to take the risk. So if the investment fails and the bank is unable to pay back the initial investment + interest, the state is not obliged to bail out the bank. It is partly the customer's responsibility (for choosing the wrong bank) and partly the bank's responsibility (for choosing the wrong investments.) Debtors would also lose money and property since it is their inability to pay back that leads into this collapse.

In the SMS, it becomes much easier for the state to control the money supply, have price stability, and make the risk-takers take responsibility for the risks that they are taking. As Frosti puts it, one "fundamental aim of the Sovereign Money System is to reduce the risk of the power to create money being misused or abused for private gains" (p.78).

Another key feature of the SMS is that the newly created money goes to the government via the Central Bank of Iceland. The way this works is that the government sells interest-free bonds to the CBI and then puts the money into circulation. The fact that the creation and allocation of money are done by two different organizations is already a strength, but what is more, the fact that an increase in money supply directly increases the country's revenue is beneficial, too. Frosti suggests five different ways in which the government can distribute the additional money to the citizens. In each case, the idea is to put the money directly into the real economy as opposed to the speculative economy of assets, interests, etc.

A system like the SMS is indispensable for any country who wants to deliver a good social security system. Compared to the current banking system in Iceland, the SMS allows the government to substantially reduce spending on bond interests and increase its revenue. This allows the government to allocated a larger budget for social security, something which is very much needed in the current depressed and unequal economy of Iceland. Also, the SMS is more democratic and real-life oriented in that the government only supports those who are laboring and producing surplus-value in the real economy, while forcing speculative investors to assume full responsibility for the games that they choose to play.

In short, the SMS creates a safe haven for honest workers and keeps the players involved in casino capitalism outside its fence. I think this is a great idea and I really hope that Iceland will set this great precedent for other countries to follow. (It is too much of a tall order to expect anything like this system to be introduced in a country like Japan, even though Japan is in much more dire need of such a system compared to Iceland.) It might not be a flawless perfect system, but at least the principle which it aspires to uphold is clear, simple, and noble, and the details of this system seem much more practically effective compared to those of the current system.

Why Basic Income is Feasible Today in Japan

Basic income is a guaranteed income system where every citizen is given a fixed and equal amount of money every month. I will mention the merits of this system later. First, I would like to briefly consider two common objections, before turning to a third which is a little more sophisticated yet is by no means valid.

Objection 1: People will stop working. Society will therefore fail to provide for the basic necessities of its members.

It is true that many people will choose to not work for wages. However, wage labor is only one form of labor. Many other forms of organizing labor exist in our global society: NPOs/NGOs (just think of the volunteer groups that play such an important role in disaster relief efforts), work sharing, volunteer organizations, local communities, and of course informal network of friends.

In fact, proponents of basic income argue that the system will actually encourage people to learn more skills which allow them to contribute to society in a wider variety of ways. This is how, for example, the medieval and early modern guild systems developed - that is, a person who wanted to learn a new skill would join a guild that specialized in the sorts of work that enhanced such skills. The pre-modern apprenticeship culture in Japan is another great example of a non-capitalist, non-market based skill acquisition system.

Another way of countering this objection is to point out that the objector's understanding of labor and the labor as understood by the basic income earner will necessarily be very different. For the objector, labor is a means for getting paid money. To work means to earn money, and to live means to spend money. However, this is simply a distortion of what labor is. Originally, labor is meant as a way of life as well as a way of producing use value. If a person wants to join a community or a society, he or she can only do so through some form of labor. And if a person is really concerned about the survival of the members of his or her society, then they would not think about how to earn money, but rather think about what needs to get done in order to bring about and maintain stability.

In short, a basic income system liberates labor from being exchanged with a fixed amount of money. It changes the way citizens conceive of labor, and will allow them to develop skills according to need-based and community-based cultural norms. These are not utopian visions, but rather are facts of history.

Objection 2: There are not enough government funds to cover the costs.

Let us then take a look at the budget of the Japanese government - because that is where I happen to live (you can try the same with your own government and see if this objection really holds or not.) At present, the Japanese government spends a little over 90 trillion JPY in social welfare. If this were simply distributed to each and every Japanese citizen, every citizen will be given a guaranteed annual income of about 620,000 JPY which is about 50,000 JPY per month.

