Let those who are still dissatisfied with this beginning take upon themselves the challenge of beginning in some other way and yet avoiding such defects. Science of Logic. 2010. p.53.
Historicizing the legacy of Hegel is perhaps the most formidable task which contemporary philosophy faces. Heidegger's approach does not work, in so far as Dasein in Being and Time is in fact a concept, a thought, and thus is in some sense a representation. Dasein is the being to which (or to whom) the question of the meaning of being arises. In so far as the questioning is taking place at the beginning of phenomenology, Dasein is an as it were a priori necessary being. However, this does not mean that one ought to begin philosophy from the analysis of Dasein. There are other beings for which (or for whom) the question of the meaning of being does not arise. Why should one begin philosophy with Dasein rather than from one of these latter beings? The answer is that, while Dasein is necessary for philosophy as such to have its existence, these latter beings may or may not be there for philosophy. Another reason is that these latter beings, in order to be there, must have already been mediated in some way by the question of the meaning of being, for after all these are beings. However, even here, the question still remains as to whether or not it really is necessary to have a questioning being, i.e. Dasein, as the a priori foundation for the being of all other kinds of being. What if there were beings who are able to be without the mediation of a conscious, questioning being such as Dasein? This, then, is the limit of Heidegger's thought: for Heidegger, the legitimate question in philosophy is always a question concerning a question, or a reflection upon an seemingly immediate question. In other words, the question of the meaning of being is always reflected back into the question of the meaning of being of Dasein. This leads Heidegger to describe the presuppositions which make a particular Dasein possible, but Heidegger's questioning cannot reach beyond the "world" which is always the world of Dasein.
The same defect can be found with any other mode of questioning which in some sense presupposes a mediation when beginning a process of questioning or dialectics. Hegel's challenge is to have philosophy make a beginning without presupposing such mediation. While Heidegger's legacy does constitute an interesting and constructive chapter in the philosophy of mind, it nonetheless is not powerful enough to overturn the Hegelian system or to meet the challenge which Hegel poses in the Science of Logic.
There is no quick and easy way out of the problem of the beginning. If one begins with the thought of pure being, then one necessarily ends up thinking pure nothing, and the Hegelian machine comes into motion, manufacturing all the other categories with a necessity and rigor which is difficult to dispute. And even when one is able to insert other categories in between, the introduce further mediations into the system -- a task which is no doubt appropriate given the significant advancement in all fields of the different sciences since Hegel's death -- the fact still remains that the system is fundamentally a Hegelian one. This is because the beginning is made with pure being, and because the thought of pure being immediately collapses into pure nothing. Negation here necessarily becomes the predominant motif, and unless one is able to find a still prior, different motif which can also envelop negation, one remains caught within the Hegelian framework.
One question worth raising is this: how did Hegel himself manage to historicize his predecessors? The answer is: Hegel found a way to begin philosophy with a thought which is more fundamental than anything else, and he succeeded in patiently working through the consequences of making such a beginning. In particular, Hegel's way of beginning philosophy allows him to uncover and criticize the hidden presuppositions in the systems of Spinoza and Fichte. The lesson to be learned from Hegel, a lesson which will allow a thinker to historicize and overcome Hegel, is this: one ought to begin philosophy in a manner different from that of Hegel's, and thus uncover the hidden presuppositions which informs Hegel's way of beginning philosophy.
