I possess the members of my body, my life, only so long as I will to possess them. An animal cannot maim or destroy itself, but a human being can.In so far as the body is an immediate existent, it is not in conformity with spirit. If it is to be the willing organ and soul-endowed instrument of spirit, it must first be taken into possession by spirit. But from the point of view of others, I am in essence a free entity in my body while my possession of it is still immediate.But may a human take his own life? Suicide may at a first glance be regarded as an act of courage, but only the false courage of tailors and servant girls. Or again it may be looked upon as a misfortune, since it is inward distraction which leads to it. But the fundamental question is: Have I a right to take my life? The answer will be that I, as this individual, am not master of my life, because life, as the comprehensive totality of my activity, is nothing external to personality, which itself is immediately this personality. Thus when a person is said to have a right over his life, the words are a contradiction, because they mean that a person has a right over himself. But he has no such right, since he does not stand over himself and he cannot pass judgement on himself. When Hercules destroyed himself by fire and when Brutus fell on his sword, this was the conduct of a hero against his personality. But as for the simple right to suicide, this may be denied even to heroes.
Suicide is not rightful, because a body is not a property. A body is not a property, because it is the real existence of personality, and personality, as the real existence of free will, cannot become dependent upon something other than itself. This is Hegel's argument against the right to suicide in a nutshell.
There are two key premises in this argument: 1) Personality is the real existence of free will. 2) The body is the real existence of personality. Let us consider their meaning one at a time.
First, personality is the real existence of free will. Free will is the will that is free. To be free, in its most abstract, is to not depend upon other things, i.e. to be independent. This means that a desire is not a free will, since the former is a desire of something, and is thus bound to this something. In so far as the immediate relation between nature and freedom is concerned, the will is not free, for it is related to something external to itself, namely nature. The will becomes free when it related only to something that is not external to itself. This only means that the free will relates to itself. Therefore, the free will is the will that will freedom. It is this self-relating will which Hegel names "personality." Personality is real in the sense that it is consistent. Whereas non-personal forms of the will, such as desire, impulse, inclination, and so on, are concerned, they cannot qualify as the real existence of the free will, for they all contain an element of unfreedom.
Secondly, the body is the real existence of personality. Personality is the will that relates to itself, free will. This self-relation had a negative moment, namely the negation of external nature. In so far as the will is to be free will, it must necessarily stand in a negative relation to nature. This negative relation is at first abstract, for personality as such negates nature as a whole without distinction. In a Kierkegaardian manner, Hegel here argues that this negation, precisely because it is a negation of all nature, fails to negate anything, or rather, the will fails to exist concretely because it does not have a determination. It is simple negativity. But the will also is a negation of this or that external nature, for nature as such contains determination. In order to negate determinate nature, therefore, the will must itself be determinate. But personality as such lacks determination; hence, personality must become corporeal through the body. The body is personality in its particular, determinate existence. The body endowed with spirit, or the free body, carries out the determinate negation of nature that is required but not realized by the concept of the free will. In this sense, the body is the real existence of personality. A mere body, which is not penetrated by the free will, is not the real existence of personality, since it does not carry the purpose of negating natural things in their naturalness.
Based on these two premises, Hegel interprets suicide as the act of alienating my own body as if it were my private property. Hegel does not say much as to why suicide should come under the sub-section of alienation of property, but I think that this gap can be filled in the following manner. The act of suicide, in so far as it is a free act, requires two things to exist, namely the free will and the object of this will. The term "suicide" suggests that the will kills not an external other but itself, sui. However, in suicide, the agent does not literally believe that he or she is killing him or her self. Rather, the agent believes that the killer and the killed are distinct, and that by destroying him or her own body, he or she (i.e. the pure personality) is relieving him or her self of the problems associated with his or her bodily existence. In this sense, the suicidal agent is treating his or her own body as a thing, a property. Hence, the act of suicide is the act of alienating one's own body, or to voluntarily give up possessing it.
Suicide is not rightful because it is based on a false understanding of what it is actually doing. The suicidal agent believes two things. First, that the body is a property at his or her disposal. Second, that the act of suicide is a free act. The first point is false, because the body is ultimately the real existence of the agent's own free will, and so is not a property. The falsity of the second point follows from the falsity of the first point, for if the body is the real existence of the free will, then to will to destroy the body means to will to not will, which is tantamount to saying that the agent wills unfreedom. But free will is the will which wills to will. Therefore, the will to not will, i.e. the act of suicide, is not an act grounded in or following from the free will. Since suicide is not an act of free will, it is not the objective existence of the free will; hence, it is not rightful, since right is the objective existence of the free will.
The Hegelian argument against the right to commit suicide is based on the claim that suicide is not an act following from the free will. This is an interesting strategy. Usually, when confronted with the question "Is committing suicide rightful, moral, or justifiable?" one tends to think of the reasons for and against the act of committing suicide. However, by starting to think in this way, one already assumes that suicide is a free act. If suicide is not a free act, then there is no longer the question of its rightfulness, morality, justice, etc., for these questions only make sense for acts which are grounded in the free will. The above question assumes the freedom of suicide without proof, and it is this assumption that the Hegelian argument attacks.