50,000 JPY per month is actually an almost perfect amount. If too much is given, and if citizens cannot spend the money, then there will be a problem of circulation. Now it is possible to implement a taxation system such that people who hoard or save excessively are made to return the extra money back into the pool of the national budget. Nonetheless, it would be much more efficient if citizens were simply given the amount necessary to survive and no more. If one wanted to consume luxury goods or go on trips or do anything that might cost quite a lot of money, then one would need to work and save in order to do so, which is perfectly fair.

Now the objector might continue by saying that part of government revenue comes from the national health insurance program and the national retirement pension program, and that by introducing the basic income system, these programs would have to shut down, which implies a shortage of funds. However, these programs bring only about 20 trillion JPY in revenue. On the other hand, the Japanese government pays 100 trillion JPY in bond interests. Sort out the bonds that have gone "toxic" and reduce spending on bond interests by 20%, and your costs are completely covered. This can be done through a variety of techniques; some can be conventional (merely evaluating the existing bonds) while others can be more radical (replacing current bonds with zero-interest bonds.)

Here again, there is a difference between the objector's concept of debt and debt as it is conceived by the advocate of basic income. For the objector, debt is something which has to be repaid at all costs, even at the cost of letting the members of the state starve or wander in the streets. This, indeed, is the concept of debt that has dominated most of the history of humanity for almost 5,000 years. However, the advocate of basic income conceives of debt as something which ought to be paid back only according to one's ability. From Aquinas onwards, there is a tradition of thought which permits debtors to default on their debt, or starving people to steal, without being penalized for doing so. In the same way, the debt of the state ought to be written off to the extent that is necessary for guaranteeing the survival of all of its citizens. The state can do this by introducing the appropriate laws.

Objection 3: The labor market will dry up, and corporations will move to other countries. This will substantially reduce tax revenues, which will make it impossible for the government to maintain the basic income system.

As of 2014, the Japanese government's tax revenue adds up to about 55 trillion JPY. Therefore, this objection is more substantial than the preceding two. Indeed, if corporations withdrew altogether from Japan, and if Japan lost its source of tax revenue, would not the system collapse?

It is important to notice that the basic income system produces a kind of a guaranteed market. Every month, 130 million people are in the market with 50,000 JPY each, ready to spend it on necessities. This makes it easy for business owners to predict the sort of things that will sell out, and will be able to reduce risk of overstocking and loss. Therefore, basic income would create a sustainable market which would be very attractive to businesses. This will be a strong incentive for citizens to start their own businesses and hire themselves as well as others around them. And, crucially, they can hire their friends without making those friends dependent upon them -- a crucial factor that allows business owners and employees to maintain a long-term good relationship. These considerations show that, while the rate of surplus value and therefore the rate of profit might diminish due to lack of exploitation opportunities, businesses can still hire people and sustain itself in a state that distributes basic income.

However, in order for the government to secure revenues, it is crucial to have a set of laws that discourage long-term hoarding and also prohibit unearned income, i.e. income due to rent, interest, and inheritance. How such a system ought to be designed involves many issues which require detailed consideration.

The problem of unearned income can be overcome if the right kind of laws are established. Once this is done, there will be a strong incentive for citizens to run businesses not for the sake of realizing the fantasy of a work-free life, but rather of becoming part of a society to which they belong. Being an idle consumer is in fact deeply alienating and dehumanizing. In the face of a choice between doing nothing and doing something which others ask of you, there is very little incentive to choose the former. And if the market does not provide the kind of services that the idle consumer needs, then it is that consumer's responsibility to provide such a service. For example, if it is essential for him or her to consume goods produced at a certain factory, and if nobody is willing to work at that factory, then he or she will not get those goods. The question arises as to whether one really does want or need the goods. If one does, then one would by necessity choose to work in the factory. If one doesn't, then one would stop wanting such goods, and the need for factory work disappears altogether.

