Division
1.
Existent-for-itself, the one
2.
Multiplicity, repulsion, attraction
3.
Quantity
A.
Being-for-itself as such
“We
say that something is for itself inasmuch as it sublates otherness,
sublates this connection and community with other, has rejected them
by abstracting from them. The other is in it only as something
sublated, as its moment;
being-for-itself consists in having thus transcended limitation, its
otherness; it consists in being, as this negation, the infinite
turning back into
itself” (126).
- As a representing / intuiting being, consciousness is one species of being-for-itself
- In turning back into itself, consciousness knows two things: 1) that it has idealized its object, the object is in it; and 2) that the object, as the object of idealization, has external existence (Hegel's idealism is already also realism)
- “Self-consciousness … is being-for-itself brought to completion and posited; the side of reference to another, to an external object, is removed” (126)
- Infinity has its clearest example in self-consciousness
1.
Existence and being-for-itself
The
negation of existence – which was turned towards an other
– now turns back into itself in infinite being, and here the
infinite being is self-negating, unified process. This is a
being-for-one (or a
being-for-unity.)
2.
Being-for-one
- “This moment gives expression to how the finite is in its unity with the infinite or as an idealization” (127)
- All idealizations are being-for-one
- The German expression “Was für ein Ding etwas say” (What, for a thing, is this or that) contains the insight of being-for-one – this expression asks the quality of the thing while also bringing the thing into contact only with itself
- Unlike Spinoza, Malebranche saw the ideality (“perfection”) of a thing in God as the condition for our having subjective experiences at all
- In Leibniz, or in a monadology, only the idealized result of being-for-one remains, while existence remains unthought; in this Leibniz falls behind Malebranche
- Moreover, monads, as external to each other, lack determinate negation, and thus, despite being determinate, are posited as indeterminate entities
- Kant / Fichte both stall at the bad infinite – the interplay between being-for-itself (mind) and existence (thing-in-itself) is perpetually repeated
3.
The one
Being-for-itself
is a collection of beings-for-one, while the negation which sublates
them remains immediate and unmoved – the unity which results from
this unmoved repetition is the one
Moments
of the one include (will be elaborated in due course): 1) negation in
general; 2) two negations; 3) the identity of the two; 4) absolute
opposition of the two; 5) self-reference, identity proper; 6)
negative self-reference
B.
The One and the Many
1.
The one within
- The one, qua the result of absolute negativity, is immediate an unalterable existent
- Here, the determinateness of the one is that it exists as self-reference, as true infinity
- Hence it is also true to say that the one is indeterminate
- In passing into nothing, the one becomes self-referring negativity – the void
2.
The one and the void
- The void is posited outside the one as absolutely distinct
- Here, with the opposition between the one and the void, being-for-itself acquires existence
- This kind of existence corresponds to ancient atomism
- “The void is the ground of movement only as the negative reference of the one to its negative” (134)
- To see the void or negativity as the source of movement was the speculative strength of ancient atomism
- “Physics, with its molecules and particles, suffers from its use of the atom, the principle of extreme externality, and therefore from an extreme lack of the concept, as does also the theory of state that starts from the singular will of individuals” (135)
3.
Many ones
- The one and the void are posited simultaneously, each being a negation directed against the negativity of the other
- The one is being-for-itself, the other is indeterminate existence, when considered as positive existents
- The other to which the negative moment of the one refers to is not a void but an existent, another one
- The one is thus a “becoming of many ones”
- The becoming, which is not a passing into nothing but rather a multiplication of ones, is repulsion
- There are two kinds of repulsion: 1) the repulsion of the one from within itself, or the self-negation which splits the one into a multiplicity; 2) repulsion as the mutual exclusion of two or more already existing ones
- How does the second arise out of the first is the next issue
- As a finished product, the new ones do not refer to each other or to their origins
- Thus, the one does not appear as arising out of another – it is rather pure self-reference
- Here we see that the many ones are posited as non-posited – their self-reference is presupposed in being posited
- The void sustains the mutual indifference of the many ones – it stands in as a substitute for their limits
- The infinite lack of reference of the one is converted into the infinite pluralization of the one
- “The plurality of the ones is infinity as a contradiction that unconstrainedly produces itself” (136)
- The Leibnizian monad is only determined up to this state of plurality, since the monad is this self-ideating entity
- The weakness of Leibnizian idealism is that it takes the plurality to be an immediate given, and thus forgets the moment when each monad had to refer to another one
- The consequence is that Leibniz had to externally unite those monads by positing a mega-mind, that of God or of the philosopher
