C.
Repulsion and Attraction
1.
Exclusion of the one
- Repulsion, in so far as it is directed against a one posited by an other, is repelling
- “The being-for-itself of the many ones thus shows itself to be their self-preservation through the mediation of their mutual repulsion in which they sublated themselves reciprocally and posit the others as mere being-for-another. But the self-preservation consists at the same time in repelling this ideality and positing the ones as not being-for-another” (138)
- The ones maintain themselves through their reciprocal exclusion – this is twofold: 1) they must have a firm point of support within themselves (but are in fact all the same in being mere ones); 2) their ways of relating to each other are also identical
- In this, the ones are one affirmative unity
- If their reciprocal negation is negated, they cease to be
- The ones maintain their own unities by a perpetual failed negation which merely “rebounds” off other ones
- In repulsion, the negative relation of the one to its other one becomes explicit for the one – in this explicitness, the ones is now in a new relation to the other one
- Hegel calls this new relation a “coming-together-with-oneself” - this is attraction
- In attraction, the one posits the many within itself by itself
- The concept of a pure, exclusive self-subsistence is one of the worst errors in logic and science
- This error is exemplified in solipsism, which, in its efforts to remain self-conscious of its own purity, repeatedly destroys the diversity confronting it, which latter is in fact part of itself
- “Reconciliation is the recognition that that towards which the negative relating is directed is rather its essence, and this is only in the disisting from the negativity of its being-for-itself rather than in holding fast to it” (140) – the recognition is not that of the other as other, but rather the act of passing judgment on the quality of the other as if it were that of the one; the other is stripped of all mysteriousness here
- The propositions regarding the one and the man is Plato's Parmenides are false on account of conceiving their relation as being rather than becoming
2.
The singular one of attraction
- If repulsion is the fragmentation of the one, then attraction is initially a movement which presupposes the former
- Attraction as such points to its own ideality by showing that its own realization is its own negation; it requires its opposite, repulsion
- Attraction is the positing of the identity between the many ones – new one is here posited
- This posited one now has ideality – a singular one, which “attracts through the mediation of repulsion”
3.
The connection of attraction and repulsion
- The difference between one and many (static states) have turned into the difference between repulsion and attraction (logical movements)
- The movement of dispersal (repulsion) just is the unifying factor of the many (attraction) – the two presuppose each other
- Repulsion “ought to have” attraction and vice versa – this is their connection
- In this, both repulsion and attraction come to contain its other within itself as its own mediation
- Repulsion qua repelling presupposes that the one has already sundered itself
- Attraction qua unification already presupposes that the many has ceased to be a collection of self-subsisting ones
- In either case, the result is presupposed in the movement, which means that each presupposes the other
- “Therefore the coming-out-of-itself (repulsion) and the self-positing-as-one (attraction) are already inherently present as undivided” (143)
- With the insight that the one repels itself as its own absolute, being-for-itself is completed
- This new one – for which an immediately given multiplicity is always viewed as attracted in their repulsion and vice versa, which is to say that the ones are mere idealized moments – this is quantity
Remarks
- Attraction and repulsion are commonly equated with (natural) forces
- In the following, the difference between logical movement (the present conception) and natural force (which is the common conception) will be compared
- As forces, both are independent of each other
- Moreover, both find their unity in a third, matter
- The Kantian conception deduces matter as a necessary concept out of repulsion and attraction
- The comparison here is justified by the fact that sensuous instances of repulsion / attraction have their logical counterparts as their ground
- Kant's “construction” (a synthetic movement) of matter is really just an analytical procedure which presupposes the concept of matter
- This is evident from Kant's claims that “attraction is necessary because repulsion alone would not give rise to matter”
- For Kant, repulsion is given as intuition, while attraction is a product of reflective judgment
- But Kant ought to have noticed the sensuous manifestations of attraction too, for example in visual phenomena
- Nonetheless, the claim that two forces are required for the representation of matter is to be highly esteemed
- Kant assumes that attraction can “act across empty space” - but here matter and space are uncritically separated, and moreover space is assumed to be “empty” even if attraction, qua force, permeates it
- In fact, matter, according to Kant, ought to be constituted by forces, not merely be moved by them
- The same criticism applies to distinctions like centripetal / centrifugal
- The ambiguity inherent in such distinctions lead to problems concerning how to measure these forces – this issue will be dealt with in the discussions concerning the inverse ratio