As it is clear, this issue involves many small decisions at the national, communal, and individual levels. Therefore, unlike the previous two objections, there is no clean and straightforward way to address the issue. Nonetheless, the above general considerations ought to show that it is in fact more than plausible to suppose that businesses will continue to thrive in a society with basic income, and that a decent market will continue to function, in some cases discouraging consumers from acts of conspicuous consumption, in other cases encouraging them to do the work necessary to produce what they really need.

In today's Japan, there exists a significantly pro-work ethic and tradition, combined with a more than workable budget, which allows the state, if it so chooses, to introduce a basic income system right away. The barriers are mainly ideological, and it is important for writers who are advocating basic income to continue to criticize certain popular objections which are, on closer inspection, not supported by historical evidence but are rather ideological constructs.

To conclude, basic income has many merits besides guaranteeing the survival of all citizens. It also allows the government to cut spending on its bureaucracy, and it also guarantees a relatively stable consumer market. It prevents corporations from coercing individuals to work under horrendous conditions only for the sake of surviving. It also places a check on capitalist growthism, and thus allows the state to make real material progress in mitigating climate change issues. It turns the mechanization of work not into a crisis but rather into an opportunity and advantage. Moreover, it discourages businesses to try and create new markets of conspicuous consumption just for the sake of securing additional revenue. Finally, basic income alters the concept of money and labor quite radically, to the point where it might single-handedly allow the state and its citizens to survive through future crises of capitalism which are bound to intensify.

For information on pilot studies related to basic income implementation, this report by bigpush.net is thorough and detailed.

Support basic income: sign this petition on avaaz.org. In basic income politics, petitions make a real difference.

『資本主義の１７の矛盾と終焉』―デヴィッド・ハーヴィー

２０１５年４月２日、デヴィッド・ハーヴィーのThe Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalismが発売された。和訳も近々出るかもしれない。

ハーヴィーは「資本」と「資本主義」とを区別する。「資本主義」とは資本に基づいた社会全体のことで、資本よりも範囲が広い。この作品は「資本」に焦点を絞っている。

マルクスの『資本論』をわかりやすい英語に翻訳し、現代の資本の状況に合わせて修正したら、ハーヴィーの作品になるだろう。ピケティの『２１世紀の資本』が統計をずらずらと並べる本ならば、ハーヴィーの『１７の矛盾』は資本を身近な問題として考える上で必要な道具を与えてくれる本である。そして、ピケティの作品が累進課税というあまりにも単純化された解答しか与えてくれないのに対して、ハーヴィーは世界の各地域に合わせてカスタマイズできるようなプログラムを提出している。

貧富の格差や環境問題、また資本に内在する論理的な諸問題（複利成長という不可能なことを要求したり、誰にも消費されえない商品を大量生産してしまうこと等々）を乗り越えるための鍵は、ハーヴィーによれば、お金である。

今、大学の経済の授業で使われている教科書の大半には、お金の機能として「価値の貯蔵」「会計の単位」「交換の媒体」の三つが挙がっている。しかし、これではお金に対してフェティッシュに関わることになってしまう。お金そのものに「価値」が「貯蔵」されるなどありえないし、「交換の媒体」はあたかも商品の交換の媒体であるように思わせる。ハーヴィーはマルクスに従って、お金を「労働の表象」(representation of labor)と定義する。「労働の対価」と言い替えてもいいだろう。つまり、お金とは、（１）誰か他の人に何かしてもらうためのもの、ないし（２）他の人のために何かをしたという証明、のいずれかなのだ。

とすると、お金の「価値」は労働の量や有無によって定められる。しかし、労働は「貯蔵」することができない。（年金制度はこうした貯蔵が可能であるという錯覚に基づいてデザインされているのでうまくいかない。）

また、労働を通してではなく、何か他の方法でお金が増えてしまっては、それに見合う労働がないので、お金と労働との間にギャップが生じてしまう。これは、ものの使用価値と交換価値の差の開きにもつながる。

こうしたことをおさえた上で、ハーヴィーはものの使用価値を交換価値に優先できるようなお金、また「価値の貯蔵」などではなく労働の対価として機能するようなお金をデザインするよう呼びかける。具体的には、使わずにいるとどんどん価値が下がるようなお金だ。

