Part II of Outline of the Philosophy of Right is all about
abstract subjectivity. At the starting point, the subject emerges as the
gap between the promise and performance of a contract. The subject
occupies both sides in a negative way, and so is the gap which separates
the two. By degrees, the subject frees itself from the initial thing
which was its object of contract. The subject passes through various dichotomies -- intention/action, means/ends, etc. -- and then reaches its unity in the notion of happiness. It then passes through the dichotomy "good/conscience." In the end, the subject is thoroughly stripped of all positive and particular content, and thereby occupies the place of pure particularity and arbitrariness.
Part III, "Sittlichkeit," begins from this point where the subject is this thoroughly abstract self-related negativity. The subject is in itself the will to be all, or to be the subject. On the other hand, for itself, the subject is still one, particular subject, against which stands the highest good.
The first attempt of the subject to become all is family. The family grows in twos and threes. Two: two individuals make absolute commitments to each other, renounces their particularity, and thus becomes a universal self-consciousness. Three: the child produces another family, and the tension between families, as well as the family and the subject, becomes explicit in the consciousness of the child. The second attempt is civil society. The third attempt is the state.
An important first step, by which consciousness steps into the sphere of ethics proper, is marriage. In marriage, two minds absolutely commit to each other. This commitment is "absolute" in the sense that its meaning and form is not influenced by what has preceded it. Marriage is thus a fresh beginning, a negative act by which the very negation which negates the past is also negated.
One important point to note is that marriage can only happen between two individuals. Why? One individual is the I, the mind which is related to itself. The other individual is the other mind, who is equally an I yet is related to me in a negative way, that is, there is always the possibility that the other will will the opposite of what I will. However, if a third individuals comes along, then there is the possibility that the two others oppose each other. This possibility allows me to make an arbitrary choice between the two opposite wills. This choice will always rest on a particular, contingent, and external reason, which has nothing to do with an absolute commitment to the barren will of the other. This choice and contingency is strictly virtual. Therefore, for example, it does not matter if all three individuals live in the same house. There is a possibility that the three would live in separate places, in which case there is no way for one's will to be directed simultaneously to both of his partners (e.g. I cannot sincerely want to live in Washington DC while also wanting to go to Ottawa at the same time, assuming that it is in those two places that my presumed two partners live.) Only if there is just one partner could I ever desire to live with her absolutely and thus blame the inability to do so on external, contingent reasons. Otherwise, the fault lies in the form of the relationship, not just on such contingencies.
One question arises here: how does this absolute negativity of marriage relate to the equally absolute subjective notion of love? On the one hand, the two are in tension. In marriage, love is a derived effect of external and objective ceremonies. Therefore, it is not that I marry someone out of love, but rather that I love someone because I am married to her. Love, however, also asserts its absolute negativity, although subjectively. Love commits my own will to the abstract will of the other. No matter what the external appearance of our relationship might be, it is this subjective commitment that counts in love. Therefore, from the point of view of love, whether or not I am married to the other is a contingent and insignificant matter.
How to resolve this tension? On the other hand, love and marriage share an essential feature, namely, that both privilege the act of commitment over any particular quality or event. This formal correspondence between the two is precisely also the reason why the gap between the two cannot be simply closed. If there were to be such an absolute merging of two wills, then it has to be either subjective or objectively initiated, but not both at the same time. Or at least this is how the situation appears after these two positions are spelled out in their formal detail.
Hegel does not talk about the ethical role of love in the sections on marriage and family. However, since love is essentially the moment of subjective ethicality, as it were, it surely has a role to play in altering the content of the ethical form of marriage.
An important first step, by which consciousness steps into the sphere of ethics proper, is marriage. In marriage, two minds absolutely commit to each other. This commitment is "absolute" in the sense that its meaning and form is not influenced by what has preceded it. Marriage is thus a fresh beginning, a negative act by which the very negation which negates the past is also negated.
One important point to note is that marriage can only happen between two individuals. Why? One individual is the I, the mind which is related to itself. The other individual is the other mind, who is equally an I yet is related to me in a negative way, that is, there is always the possibility that the other will will the opposite of what I will. However, if a third individuals comes along, then there is the possibility that the two others oppose each other. This possibility allows me to make an arbitrary choice between the two opposite wills. This choice will always rest on a particular, contingent, and external reason, which has nothing to do with an absolute commitment to the barren will of the other. This choice and contingency is strictly virtual. Therefore, for example, it does not matter if all three individuals live in the same house. There is a possibility that the three would live in separate places, in which case there is no way for one's will to be directed simultaneously to both of his partners (e.g. I cannot sincerely want to live in Washington DC while also wanting to go to Ottawa at the same time, assuming that it is in those two places that my presumed two partners live.) Only if there is just one partner could I ever desire to live with her absolutely and thus blame the inability to do so on external, contingent reasons. Otherwise, the fault lies in the form of the relationship, not just on such contingencies.
One question arises here: how does this absolute negativity of marriage relate to the equally absolute subjective notion of love? On the one hand, the two are in tension. In marriage, love is a derived effect of external and objective ceremonies. Therefore, it is not that I marry someone out of love, but rather that I love someone because I am married to her. Love, however, also asserts its absolute negativity, although subjectively. Love commits my own will to the abstract will of the other. No matter what the external appearance of our relationship might be, it is this subjective commitment that counts in love. Therefore, from the point of view of love, whether or not I am married to the other is a contingent and insignificant matter.
How to resolve this tension? On the other hand, love and marriage share an essential feature, namely, that both privilege the act of commitment over any particular quality or event. This formal correspondence between the two is precisely also the reason why the gap between the two cannot be simply closed. If there were to be such an absolute merging of two wills, then it has to be either subjective or objectively initiated, but not both at the same time. Or at least this is how the situation appears after these two positions are spelled out in their formal detail.
Hegel does not talk about the ethical role of love in the sections on marriage and family. However, since love is essentially the moment of subjective ethicality, as it were, it surely has a role to play in altering the content of the ethical form of marriage.
