What does it mean to philosophize in Japanese? And what happens if one's thoughts come together through two languages?
The science of time needs to be prefaced by a science of infinities.
At least on Terry Pinkard's interpretation in Hegel: A Biography, Hegel's idea of society is not based on the collection of individuals. Rather, individuality as such emerges as a result of universal self-consciousness, i.e. reason. It is always through another that a 'self' reflectively comes into being, and only at a certain stage in such an interaction can a 'self' become self-conscious as an individual, i.e. a person whose borderline between itself and its other is clearly defined and definable. For instance, in order to secure the autonomy of my bodily movements, I need to first and foremost live in a society, founded on the "ethical substance" of modernity, which gives rise to a whole host of minute practices that prevent others from unnecessarily or 'irrationally' intervening with how I will move my own body. Likewise, freedom of thought and speech is something cultivated by first learning various methods of thought and rules of language and then told afterwards to reflect on these. It is only through such a 'negative' reflection that the standpoint of the 'self' becomes recognizable for the self. This act of self-reflection, however, is again only possible within a society which, through its own rationality, makes various practices manifest. These ways in which society 'gives rise' to individuals imply that 'society' in the Hegelian sense is neither a representation originally represented (either implicitly or explicitly) by a 'transcendental' self or subject, nor a material or spiritual collection of multiple 'individuals' which are ontologically prior to society.
At least on Terry Pinkard's interpretation in Hegel: A Biography, Hegel's idea of society is not based on the collection of individuals. Rather, individuality as such emerges as a result of universal self-consciousness, i.e. reason. It is always through another that a 'self' reflectively comes into being, and only at a certain stage in such an interaction can a 'self' become self-conscious as an individual, i.e. a person whose borderline between itself and its other is clearly defined and definable. For instance, in order to secure the autonomy of my bodily movements, I need to first and foremost live in a society, founded on the "ethical substance" of modernity, which gives rise to a whole host of minute practices that prevent others from unnecessarily or 'irrationally' intervening with how I will move my own body. Likewise, freedom of thought and speech is something cultivated by first learning various methods of thought and rules of language and then told afterwards to reflect on these. It is only through such a 'negative' reflection that the standpoint of the 'self' becomes recognizable for the self. This act of self-reflection, however, is again only possible within a society which, through its own rationality, makes various practices manifest. These ways in which society 'gives rise' to individuals imply that 'society' in the Hegelian sense is neither a representation originally represented (either implicitly or explicitly) by a 'transcendental' self or subject, nor a material or spiritual collection of multiple 'individuals' which are ontologically prior to society.