これによって何が起こるのか。まず、不動産や会社、特許や知的財産の売買によるマネー・ゲームを抑えることができる。そもそも、バブルの原因は、２億円で買った家を３億円で売って、１億円を懐に入れ、これを使って一生優雅に過ごそう、という幻想である。しかし、１億円を得ても、それを一気に使わない限り数年でまた０円に戻ってしまうとしたら？　それでもなお、後先考えずに１億円を懐に入れようとやっきになるだろうか？　こうした儲け方はもはや意味をなさなくなる。代わりに、「貯金ができない」ことが当り前であるような人生を生きるだろう。

現実的な影響力を持つためには、この「貯金不可能なお金」はドルである必要がある。つまり、ドルを「貯金不可能」にすれば良いのである。

さて、これと連動して、ハーヴィーはベーシック・インカム制度のような何らかの手厚い社会保障を導入すべきだという。それも、「人のため」などといった道徳的な理由からではなく、資本の流動性を保つための手段としてである。

ベーシック・インカム制度の問題は、財源ではない。そうではなく、これを貯金してしまわれた場合、資本の流動性が確保できなくなってしまう、という点である。しかし、貯金不可能なお金によってベーシック・インカムを支給すれば、最終的には毎月ないし毎年支給分は消費されるので、流動性は確保される。

また、貯金不可能なお金を導入するためには、ベーシック・インカムのような社会保障は必要不可欠である。そもそも、人が貯金をしたがる原因は、将来に対する不安である。この不安を取り除けば、貯金をする必要を感じることもない。

三番目に、ハーヴィーは賃貸取引の禁止を呼びかける。土地や不動産、知的財産や特許を使って、大多数の人々からお金を巻き上げるのが現代の資本家のやり方である。しかし、これでは労働の対価としてのお金ではなく、マルクスのいう「虚構資本」を増産するだけで、資本の矛盾はエスカレートするばかりだ。賃貸契約を結ばなくてもまわる社会はいくらでもあるし、知的財産などもすでにインターネットや図書館などを通じて共有されている。賃貸取引を禁止することは、そう難しいことではない。

最後に、ハーヴィーは「成長率０％」でも良いという新しい常識を作るべきだと言う。現在、資本主義社会では、GDP成長率が３％であるのが「常識」となっている。これは複利成長なので、二年目は一年目の１０３％の金額にさらに３％を上乗せし、これが雪だるま式に増えてゆく。これほどの成長は、物質的に不可能なのである。元々不可能であることが簡単に証明できるのだから、だったらやめてしまえ、というのがハーヴィーの考えである。

これと連動して、「お金に固執する人はどこかおかしい」という常識も作りたい、とハーヴィーは言う。人生がお金への関心で埋め尽くされるのは残念である。貧困の問題点もここだろう―つまり、お金に精神を傾けるあまり、他の大切なことを考えたりしたりする余裕がないばかりか、自分の人格までがこうした「損得勘定」に支配されてしまう。貯金はできないし、賃料によって儲けることもできない、さらにベーシック・インカムで生活が保障されており、国の安全もGDPの成長には依拠していない―このような仕組みの中では、お金に固執する理由がない。

「値段の競り合いというゲームは、一部の変人たちが狭い画廊の中でピカソを巡って楽しめば良い」とハーヴィーはある講義の中で冗談交じりに言った。

いずれにしても、こうした制度改革は国家レベルで（あるいは通貨レベルで）行わなければ意味がない。いきなりアメリカでこうした改革が起こることは考えにくい。私は、アイスランドのような、人口が少なく、政治的にも進んだ国が先陣を切ってくれないかと、無責任にも思ってしまう。ストライキをして強い交渉をする元気が、アイスランドの労働者たちにはまだまだある―アイスランドでは、昨月から全労働者の４０％近くがストに入っている。要求もはっきりしている―最低賃金の５０％増額である。どんなにアイスランドが小さい国であっても、国として成功例を示せば、他の国―例えばギリシアやアイルランド、日本など、資本の論理の負の側面、陰の側面を背負っている人たちが教養と行動力とを備えている国々―もそれにつづく決断をするかもしれない。

