Tuesday, 16 April 2013

Doctrine of Being: Quality - Existence (1)

Division

1. Existence as such
2. Something and other, finitude
3. Qualitative infinity


Existence as Such

A. Existence in general
  • Existence is Dasiein, being (sein) in a certain place (da)
  • However, Dasein is not to be equated with a spatial phenomenon
  • Being which has nothing as both its presupposition and as its consequence, this is Dasein as simple determinateness
  • Dasein is first being as it is related negatively to other determinatenesses within itself
  • This is quality

B. Quality
  • Quality is determinateness as immediate, non-posited, and simple; this is reality
  • When the determinateness of nothing is there (with being) as equally simple, quality becomes negation
  • Each side is determinate on account of its internal relation to the other

Clarifications
  • The meaning of “reality” here is akin that as in: “the idea sounds good, but not very real” etc.
  • God as the “sum total of all realities” - which means the lack of negation – is merely a simple being on account of said lack
  • There cannot be a sum total of all realities and an equal totality of negations – rather, “reality only exists in so far as it still has over against it something which it has not sublated” (86)
  • Thus, the definition of God as a totality fails to attribute reality to Him
  • Spinoza's “omnis determinatio est negatio” is of great importance in this connection
  • For Spinoza, it was necessary to conceive of only one substance, since everything else derives its reality as a negation of the other, e.g. thought and being
    • This kind of unity leads to the Spinozian concept of infinity (more to come)
    • Since thought, being, etc. are not reality on their own account or as in-and-for-itself, Spinoza conceived them as attributes
    • Attributes are real only as sublated (by the movement of becoming)
  • Quality turns into property when it is conceived as an isolated determinateness (external to being) which is immanent to a being (thus connected)
    • Properties are independent of the beings to which they connect, but they are still rigid and unalterable
    • By comparison, determinatenesses like shape, size, etc. are not properties, but something higher, since they can assume differences within themselves (different shapes, different sizes, etc.) - more to come on this too.
  • Jacob Boheme: (In)qualierung is an apt expression of the existence of qualities, since each exists only in its qual (=torment) or internal conflict of reality and negation


C. Something
  • Distinction between qualities through their reality / negation has thus emerged within existence
  • Thus, when we return to existence out of this initial distinction, it now is “being + qualities” - it contains qualitative being
  • In this return into itself, existence is “being-in-itself” or a something
  • This is the first “negation of negation” - it allows for the existence of a something, which is neither simple reality nor its simple negation, but as the suspension of this simple negative act by a second negation of the first negation
  • The negative negates the thing itself; thus, the thing “vanishes out of sight” on its own account due to its own negativity, and it reappears in the same way, through its internal movement
    • Thought becomes a thinking being, Life becomes a living thing, through this negation of its own negativity (this is the key insight of the “Existence as Such” section)
    • This accounts for the emergence of the subject (the subject has not yet emerged fully at this point, but the seed is planted, so to speak)
    • The first, simple negation is general and indiscriminate; the second is individual, it aims at a determinate negation, which is for Hegel an “absolute negation”
    • Something is an existent as the negation of negation, for such a negation is the restoration of the simple reference to itself [note: not “return to simple being”] - but the something is thereby equally the mediation of itself with itself” (89)
    • Here, something returns into being, but this time the movement is not between pure being and pure nothing, but rather an existent and its specific negation; the latter negation, by virtue of its specific reference to an existent, is the other
    • The movement of becoming between a something and an other is alterationconcrete becoming
    • At first, alteration only takes place abstractly between two beings-in-themselves