日本では、７０年代から労働組合の力が弱まっている。今では、ストライキはほとんど起こらなくなっている。そのため、労働者の交渉力が皆無に等しくなっている。しかし、労働者の力を１９３０年代から６０年代後半のように回復しても、根本的な解決にはならない―余剰価値が生まれなくなり、資本が再び危機に陥るからである。このあたりをわかりやすくハーヴィーが解説している動画がある。（英語だが。）

とはいえ、ストをする能力というのは、労働者の権利を守る上でほぼ唯一有効な武器なので、再びこれを回復するために労働組合を通じてネットワークをつくるのは大切だと思う。例えば、コンビニのフランチャイズ店舗の店長がいっせいにストをする態勢ができていたらどうか。セブンイレブンやファミリーマートなどの上層部も、賃金の見直しをせざるをえなくなる。このような具体的な活動が何を目指しているのかを、ハーヴィーの本は明確にしてくれる。例えば、ストが目指すのは単なる賃上げではなく、労働者の生活が政府によって法的に保障されることである。ということは、これと連動して、新しい貨幣システムの導入も必要となる。つまり、労働組合と連動して、例えば地域通貨やオルタナティブ通貨団体なども動くことになるだろう。例えば、ストの間に物資の交換を行うための専用の貨幣をつくっても良いかもしれない。

さらに、ストに加え、家賃を払わないなど、賃料の滞納も、戦略的に行えば抵抗運動になる。一人の人間が賃料を滞納するだけでは大家さんに追い出されるだけだが、例えば全国規模で２ヶ月滞納した場合、 事情は全く違ってくる。マイクロソフトのオフィスツールを買わずに、無料のオープンオフィスやウブンツなどを使うことも有効だ。土地、不動産、そして知的財産は、共有物として必要に応じて使えるようにすべきだ。バンクーバーやニューヨークなどの大都市で特に顕著に見られる現象だが、箱物だけが増え続け、一部の人間の売買ゲームに使われる一方で、路頭に多くの人々が迷っているのは明らかにおかしい。家賃を払えない人は払わなくても部屋を使って良い―こういう意識は、例えばニューヨークの低所得層の間にはある程度浸透しているし、日本でも田舎の方に行くとこういう意識を持っている人もけっこういる。不可能なことではない。

こうした運動をするためには、個人が失敗しても集団としては運動を続けられるような団体が必要。カナダやイギリスなどではこうした団体がたくさんあるが、日本では「第三国を助ける」というような「慈善団体」はあっても、日本国内の問題について政府や企業と積極的に交渉するような団体はまだまだ少ないのではないか。ハーヴィーの本を読んだあとは、こうした団体を将来的に立ち上げて運営する必要を感じた。

Unemployment Rate in Japan According to the Japanese Government - Its Definitions and Biases

There is no such thing as a "neutral" unemployment rate. This is because the definitions of "workforce," "employed," and "unemployed" may vary. According to what do they vary? Here, political and economic considerations quickly enter into the picture. But before getting ahead of ourselves, first we should look at how the Japanese government defines these categories.

The Japanese government's website divides the entire population into the following categories:

0. Those younger than 15 are automatically excluded from consideration.

1. Those older than 15 are divided into:

1.1.Non-workforce (i.e. people who are not considered to be part of the labor market)

1.2. The workforce (i.e. the labor market)

Of the latter,

1.2.1. The employed
1.2.2. The unemployed

Here comes the problematic part. According to the website, if you worked for one hour or longer during the final week of a given month, you are considered employed. (For those who can read Japanese, see Question F-5, "If you only worked for one hour per month, are you still considered employed?") That means that, working for one hour at, say, a local daycare centre, and earning something like $10, already makes you employed. You are then put into the same category as those who earn $3,000 per month working in an office.

As if this were not enough, the government also states that if you are staying at your relative's house and helping out with housework, then you are employed. (Again, see Question F-4, "Are people who help out with housework considered employed even if they do not earn anything?")

As a side-note, the government claims that these definitions are in accordance with ILO standards. However, the ILO criteria explicitly states that housework without pay should not count as labor. Here's the evidence:

Students, homemakers and others mainly engaged in non-economic activities during the reference period (...) should be regarded as unemployed (Paragraph 1, (6))

How is the Japanese government's definition of the "unemployed" consistent with this?

To top it all off, the definition of "workforce" on the Japanese government's website states that if you are not registered at the unemployment office, and if you have not been submitting resumes or going to interviews during the reference period, then you are not part of the workforce. This means that the so-called "NEET" people are mostly excluded from the survey altogether and so are not counted as unemployed.

In sum: the Japanese government considers people helping out with housework and people who take up highly precarious work as employed, while they do not count the NEET and other such "inactive" people as part of the unemployed.

Taking all this into account, the official unemployment rate, which is 5% for age 15-24 and 4.5% for age 25-34, begins to appear suspect of misrepresentation. In fact, the Japanese government website officially admits that the real unemployment rate may be over 10% (overall; hence, obviously higher for ages 15-34) due to biases in the way the official rate is calculated. Despite this apologetic note, however, the government still boasts that unemployment rates have been diminishing for "59 consecutive months up to now."

Why does the Japanese government work with such obviously problematic definitions? The answer is that it wants to justify its cut on public spending. At the national level, it is convenient for the Japanese government to present Japan as a country with a healthy and sustainable economy, so that it can maintain the confidence of those who invest in Japan-based corporations. It also helps to have a good image when trying to host the Olympics in 2020. At the individual level, it allows government bureaucrats to reject more applications for social security and thus cut expenses. If you live with your relatives and help out with housework, and if you apply for social security, you will not get it because you are technically speaking "employed."

Corporate executives, or financial capitalists, also have an incentive to keep this kind of definition in tact. In this way, they can encourage workers to actively market their own labor power on the labor market and generate competition. This then discourages those who made it into the white collar work environments from negotiating with their bosses or employers -- the employers will simply fire such "rebels," or might put pressure by pointing out that there is a huge reserve army waiting to take his or her position. This is how not only "unskilled" (a dubious category in its own right) but also "skilled" labor is made cheaper -- lawyers, doctors, professors, and state officials are made to work at wages and salaries which are no better than the part-time worker struggling at a convenience store or a hamburger shop.

So, what is the take-home message for the unemployed youth? 

First, on a psychological level: Do not feel as if you are part of the 4.5-5% "lazy" people. There are so many more people like you who are not counted in simply because of the way the definitions are set up.

Second, on a political level: The government has an interest in making unemployed young people invisible. Therefore, actively promote visibility. Make it an issue which the government cannot ignore. Let those who work for social security offices know that there is a bias in the way the government defines "workforce" and "employed."

Finally, it is also important to remember that being employed does not necessarily make one any stabler. Currently, 40% of all Japanese workers are part-time, or, more accurately, precarious. Of the remaining 60%, an indefinite part are under pressure to work well beyond the norm to avoid getting fired. There are physical and psychological health risks associated with working under such conditions. It is very important for unemployed people to be selective with what kinds of jobs they are willing to take. Do not let unemployment statistics and the rhetoric surrounding it prevent you from being selective with the kind of job you would like to take.

Meanwhile, there is much that the Japanese government can do to improve their method and produce a more accurate unemployment rate which better reflects reality.

Here are the suggestions:

(1) Revise the definitions. Basically, if a person cannot earn enough income to sustain him or her self, then even if that person is working, that person ought to be considered unemployed. In other words, do not count the working poor as employed.

(2) Use different data. Presently, the government surveys 100,000 citizens from 40,000 randomly chosen households. This is a very, very small sample - only 0.077% of the total population. Rather than relying on such a limited survey, the government should make corporations and companies produce employment reports and compare these reports with census data to calculate the unemployment rate.

Obviously these are very rough formulations and require much improvement, but the main idea should be clear. Working along those lines, the Japanese government, working with the ILO, can draft an alternative set of criteria in order to increase the accuracy of unemployment rates.